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RICHARD COUDENHOVE-KALERGI

FROM WAR TO PEACE

Translated from the German by





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CHAPTER ONE

PERPETUAL WAR

1. War and Peace

MAN is both peace-loving and warlike. He longs for peace, yet he is attracted by war as the moth is attracted by the flame of the candle that burns its wings.

Beneath the harmony and peace of the star-studded firmament, nature presents the spectacle of a perpetual struggle for survival—a struggle which is harsh and pittless, and which began long before the appearance of mankind and will continue long after mankind has passed away. The struggle for survival is the law of life; without it there could be no evolution; and war is a specific variety of it. War is not a human invention. Ants and termites also mobilize their armies, fight battles, and wage war. Indeed the history of the world is the history of war.

The Bible tells the story of the first world war, when, during humanity's second generation, one half of mankind fought against the other: Cain against Abel. The whole globe was open to them. They could have shared the earth between them and handed it on to their descendants. But Cain hated Abel. He killed him. Not for motives of self-interest or greed, but from envy and wickedness. The blood of Cain flows in all our veins, the blood of the first number and the first warrior.

The history of mankind begins with Cain; but war is older than mankind. Long before the creation of Adam and Eve

there had been war among the angels. The most glorious and proudest of them all, Lucifer (the bringer of light, Prometheus) had rebelled against God — from envy and from arrogance. Countless angels took part in this revolt, which was crushed only when the loyal hosts of heaven, under their supreme commander, the Archangel Michael, won a great victory in the skies. The fallen angels became devils. They were banished to Hell and to Earth. One of them, disguised as a snake, succeeded in crawling into Paradise. There he seduced Eve into tasting the forbidden fruit and persuading Adam to do likewise. Thus came about the fall from grace, and mankind was driven out of the realm of peace, expelled from Paradise. Henceforth man was to live in the world of pain, trouble, work, and war.

Man's nostalgic memory of that golden age of peace remains. It is reflected in most of the religions, in the sagas of civilized and of primitive peoples alike, and in man's continual yearning for leisure and happiness — and peace.

The belief in that former paradise is complemented by man's faith in a paradise to come. However, the future paradise will not exist here on earth, nor in the Garden of Eden, but outside our world, in the Kingdom of Heaven. The Buddhists call it Nirvana, where there is neither birth, nor death, nor desire, nor pain, nor strife, nor struggle. It is the realm of eternal peace, of eternal life — but also of eternal death. It is a world without time.

War and peace are the two political aspects of the world's eternal dualism, which is evident in the antitheses between time and space, between strength and form, between force and harmony, between man and woman. Space without struggle can be envisaged, but not time without struggle.

When time stands still there can be no development and no struggle. The concept of eternity — of timelessness — is closely connected with the idea of peace. Time means change, and change means struggle. Political struggles are usually expressed in wars, or in revolutions, which are simply internal wars.

Greek mythology discloses the relationship between time and struggle. Cronus, who was Time, overthrew his father, Uranus, who was Heaven. Thus began the age of struggle, gods against gods and men against men: it was the irruption of time into space.

2. Heroes and Saints

War and peace are personified respectively in heroes and saints.

The hero represents the ideal of the fighter, the warrior. He dies and kills for his ideals: for his faith, his god, his king, his people, his wife or his beloved, his friends, his family, his honour, his freedom, his rights. The hero is deficient in sense. Dangers do not deter him, but rather attract him. He is brave and loyal: nobody would expect him to be cautious, or clever, or wise.

The hero cult is one of the three fundamental religions of mankind; worship of the stars, and of the spirits of nature, are the other two. In Japan the hero cult provides the kernel of the official religion, Shintoism. In Europe it was an intrinsic element in all the heathen religions, Greek, Roman and Teuton. Christianity officially substituted, for the cult of the hero, the cult of the saint; but the ideals of the older faith live on.

Everywhere and at all times the hero provides the ideal

for the best in youth: boys dream of becoming heroes, girls dream of being loved by heroes. World literature, from the *Iliad* and the 'Edda' to yesterday's adventure story, has accepted and preached the cult of the hero. So has the theatre, from the period of the Greek and Japanese tragedies to the present. In its primitive fashion the cinema apes the stage as a temple of the hero cult: it exalts the hero in all his diversity, as adventurer, or soldier, or gangster, or detective. For the cinema is beyond good and evil, tailored to suit the instincts of the masses, and these instincts demand that the male be strong and brave, the female gentle and beautiful. 'Sex-appeal', shown thus by the cinema, acts as the lodestar for the higher development of mankind: it obeys aesthetic, not ethical, laws: it accepts as an article of faith that the hero is the link between man and the demigod, between the demigod and the god.

This hero cult is ineradicable, for its roots lie deep in human nature. So long as there are young people, they will honour and admire heroes. The end of the hero cult would mean the end of our culture. But while the cult does honour to mankind, it is a threat to mankind as well: for it has been one of the principal sources of the perpetuation of war.

As the hero is the man of war, so the saint is the man of peace. The peace that is in his heart shines through his eyes: he is at peace with God, with his fellow men, and with all creation. He too is a fighter, he too is brave and strong; but he fights not against his fellows, nor even against dragons and wild beasts, but rather against the evil instincts and passions within himself—against greed, the lust for power or glory, the gratification of the senses. The saint is a hero whose heroism is directed inwards. He is ready to die for his ideals, but not to kill for

them. He is a pacifist, because his heart is filled with peace and the love of peace, and he would share this peace with the world around him; therefore war is abhorient to him. But since the days of Alexander the Great, true heroes and great warriors have honoured the saints, for they have recognized that the saints were enlightened heroes and therefore of the same essence as themselves.

Buddhism and Christianity have attempted to replace the cult of the hero with the cult of the saint, and to banish the former; but they have failed to do so, for the saint and the hero complement each other, as the love of peace complements martial ardour. If all human beings were to become saints there would be no more wars: but humanity would case to exist.

3. Sceptres and Crouns

The sceptre is the royal symbol of war, the crown the symbol of peace. The sceptre is the staff that man strikes his foe with; it is the precursor of the sword, of power over life and death. The crown is the halo materialized, the symbol of that golden aura that includes the brows of the elect.

Haloes are visible only to sensitive persons who have long accustomed their eyes to darless. It would seem that, owing to modern methods of artificial lighting, the ability to observe them has almost ceased to exist. But belief in the glow that surrounds the brows of great men lives on among all races: in the haloes of Buddhist and Christian's ints; in the tongues of flame that Michelangelo painted bout the head of Moses. The crown of royalty is not the only symbol of this aura; it appears also in the laurel wreath of the poet, marking him as a genius,

and one of the elect. The aura, and thus the crown, is a symbol of dignity, of authority, of majesty. It is mastery through the power inherent in man's personality.

The king grasps the sceptre in his hand and wears the crown upon his head, for in him are united the twin bases of the state: power and justice. He is both the supreme war lord and the highest judge. The sceptre symbolizes royal power, the crown royal justice, for every state is simultaneously an apparatus for power and an apparatus for justice: without justice, the state would be nothing but a robber band, and without power, nothing but a legal debating society.

This dualism of power and justice can be traced back to the dual origin of the state, which derives both from the horde and from the family.

The horde is the human version of the wolf pack. A mature, strong wolf defeats his rivals one by one, until the whole pack accepts his leadership. Such a community of fighting beasts gets its members more booty than they could hope to get as individuals. This is equally true of human hordes; they not only safeguard their own hunting grounds and pastures, but also seize new hunting grounds and pastures for the horde when the old are exhausted. They wage wars.

The family, the other precursor of the state, serves among animals to break the bonds of egoism. The mother cares and fights for her young; birds with a nest of chicks do not swallow the worms they have caught, but fly with them to their fledgelings. In primitive races the mother shares out the food among her children, whom she trains, rewards and punishes: she is the first judge. Families come together to form septs, septs to form tribes, tribes to form states.

The state is a mixture of the family and the horde. Every state, even today, wears this double mask of Janus: it is an organization for justice, and an organization for power: a community of peace, and a camp of war.

4. Struggle and War

Any attempt to do away with struggle as the basis of life would be Utopian and senseless. The fundamental political problem nowadays is to substitute some other method of struggle in the place of war.

History is the story of the endless change in human relationships, the rise and fall of living organisms, of states, of peoples, of classes, of religions, of civilizations. This rise and fall rarely comes by peaceful development; sometimes it comes by revolution, usually by war.

The invention of the atomic bomb opens a new chapter in the history of war. At a moment when war seemed to flourish as never before, it is suddenly nipped in the blossom, as it were, by the advances of technical science. To change the metaphor, war has now reached a dead end. Wars have suddenly become senseless. Their eternal purpose, victory, is rendered meaningless, since an atomic war would leave no victors but only vanquished on both sides, and would mean annihilation, not only for the defeated but for all humanity.

If man were a sensible being the invention of the atomic bomb would strike the death-knell for the age of wars. Unfortunately man is not sensible is controlled by his instincts, his ideals, his passions, his imagination. Reason can act merely as an adviser — and one whose advice is only too frequently

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ignored. Therefore the senselessness of war is no adequate ground for its abolition. Only people so naive as to believe that mankind is rational can be duped into imagining that the invention of the atomic bomb will automatically mark the end of the age of wars. A war fought with hydrogen bombs would be as senseless as a duel fought at close range with sticks of dynamite. A monarch who attempted to put an end to duelling by making a law that duels might only be fought with sticks of dynamite, would soon be sadly disillusioned. Duelling would it is true become rare in his country, but there would always be a few people ready to avenge their sullied honour by means of a double suicide.

Experience of these last few years reinforces these pessimistic conclusions. It would have been logical to expect that the production of hydrogen bombs by the Soviet Union would mark the end of war propaganda in the United States; but quite the opposite occurred. Influential American politicians attempted to persuade their government that it should solve the Formosa problem by dropping atomic bombs on Chinese cities — accepting the risk that the Russians, in reprisal, might well drop atomic bombs on the industrial centres of America.

No power on earth can prevent the employment of atomic and hydrogen bombs in a third world war. Even if it were possible in peacetime to prohibit the production of atomic weapons by means of an agreement supervised by international control, the moment war broke out there would be a race between the belligerents to produce the hydrogen bomb first. Each would attempt to anticipate the other in dropping the bomb, each must try to annihilate the other before he is him-

self annihilated. No sort of parallel can be drawn with the fact that the prohibition of poison gases was observed by both sides during the Second World War. Had Hitler believed that the dropping of gas bombs would have brought the war to a victorious conclusion, no signed document would have stopped him from ordering it to be done.

Those who would avoid an atomic war must work to prevent a third world war. All else is self-deception, and deception of one's fellow men.

5. Substitutes for War

The prevention of war implies the substitution in its place of other means of struggle.

Mahatma Gandhi dared to attempt this—and was triumphant. By so doing he opened a new page in the book of history. Instead of employing the means of bloody revolution, as was done throughout the millenniums, he had the original idea—the idea of a genius—of carrying out a revolution with the bloodless weapon of passive resistance: and the people of India were sufficiently disciplined to follow him along this novel path.

Unfortunately such methods are not capable of universal application. The success of the bloodless revolution is due not only to Gandhi's human greatness and the discipline of his Indian followers, but also to the generosity and magnanimity of British policy. Gandhi's methods would have failed had India been a colony of the Third Reich: for Hitler's reply to India's passive resistance would have been terrorization of the most atrocious sort, and the Indians would have been

confronted with the choice of abandoning their ambition for freedom, or scrapping passivity as the means to achieve that end.

At various times and in various lands attempts have been made to substitute duelling for war. The most celebrated of these duels was the one between the Horatii and the Curiatii, in the early Roman period. In comparatively modern times, it was suggested by Charles V and Francis I that the differences between Spain and France be decided by a duel between the monarchs, but after years of negotiation this highly original plan finally broke down as a result of apparently insoluble problems of etiquette.

A far more constructive idea was that of substituting marriages for wars. This magnificent concept came from the brain of the Emperor Maximilian I of Austria. He found his views reciprocated by Queen Isabella of Castile and her husband, Ferdinand of Aragon. By a marriage of their children, they founded a European power such as the world had not seen since the days of Charlemagne. Through a succession of marriages, and not through wars, the House of Habsburg succeeded in uniting half Europe: and this method might well have succeeded eventually in making all Europe subject to a single monarchy had it not been for the Salic Law in France, which laid down that succession could only be through males and which therefore rendered France's incorporation into a supermonarchy by marriage an impossibility. Only on a single occasion would it have been possible to merge the House of Habsburg with the House of Bourbon. This was at the time when there was no male Habsburg heir. Had Louis XV then married Maria Theresa, Europe would have been united.

Unfortunately republics have not yet found any means of



merging their peoples other than by war. During the Second World War Churchill attempted to arrange a 'marriage' between the British and French peoples. This plan for a union came to nothing, and it was not resurrected when the war was over.

The best proved means of avoiding wars are courts of arbitration; their disadvantage is that sovereign states will not submit to arbitration when vital interests are at stake — they prefer an appeal to arms, despite the danger that such an appeal may go against them. Only states forming part of a federation will accept the compulsory authority of a court of arbitration or decisions made by a federal court.

One need not be a prophet to foresee that negroid Africa, despite all the blessings it has received from Western civilization, will not tolerate white domination indefinitely. Within the predictable future, therefore, the mastery of the white races over the Black Continent will cease. The question is not whether, but when and how, these changes will be brought about: whether by war or revolution, through passive resistance or plebiscites, as a result of the pressure of world opinion or of a voluntary withdrawal by the colonial powers.

For the wheel of history can be delayed, but cannot be stopped. If necessary developments are not allowed to happen bloodlessly, then they will be extorted at the cost of human life, that is to say by war or by revolution: for so long as no supranational authority exists capable of enforcing its decisions, the abolition of war can have no more meaning than to substitute revolution in the place of war.

6. The Elixir of Life

During the Middle Ages alchemists in both Europe and Asia searched for the philosophers' stone, for that secret elixir of life that would bring immortality to mortal man. After bitter disappointments the alchemists were forced to admit that they had failed to find the philosophers' stone: that there was no elixir: that all men must die: that a limit was set to each man's life.

From this failure, modern medicine is sprung — the science of protracting life. Instead of hunting for the philosophers' stone, doctors ceaselessly search for new ways and means of curing illness. They have abandoned the struggle against the inevitability of death, and have adopted the more modest and more realistic target of attempting to prolong the life of man. In its fight against death, medical science can win battles but can never win the war. Even though the doctors succeed in saving a patient's life ten times over, eventually death will conquer life and all the science of medicine. The modern medical attitude is one of optimism against a background of pessimism. Medical science fights on, though she knows that her ultimate defeat is certain. Yet by so doing she helps humanity. She prolongs life, she overcomes disease, she lessens pain. The services she has rendered mankind are incomparably greater than those performed by the alchemists.

The same transformation from alchemy to medicine must now be carried out by the pacifists. They must cease looking for the magic formula, 'Eternal Peace', for that is the political equivalent of the philosophers' stone. Like everything else here on earth, peace is mortal. But it is possible, through wise policy, to protract its life by generations.

The last will-o'-the-wisp of eternal peace was the League of Nations. In those days thousands of young Americans fought on the battlefields of Europe in the illusory belief that the war they were engaged in was history's last, that by the creation of the League of Nations the era of wars would be ended for ever. This will-o'-the-wisp resulted in the disarmament of the victors, the rise of Hitler, and the Second World War. When the United Nations Organization was founded there was talk of peace, it is true, but no longer of eternal peace. That beautiful illusion had fled.

Only with the appearance of the atomic bomb did the world begin once again to speak of eternal peace. The atomic bomb seemed to be the philosophers' stone, which made war impossible and ensured a lasting peace. But this too is an illusion. In every age, men have allowed themselves to be tortured, broken on the wheel, and burned alive, for the sake of an ideal or an illusion. Men of this sort will not be restrained by fear of atomic bombs. Even the annihilation of the human race may appear to many to be less a threat than a hope, promising as it does the final liberation of the world from this earthly vale of tears.

The atomic bomb is not the elixir of life for peace — but it is the strongest weapon in the hands of the pacifists. If properly employed, this weapon can ensure a long period of peace, a peaceful epoch embracing generations; and what our age demands is not eternal peace, but the assurance of a period of world-wide peace of maximum duration.

History can show periods of peace that have lasted for generations and even centuries. In the past, both large and small countries have enjoyed such epochs. Today, owing to the

development of modern means of transportation and communication, the whole globe has become one great unit, and instead of countries or continents at peace, what is needed now is world peace.

The problem is to organize such a world peace by recognizing and dealing with the specific perils that can lead to war. Meanwhile the next generation must be trained to carry on this work for peace after our death. If we can only succeed in banishing the danger of an atomic war for two generations by a realistic policy of peace, we can rely upon our grandsons to toss the ball of peace on to their own grandsons.

It is not possible at present to exert any direct influence on the politics of the twenty-first century. By then there will have been new discoveries and new ideas which may contribute to world peace but equally may work against it. But this is no excuse for resignation, rather it is a reason for getting down to work. A doctor does not abandon his struggle against a disease because he knows that his patient must die eventually in any case. Statesmen and politicians should regard themselves as humanity's doctors, and as the protectors of peace. Their practical aim should be to prolong the era of peace that began with the ending of the Second World War, so that it will endure for the span of generations.

This realistic aspect of pacifism requires a new interpretation of history. It is fundamentally wrong to regard wars as episodic interruptions of long or short duration, in a normal state of affairs which is peace. On the contrary, periods of peace are in fact neither more nor less than oases in a desert of perpetual war. The stuff of world history is war, and indeed the natural state of human society is war. Periods of peace are

the creation of men, works of art based upon political equilibrium. Most so-called peace treaties have been nothing more than armistice agreements, made in order to prepare for new battles.

This book depicts the history of mankind's major wars, of the great periods of peace, and of past attempts to ensure peace. For the past is the school for the future, and history teaches politics. Events and situations never recur, but resemblances do. Only he who understands the past can dare to interpret the future, to hope for the future, to master the future.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ORIGINS OF WARS

1. Offensive and Defensive Wars

ARS come about when powers collide, or ideas or human beings are in conflict. A great war may last for centuries, embracing many generations of men; and it ends only when the cause of the war has become irrelevant, owing to changed conditions. The analysis of the history of war shows that only rarely has a monarch or a statesman deliberately started a great war, and that so far as most such wars are concerned it is more useful to look for the causes than to attempt to establish war guilt.

Of the great European wars, those fought against the Huns, the Avars, the Magyars, the Saracens, the Turks and the Russians were continental defensive wars. Although the Persian War began as a war of liberation, it was basically a war of power; so too were the Punic War, the Anglo-French War, the Sea War, the Habsburg-Bourbon War, and the war between France and Germany. On the other hand the wars between Emperors and Popes, between Catholics and Protestants, between supporters of the legitimacy principle and those who favoured the self-determination of nations, were all ideological wars.

Nothing is more difficult than to establish the guilt for these wars. Were the Persians responsible for their war, because they subdued the Greeks of Asia Minor living within their zone, or were the Greeks to blame for attempting to liberate their oppressed kinsmen? Were the Carthaginians responsible

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for the Punic War, or were the Romans? When the Goths were driven from their homelands by the Huns, what choice had they but to invade the Roman Empire? Were the English to blame for the three hundred years war, or were the French? Should Popes or Emperors have given up their claim to the heritage of the Caesars without a fight? Could the Catholics have reconciled their consciences to a surrender of Europe to Protestantism—and similarly could the Protestants with a clear conscience have failed to resist the counter-reformation? And ought the champions of European liberty to have accepted the shackles of reaction, instead of fighting against the reactionaries?

Naive pacifists believe that they have discovered the key to world peace: they would prohibit offensive wars, with the additional safeguard that all the nations of the world should be obliged to come to the assistance of any state that was the victim of aggression. These pacifists ignore the fact that only rarely is it possible to identify the aggressor, since wars are usually collisions and not attempts at murder. Frequently the technical aggressor is morally the defendant, and vice versa. It is often the defendant who declares war, not the real aggressor: in the Second World War, France and Great Britain, as the allies of Poland, declared war before Germany did so.

2. Wars of Liberation

The classification of all wars as offensive or defensive overlooks the fact that there is a sort of hybrid, the war of liberation. Wars of liberation are in appearance offensive wars, in essence defensive wars against a frozen and chronic aggression,

that of the oppressor. Only when oppression has ceased does the danger of a war of liberation vanish. For no world-wide agreement can ever deprive the oppressed of his fundamental right to free himself by force if all other methods have proved invalid in his quest for liberty. And no one can blame the friends and relatives of the oppressed if they support him in this struggle for freedom.

The Balkan War of 1913 was a typical war of liberation. The Balkan Christians were unquestionably the aggressors. They attacked the Turks in order to free their oppressed kinsmen in Macedonia, Albania and Thrace.

During the Thirty Years War the Swedes attacked in defence of the German Protestants, the Spaniards as defenders of the German Catholics.

The communist peoples regard their fellows outside the Iron Curtain as the victims of capitalist oppression—while the capitalist world is firmly convinced that communism is a system of total oppression. Both are playing with the idea of a war of liberation. Such thoughts could become grimly serious should a war of liberation actually break out on one side or the other of the Iron Curtain.

The problem of world peace is therefore indissolubly linked with the question of oppression. Wars can only cease when oppression also has ceased. But a form of government under which nobody feels oppressed has yet to be invented.

3. Preventive Wars

It has happened over and over again in the history of the world: somewhere deep in the forest a gamekeeper and a

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poacher come face to face, and each attempts to shoot the other before the other can shoot him: thus does each try to save his own life. Such an incident, transferred to the national level, is called preventive war.

The question of the justification of preventive wars corresponds to the problem of the individual's right to self-defence. Should this right be invoked only when the highwayman has already fired his gun? Or when he draws his gun? Or when he reaches for it? The answer must depend upon the circumstances—as for individuals, so for the state. Preventive war is a means of defence against a threatening attack; again a defensive war in the guise of an offensive war.

The First World War was a preventive war on the part of Austria-Hungary. The nationalist theory had undermined the monarchy. It was still held together by the personal authority of its great ruler, in whose reign most of his subjects had been born — he was the Father of the People — but it was only to be expected that with the death of Franz Joseph, the state crisis that had been simmering since 1848 would boil over. So long as the intelligent, experienced and energetic heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, lived, there was at least a slight hope that he would succeed in overcoming this pending crisis by reforms to the structure of the state; but his murder at Sarajevo put an end to such a hope. Austria-Hungary was still a great power, her army and administration still intact. Vienna and Berlin were agreed that there would be less risk in an immediate war than in postponing the crisis until the death of Franz Joseph and having to face the attendant revolutionary activity. So Austria dispatched an ultimatum to Serbia, and began a world war. When Russia mobilized, Germany declared war

against her. History has passed a harsh judgment upon this particular preventive war, which failed to postpone the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy.

On the other hand history has also condemned the Western Powers because they did not launch a preventive war against Hitler, at a time when such a war would have amounted to a parade and might have prevented the Second World War. When Hitler informed the Western Powers, in that he no longer regarded himself as bound by the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty, MacDonald, Laval and Mussolini met at Stresa. Mussolini proposed an immediate preventive war, with the purpose of rendering the Third Reich innocuous before its massive rearmament got under way. MacDonald and Laval turned down this proposal: their democratic peoples would march only when they had first been attacked. Mussolini drew his own conclusions: he took the risk of attacking Abyssinia, and prepared to become Hitler's ally.

A third world war has every prospect of beginning as a preventive war. The military experts are all agreed that in the age of the hydrogen bomb it is the first battle that will decide the outcome of the war, not, as in the old days, the last.

Paradoxically, preventive war can be neither banned nor permitted. Banning preventive war would mean placing a premium upon aggression, for the aggressor would have nothing to fear while preparing for his offensive operations. Permitting preventive war would mean throwing open the gate to every sort of aggressive attack. The only constructive solution to this dilemma lies in the organization of a world state, which would protect all its members against the threat of aggression and thus make the question of preventive war irrelevant.

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4. Economic Wars

Shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, the celebrated English economist and pacifist, Norman Angell, published a remarkable book, *The Great Illusion*. By facts and figures he proved that all wars, including victorious ones, are in the final reckoning bad business. Many pacifists hoped that this revelation would prevent future wars, since nobody willingly invests his money in an enterprise doomed to failure.

These optimists were arguing from the false premise that most wars are fundamentally economic wars, decked out with a political or ideological façade. An analysis of the great European wars shows the contrary to be the case: economic matters play a purely secondary part in relation to questions of power and ideological conflicts.

Economic motives often have a contributory role, but what is decisive are problems of power relations—between individuals, cliques, nations, empires—or ideological questions. Alexander the Great would have set off on his Persian campaign even though Aristotle had shown him that his plan to to conquer Persia was a poor and risky business undertaking.

5. Wars of Faith

Many people believe that the age of wars of faith is past. They are mistaken.

The bloodiest of all the wars of the nineteenth century was a war of religion: the Taiping Rebellion (1850-66). A Chinese visionary founded a new religion, a hybrid of Christianity and Confucianism, he declared himself to be the Son of God and a

younger brother of Christ, and large parts of China accepted him with enthusiasm. The Peking government proved incapable of mastering this rebellious movement, until finally England intervened, and General Gordon put down the uprising. The new sect was wiped out by the Chinese with the same thoroughness with which the crusaders of Simon de Montfort had once eliminated the Albigensi of southern France. In the course of this Taiping Rebellion, some twenty million persons are said to have died in battle, by massacre, through hunger or from disease: more, that is, than in all the Napoleonic Wars: more than in the First World War.

One generation later a religious war broke out in Africa (1885-98). It began in the Sudan, with the appearance of a man who proclaimed that he was the Mahdi, as prophesied in the Koran. He set ablaze a great political and religious movement among his compatriots, which was crushed only after heavy loss, by British and Egyptian troops.

For many of the men who fought for freedom during the course of the nineteenth century, their struggle for liberty and for national unity was a war of faith in modern dress. The same is true today for many twentieth-century communists. Bolshevism has not only a political and an economic aspect, but a religious one as well, and it may be that Lenin will one day be counted among the great founders of religions. For Bolshevism has its holy book (*Das Kapital*), its missionaries and martyrs, its Church (the Party), with the usual appendages of a theology, an inquisition, and an index of forbidden books: and it is in this pseudo-religious character that the danger of Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik crusades lies.

In addition to its political nature, the Second World War

THE ORIGINS OF WARS

had an ideological character. Three ideologies confronted one another: Western democracy, which is rooted in Christendom; Russian Bolshevism; and the German ideology of race. With the collapse of National Socialism, Western democracy and Bolshevism found themselves face to face in the 'Cold War'.

We are now experiencing a phenomenon that recalls that of the Thirty Years War, only in reverse. The Thirty Years War began as a religious war, but in the course of a generation changed into a political war. The World War began, in 1914, as a political war, but after four decides it has become an ideological war, in which it is not now nations that stand opposed to one another but philosophies of life. At the beginning of the Thirty Years War a German Protestant felt closer to his Swedish co-religionists than to the German Catholics; similarly today, an anti-communist Chinese on Formosa feels closer to the Americans than to his communist compatriots on the mainland. In a third world war most of the Western communists would welcome the defeat of their own countries and the triumph of communism.

It may be that the 'deological contradictions that divide the world today will gradually disappear; or it may happen that they become more rigid, in which case the world is moving towards one of its grimmest causes and catastrophes, a pitiless war of faith fought between two hostile philosophies of life.

CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORY OF MAJOR WARS

I. Asiatic Wars

THE idea of a European continent is a product of European megalomania. For there is no continent of Europe, but only a European peninsula and a European culture.

The great continent of Asia (which out of politeness to Europe is often referred to as the Eurasian continent) has given birth to four great cultures: the Chinese, the Indian, that of the Near East, and that of the West. In the midst of these cultural regions lies the great steppe, a sea of grass, separating and connecting them.

Persia was the kernel of the Near East. Frontier disputes and cultural relations between that country and Europe were incessant: and this was true also of that country and India. East Asia remained isolated from the other cultures, just as India was isolated from Europe; but, as the Near East provided the cradle for Christianity, the religion of Europe, so was India the cradle of Buddhism, the religion of the Far East — though, as the Near East ceased to be Christian itself, so India abandoned Buddhism.

The boundless steppe extends from Manchuria to southern Russia. Encircling it there arose the great civilizations that cultivated the soil, built cities, created industries, and indulged in luxury. Meanwhile within the steppe the nomads continued to live their hard and harsh existence, unobserved throughout

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the revolutions of the ages, with their horses and their herds of cattle. When they saw the rich lives led by the citizens of the encircling civilizations, they felt themselves to be the world's outcasts. Thus came about the endless cultural and class struggle between the nomads and the tillers of the land.

Again and again the semi-anarchic steppe assembled under mighty leaders and set out to plunder the world of civilization. For the eternal ambition of the steppe is to devastate the cultured regions, that is to say to bring cultivated land back to steppe and desert again. The nomads fall upon the cities like robber bands, murdering, pillaging, burning, raping. They do this for reasons not of self-interest, but of fury. They hate civilized man as the wild and hungry wolf hates the tame and well-fed dog — from the bottom of their hearts. But when they succeed in capturing a civilized region, their children and grandchildren fall under the spell of the hereditary enemy. They cease to be nomads, and become farmers or citizens. They break with the traditions of the steppe. They become soft. Then new hordes pour forth from the steppe, and the story begins again.

The whole history of China is concerned with this struggle between the civilized people vithin China and the nomadic peoples to the north. The struggle begins with the foundation of the Hun Empire on the borders of China, a thousand years before our era, and ends with the capture of China by the Manchus in the seventeenth century and these periodic invasions from the north were the reason for the frequent dismemberment of the Chinese Empire.

Persia and India too had to defend themselves over and over again, against the irruption of barbarians from the north — not

always nomads, but frequently wild mountain tribes, toughened by the struggle against a cruel and parsimonious environment and attracted by the warm and luscious south. But the most dangerous invaders both of Persia and of India came not from the north but from the south-west, from Arabia. It was the Arab whirlwind that made Persia part of Islam, and split India in two halves, Mohammedan and Hindu, a religious division which in our own generation has torn liberated India asunder. In addition to these invasions from north and south, the history of Persia is filled with frontier wars against Romans, Arabs, Byzantines and Turks, and that of India with the struggles between her own princes and kings.

Only in modern times did the great war between Europe and Asia begin. Europe became mistress of the seas. Europeans rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and landed — in 1598 — in India. Portuguese, Frenchmen and Englishmen settled firmly in India, and eventually the whole country was a British colony. The Philippines became Spanish, Indonesia Dutch, Russia conquered the great steppe and encircled China in the north; and nothing but the mutual jealousy of the European colonial powers saved the independence of China and Persia.

It was not until 1904 that Asia began to launch her counter-offensive, which was marked by the Russo-Japanese War and the victory of the Japanese army and navy. The Battle of Tsushima, 1905, in which the Japanese destroyed the Russian fleet, is a turning-point in history, comparable to the Battle of Salamis, the destruction of the Spanish Armada and the Battle of Trafalgar. Four years earlier the Chinese Empire had suffered its deepest humiliation, when an international punitive force under German leadership put down the Boxer Rising. Now,

under the impact of the defeat inflicted upon Europeans by the Japanese, Asia awoke to a new consciousness of herself.

In 1911 the Manchu dynasty, which because of its conservatism was a hindrance to Chinese revival, was overthrown. During the long years of revolution, which were accompanied by the struggle against Japanese attempts at domination, China accomplished her liberation; and today she faces the Soviet Union and the great powers of Europe as an equal. India is freed from British rule, and so are Burma and Ceylon. The Philippines and Indonesia demand and get their independence: so, after a long struggle, does Vietnam. Persia shakes off Russo-British tutelage. Turkey becomes a great modern power, and the Arab world, liberated from the Osmanli yoke, plays an ever greater role in world politics.

This revolution of Asia against Europe is among the most important events of the twentieth century. It was rendered possible only by the lack of unity among the European powers, which had in modern times conquered the globe but proved incapable of maintaining their control. How this lack of unity came about is explained by an analysis of the history of European wars.

2. The Greco-Persian War (500-331 B.C.)

The first four great wars of European history were fought against Asia and Africa. They were the Persian War, the Punic War, the Migration of the Peoples, and the Saracen War.

The Greco-Persian War begins (500 B.C.) with the rebellion of the Greeks of Asia Minor, led by Miletus, against the Persian King Darius. After five years of heavy fighting the

rebellion was crushed and Miletus destroyed. But Darius was aware that the Greek cities could never have put up so stubborn a resistance had they not been supported by the Greeks of Europe, so he determined to conquer Greece. The possession of that peninsula would ensure his mastery of the Mediterranean: for the sea power that controlled the western Mediterranean, Carthage, was a colony of Phoenicia, itself a satellite of Persia.

The war in Europe begins in 490 B.C., with a Persian commando raid on Attica. Darius certainly did not plan to conquer Greece by means of this naval engagement, he wished only to intimidate the Greeks and encourage them to sue for terms. But the Persian fleet was forced to retire, with nothing accomplished. Athenian propaganda extolled this 'Battle of Marathon' as an event of historic significance, and it is generally accepted so, even today. The real war began ten years later, when Darius's son, Xerxes, advanced into Attica with an army. His navy was defeated at Salamis in 480 B.C., his army a year later at Plataca. Sparta and Athens, leading a navy supplied by a coalition of the Greek states, immediately launched a counter-offensive. They liberated the islands and small coastal cities of Asia Minor, and their victories resulted in the Peace of Kallias in 448 B.C., which gave autonomy to the islands and cities.

Where Persian arms had failed, Persian diplomacy succeeded. Instead of attempting once again to conquer Greece, the Persian kings relied on damaging Greek power by fomenting Greek disunity. The policy they now pursued in regard to Greece was exactly that which was to be followed in later centuries by the Romans in dealing with the Teutons, and the French with the Germans. The result was a temporary cessation of the Persian

War, which however was replaced by an endless series of wars between the Greek city-states themselves, above all between Sparta and Athens, and the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) between these two Greek cities ended with the total overthrow of Athens. After further Greek fratricidal wars the 'King's Peace' of 386 B.C. was arranged: the Greeks of Asia Minor were once again subjects of Persia, while the Persian king guaranteed the mutual independence of the cities of metropolitan Greece. A Greek alliance against Persia was thereby rendered impossible. Persia, by acting as the arbiter in Greek internal affairs, had thus won the war — without even having to continue fighting.

Half a century later came the reaction. Greece was conquered and united by Philip of Macedon. His son, Alexander the Great, generalissimo of the united Greeks, conquered the Persian Empire (334-330 B.C.), and attempted to amalgamate Greece and Persia politically and culturally. This was the end of the Greco-Persian War: it was also the end of the Persian Empire — and of Greek freedom.

3. The Punic War (264-146 B.C.)

The collapse of the empire of Alexander led to the emergence of three great powers in the eastern Mediterranean: Macedonia (which included Greece), Syria, and Egypt. These were faced by two great western Mediterranean powers: ancient Carthage, and young Rome. In a series of wars, Rome had by this time succeeded in conquering the whole Italian peninsula.

Such a balance of five powers could not endure. The Roman

and the Carthaginian spheres of influence clashed in Sicily. This resulted in the First Punic War (264-241 B.C.). Rome, with its people's army of Italian peasants, proved superior to the Carthaginian mercenaries on land. At sea, on the other hand, Carthage, the daughter of Phoenician Tyre, held the mastery against the Romans. Nevertheless Rome conquered at sea through the invention of the grapnel, which transformed naval engagements into land battles. When peace was agreed, Carthage had to sacrifice Sicily, which then became a Roman colony.

A period of peace lasting twenty-three years ensued, before the opening of the Second Punic War; it was used by both sides to strengthen their positions in the Mediterranean in preparation for the decisive struggle. Rome seized Sardinia and Corsica as well as the Po valley in Cisalpine Gaul. Carthage meanwhile founded a colonial empire in Spain, where the principal attraction was the silver mines. This plan originated with the Carthaginian general, Hamilcar Barca, who personally put it into effect. The conquest of Spain restored the former balance of power in the Mediterranean. It was probably Hamilcar's intention to circumvent the superior Roman navy and to attack Rome overland from Spain. With the purpose of hindering the advance of Carthage, Rome allied herself with the Spanish city of Saguntum. After the early death of Hamilcar, his son Hannibal took over command of the expeditionary force and simultaneously inherited his father's political aims. He attacked Saguntum, which he captured and destroyed. Rome declared war (218 B.C.).

While Rome was preparing an expedition against Spain and an invasion of North Africa, Hannibal marched his veteran

army with its elephants over the Pyrenees, across southern France and the Alps and down into the Po valley, where he was greeted by the Gallic inhabitants as their liberator from the Romans. He received reinforcements from all sides, and won battle after battle, and during his victorious progress through Italy more and more Italian towns declared for him. His victory in the great Battle of Cannae (216 B.C.) seemed to decide the outcome of the war. The larger part of the Roman army was destroyed. Rome's allies in southern Italy deserted her.

At this moment Rome was saved by the unconquerable spirit of her people — even as in our own generation England was saved by her rocklike bravery after the Dunkirk catastrophe. Instead of laying siege to Rome, Hannibal, who was receiving only inadequate support from Carthage, decided to withdraw his decimated army into winter quarters in Capua. The demoralizing luxury of southern Italy acted like a poison on his troops. One year after the Battle of Cannae, Rome went over to the offensive. An outstanding statesman and general was found, in the person of Publius Cornelius Scipio. Scipio landed in North Africa and defeated Hannibal at the decisive Battle of Zama (202 B.C.).

The peace that followed set the seal on this defeat. Carthage ceased to exist as a great power — for ever. Carthage was unable to prevent the Romans from defeating her Macedonian and Syrian allies one after the other and thus establishing herself as mistress of the Mediterranean.

Though powerless, Carthage still remained the greatest and richest trading city in the west. Rome feared her economic strength and was determined to destroy her. The Third Punic

War (149-146 B.C.) was a desperate defensive war fought by a single city against a world power. It ended with the annihilation of Carthage, and the surviving Carthaginians were led away into slavery. The duel between Rome and Carthage was over. The balance of five Mediterranean powers was succeeded by the Roman Imperium.

4. The Migration of the Peoples

The wars of the migration were loosed by three successive waves of Asiatic nomads who invaded Europe: first came the Huns, then the Avars, and finally the Magyars. One after another, these three tribes of Turkish horsemen conquered Hungary — which is the westernmost extension of the great steppe. The Hungarian plain, being guarded by mountains on all sides, constitutes a fortress not easily reduced, and inside it the nomads could live their normal life, tending their horses and cattle and preparing for their future campaigns.

Their aim was probably not the occupation, but only the conquest, of Europe. The settled nations should then pay them tribute and obey their orders. When such tribute and obedience were withheld, the nomads sent out punitive expeditions to massacre and devastate. These nomads were pirates of the dry land; they ruled by blackmail rather than by occupation. Their punitive expeditions covered great distances, even penetrating deep into France; nevertheless it is impossible to say what were the boundaries of their empire, since many peoples who cannot be regarded as vassals of the nomads paid them tribute, to avoid being plundered in their punitive campaigns.

The Hunnish horde (A.D. 375-453) was the first wave of the migration of the peoples. For centuries the great empire of the Huns had threatened the western borders of China: now they had moved westwards until they came up against the frontier of the Roman Empire. This Hunnish migration brought about, by means of a chain reaction, the movement of the Germanic tribes which was to have far greater effects on Europe than those caused directly by the Huns.

Goths, Vandals, Burgundians, Franks, Suabians, Alemanni, together with such non-Germanic tribes as the Alans, were pushed steadily and irresistibly westwards and southwards by the Huns. They sought refuge within the boundaries of the Roman Empire. The Romans gave them sanctuary, handing over whole provinces and territories, in exchange for which they expected to receive their assistance in the defence of Rome against the Huns. The Germanic tribes were politically disunited. Some allied themselves with the Romans against the Huns, others with the Huns against the Romans — until the day when the Huns withdrew, and they could parcel out the western Roman Empire among themselves.

The history books tell us how the Hunnish horde was finally smashed at the battle of the Catalaunian plains. This venerable communiqué is quite obviously an historic lie. On one of their plundering experitions the Huns had penetrated as far as Orléans. The Romans and their allies planned to cut off their retreat to Hungary in the neighbourhood of Châlons-sur-Marne; but the Huns succeeded in foiling this manœuvre by fighting, and winning, a break-through battle (452). It was the Huns and not the Romans who won this encounter between the nations. One year later Attila burst into Italy and

plundered the Po valley, possibly with the intention of pressing on to Rome; and it was only the death of Attila that led to the collapse of the Hunnish horde, just as the death of Alexander had marked the end of the Alexandrine conquests.

The Hunnish Empire disintegrated among a welter of dynastic quarrels, and the Germanic tribes assumed the supremacy the Huns had now lost. The Huns withdrew into Russia, and it was a hundred and fifty years before they reappeared in Europe: when at last they did so they were known as 'Bulgars'. But before this, about the year 550, another tribe of Asiatic horsemen, the Avars, had irrupted into Hungary.

The Avars' expeditions in search of plunder reached from the Balkans to France. Their policy was the same as that of the Huns. Unlike the Huns and the Magyars, the Avars disappeared from history, but before they did so their attacks too started a chain reaction which led to the capture of northern Italy by the Langobardi and the foundation of the Lombard kingdom. Protected by the Avars, the Slavs migrated into central and south-eastern Europe. The Avars, a nomadic race of conquerors, despised work, but they tolerated the settlement of Slav groups in the devastated areas about the Hungarian plain.

The empire of the Avars collapsed when Europe became united under Charlemagne. A united West launched a campaign into Hungary and destroyed the Avar power (796). This clash would probably have had a different outcome if the Avars had previously embraced Islam. Europe, caught between Mohammedan Saracens and Avars, could scarcely have put up a successful resistance against such odds.

Two generations after the destruction of the Avars, the Magyar horde appeared. Once again the nomads' neighbours found themselves compelled to pay tribute. As a result of the decay of the Carolingian Empire, a weakened Germany became a tributary of the new invaders. Europe in the ninth century was faced by a triple invasion, of Magyars, Saracens and Norsemen: the Norse invasion ended with the founding of Norman states in Normandy, England and southern Italy, and the Saracen armies were thrown back when they attempted to advance beyond the frontier of Spain; the Magyar horde was broken by the re-creation of the German Empire under the Saxon emperors. At the decisive Battle of Lechfeld (955) the Magyars were defeated by Otto the Great; they abandoned their plundering expeditions; their authority was limited to Hungary; they accepted Christianity; and in time they became one of the leading cultural peoples of eastern Europe.

The outcome of the great wars brought about by the migration of the peoples was that Europe succeeded in repelling this triple assault by the nomads of the steppe. But in this struggle the western Roman Empire went under, and in its place there arose a number of young Germanic states, which later developed into independent nations. Europe has remained divided ever since. European culture and civilization were thrown back a thousand years.

5. The Saracen War (A.D. 635-1492)

When Rome conquered her rivals, the Mediterranean became a cultural unit. The political unity of that sea was

destroyed by the splitting of the Roman Empire into two parts and by the migration of the peoples. This state of affairs continued until the sixth century, when the great Byzantine Emperor, Justinian (527-65), restored the political unity of the Mediterranean by means of his victories over the Vandals in North Africa and the Ostrogoths in Italy.

Six years after the death of Justinian a man was born in Mecca who was to give a new direction to world history: the prophet Mohammed. Mohammed created the Islamic religion, one of the great religions of the world, and also the Arab nation and Arabic culture. In addition, he founded the theocratic empire of the Caliphs. In 635, three years after his death, his heir, Omar, captured Syria with Damascus. The capture of Persia and Egypt followed within the next few years, and by 674 the Arabs were already attempting to seize Byzantium. Soon the whole of North Africa had fallen to the young Caliphate. In 711 the Arabs crossed the Straits of Gibraltar. At Xeres della Frontera their general, Tarik, overthrew the Spanish kingdom of the Visigoths. The entire Iberian peninsula, with the exception of a small nest of resistance in the northern mountains of Asturia, became a province of the Arabian Empire.

This empire now covered the southern, western and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, from Syria to the south of France. The Arabs became masters of the sea, and captured Cyprus, Crete, Sicily, the Balcarics, Sardinia and Corsica. The Saracens, as they now came to be called, sent out expeditions to plunder all the countries of southern Europe. They established bases in Italy and on the French Riviera. But these triumphs were followed, in the eighth century, by a series of repulses. In 718

a second attempt on the part of the Arabs to capture Constantinople was defeated. A decade later the kingdom of the Asturias was founded, with the purpose of liberating Spain, and other Spanish states were created with the same object. In 732 the Arabs were defeated in battle by the regent of the Frankish kingdom, Charles Martel, between Tours and Poitiers. They were thus forced to abandon their plan of rolling up Europe from the west. They evacuated southern France and withdrew behind the Pyrenees. In 755 they suffered their most grievous blow, the Arab schism, and the Arabian Empire became divided between two mutually hostile Caliphates, that of Baglidad and that of Cordoba.

The 'Reconquista' took five hundred years. Its first successful climax was reached in 1248, when the victories of Ferdinand III — St Ferdinand — led to the capture of Seville. Only the little Moorish kingdom of Granada, in the extreme south, held out, until it too was overrun by the armies of Spain in 1492. The Reconquista was also extended to the Mediterranean islands: Crete, Cyprus, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and the Balearics were liberated from Arab control.

Encouraged by the "successes and by the schism within the empire of the Caliplis, Christendom determined to regain its former mastery of the Mediter anean. Under the leadership of the Papacy, all the Christian world was to mobilize a mighty army of knights with the purpose of capturing the Holy Land and founding Christian states in Syria, and these states were to act as a wedge driven into the Islamic world at its narrowest point and thus split it in two. The Crusades began successfully, with the capture of Jerusalem (1099) and the founding of the kingdom of Jerusalem, but ended in a catastrophic defeat. For

two centuries the flower of chivalry was drawn to the Holy Land, there to wither and die, and in 1291 the last citadel of the Crusaders, Acre, was recaptured by the Saracens.

The result of these first wars of religion fought by the West was the permanent division of the Mediterranean world into two cultural power spheres, the one Christian, the other Islamic, with the sea between them. The Christians were victorious in Spain, the Mohammedans in Syria.

6. Emperors versus Popes (1073-1254)

During the later Middle Ages, Europe was torn by two great wars: the war between the Emperors and the Popes, and that between England and France. The war between the Empire and the Papacy was an ideological war, fought to decide whether the Church or the State should be the supreme power. The question was whether western Europe should follow the example of castern Europe, where the subjection of the Patriarch to the Emperor was an established fact: or whether it should develop as a theocratic hierarchy, as was to happen in Tibet, a civilization in which all the secular monarchs would accept the spiritual leadership of the Papacy. Neither Emperors nor Popes could give way. They could not avoid this struggle. And they both fought it out to the end, with a clear conscience.

While materially the Emperors were of course the stronger, the Popes had powerful spiritual weapons at their disposal. The Emperors could march into Italy at the head of their armies, depose the Popes, and arrange that synods elect more amenable anti-popes: but the Popes could anathematize the Emperors, excommunicate them from the Church, and free

all their vassals from their oaths of allegiance, and by so doing they could always provoke the election of anti-emperors.

There are three aspects to this war. First there is the European aspect. It was a revolution of the Popes against the Emperors, or vice versa, depending on one's point of view. On the occasions when two popes were fighting one another, it did not depend solely on the Emperor to decide which of the two was legitimate, but on European public opinion, that is to say on the opinion of all the powers of Europe, including the Kings of France and England.

The second aspect of the struggle is the nationalist one. The sympathies of most Italians were on the side of their Italian Popes, and against the German Emperors; for the Emperors wished to subdue Italy by force of arms, while the Popes supported Italy's independence. So the struggle between Popes and Emperors was simultaneously a war for Italian independence fought against a German imperialism desirous of making Italy into a German colony. On the other hand, many Germans regarded the Emperors as Germany's defenders against the ambitions of a Papacy desirous of making their country subject to the Popes of Ron.

The third aspect of this war is concerned with internal affairs, both German and Ital an. In Germany the Emperor's opponents adhered to the Papacy, while the Italian enemies of the Pope embraced the cause of the Empire. The leaders of the Papal party in Germany were the Guelphs; as Dukes of Bavaria and of Saxony, they wished to substitute their own dynastic power for the impositely power. Many spiritual and temporal princes in Germany exploited this struggle to break the power of the Emperor and increase their own. Thus the

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war between Popes and Emperors was at all times accompanied by a civil war within Germany, in which an Emperor was frequently opposed by his own sons. A similar civil war took place in Italy between the supporters of the Hohenstaufen Emperor (the Ghibellines) and the supporters of the Pope (the Guelphs). The disruption of the two nations, which endured until the nineteenth century, can in part be traced back to this struggle between the supporters of the Hohenstaufens and of the Guelphs in Germany and Italy.

This war, which smouldered for generations, was repeatedly interrupted by periods of apparent reconciliation. Since an Emperor could legally be crowned only by the Pope, each new reign was usually begun in an atmosphere of friendship towards the Papacy, which endured until the basic conflict burst into flames once again.

The conflict between Popes and Emperors dates from the coronation of Pepin le Bref. Pepin, mayor of the palace to the Merovingian kings, wished to become King of the Franks. In order to legitimize his *coup d'état* he required the blessing of the Pope. This was granted him. In return he liberated the Pope from the power of the Lombards and presented him with Rome and the Holy See. Thus the Pope, in addition to being the supreme head of the Western Church, became the temporal monarch of a territory in central Italy which included within its confines the city that had once been the capital of the Western world.

The next generation saw the resurrection of the Roman Empire. Pepin's son, Charlemagne, was not only King of the Franks, but King of the Lombards as well. He was the *de facto* heir to the Caesars, the peer of the Emperors of Byzantium:

but he lacked the equivalent rank and title. On Christmas night of the year 800 a coup d'état took place in the church of St Peter which was to have the most profound effects upon history: Pope Leo III surprised Charlemagne, who was deep in prayer, by coming up behind him, placing an imperial crown upon his head, and proclaiming him Roman Emperor.

At first, Charlemagne was vexed at being surprised in this fashion. But he soon became reconciled to this fait accompli which had made him Emperor. He was now the new Caesar—but by the grace of the Pope. A precedent had been established. It was the Pope, Christ's viceroy on earth, who had renewed the Empire. By virtue of his priestly office, he had crowned Charlemagne Emperor. For centuries no man might bear the title of Emperor of the West who had not been similarly crowned by a Pope. The Papal claim to supremacy over the Emperor was thus announced; but many generations were to pass before this claim could be enforced.

The Carolingian Empire declined and vanished; it was re-created by King Otto the Great in 962. He too was crowned Roman Emperor by he Pope. For a century the power of the Saxon and Frankish Emperors was so immensely superior to that of the Popes that the Popes were from a political point of view scarcely more than Bishops of Rome, holding that office by grace of the Emperors. Their relationship with the Emperors was comparable to that of the Patriarchs of Constantinople with the Byzantine Emperor.

A change in these power obtionships came about as one result of the founding of a Norman state in southern Italy by Robert Guiscard. Suddenly, south of Rome, there arose the

best administered state in Europe, ruled by a series of outstanding kings who regarded their new kingdom as a fief of the Papacy. All at once a power had arisen on Italian soil which could be used to counterbalance the predominance of the German Emperors. The Papacy had regained its freedom of action. In 1073, a few years after the foundation of the Norman kingdom, a great Pope was elected, Gregory VII. Gregory was obsessed with the divine mission of the Papacy, and was determined that all temporal powers should be made subject to Christ's viceroy on earth. He accepted the challenge of the Emperor Henry IV.

The quarrel was originally concerned with the question of investiture. The Emperor insisted that the investiture of the bishops of the Empire remain his prerogative, since they were not only princes of the Church but also high and very important imperial officials. Gregory and his successors steadfastly insisted that no bishop could be invested save by the Pope, and forbade all investiture by laymen, including emperors. A struggle of the greatest bitterness ensued, which ended with the victory of the Pope and the prohibition of lay investiture (1122).

Meanwhile the Papacy had carried out a masterly move: Pope Urban II had summoned all Christendom to fight against Islam and reconquer the Holy Land. The Crusades gave the Papacy political and military command of the forces of Christendom in the struggle with the Saracens. In the Crusades the role of the Emperors was a subordinate one. The First Crusade, the only successful one, was principally led and won by French, Norman and Flemish knights. The prestige of the Papacy rose in consequence.

Thus came the second round of the struggle for the leadership of Christendom, in which the contestants were now the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and the Pope Alexander III. Milan, which had adhered to the cause of Alexander, was destroyed by Barbarossa. Finally a reconciliation was brought about, an armistice without victor or vanquished.

During the reign of Barbarossa's son, Henry VI, the empire reached its zenith. By his marriage to Constance, the heir to the Norman kingdom, Henry VI became also King of Sicily. The Pope was thus encircled. Henry was master of Germany and Italy; the King of England was his liege, as well. In fact Henry VI was the most powerful European monarch since Charlemagne. But Henry's premature death in 1197 brought an end to the imperial supremacy. In Germany there was a disputed election, with both Philip Hohenstaufen and the Guelph Otto claiming the succession. The result was civil war.

One year later the most important of all the Popes was elected, Innocent III, under whose rule the Papacy attained the summit of its power. As spokesman for the boy Frederick, the infant son of Henry VI and Constance, Innocent III was master of Sicily and southern Italy. He arbitrated in the dynastic struggles within Germany; he arbitrated between France and England; he became the arbitrated between France and England; he Papacy, the Fourth Crusade of 1204 took place; though it failed to reach the Holy Land, it destroyed the Byzantine Empire and put in its place a Latin empire subject to the Church of Rome. Innocent III also organized the Crusade against the Albigens. Inhich led to the destruction of that heretical sect in southern France.

With the death of Innocent III, and the reunification of the

Norman kingdom in southern Italy with the imperial crown under Frederick II, the last phase of the struggle between Popes and Emperors began. It was a life and death struggle. While it was raging, the Mongols under Genghis Khan invaded Silesia and Hungary. They penetrated as far as the Alps and the Adriatic. The unification of Europe and an agreement between Pope and Emperor were plainly of vital urgency for the survival of the whole Western world. Yet neither Pope nor Emperor would consider making peace. Their struggle grew more and more bitter. It ended with the victory of the Papacy and the overthrow of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. Frederick II died in 1250, and his son Conrad four years later; and his grandson Conradin, the last of the Hohenstaufens, was captured fighting for his Sicilian inheritance and condenined to death in 1268. The Sicilian kingdom passed to a cadet branch of the House of Capet, while the imperial throne of Germany remained for two decades without an occupant.

But the Papacy enjoyed only a brief period of triumph. As a result of the decline of the Hohenstaufen Empire, France became the most powerful state in Europe, and King Philippe le Bel proved just as reluctant as the German Emperors to accept the supremacy of the Pope. Two generations after the overthrow of the Hohenstaufens, a decisive struggle began between King Philip of France and Pope Boniface VIII, who had publicly laid claim to Papal supremacy over all temporal monarchs in his bull, *Unam Sanctam*. Philip organized a *coup de main* against Boniface, and Boniface died as a result (1303). Two years later the French Pope, Clement V, left Rome and moved to Avignon, in accordance with the demands of the French king: and the Popes remained there until 1377. The

great Papal schism ensued from this period of the 'Babylonian captivity', and the Papacy was never again able to achieve its former position of power.

Thus the struggle between the Empire and the Papacy ended with the weakening of both parties. A new age was dawning, with new ideas and new problems.

7. England Against France (1152-1453)

The Anglo-French War of the Middle Ages was the first national war to be fought in Europe. The opening round consisted of the attempt made by the King of France to break the power of his overweening vassal, who was simultaneously king of an independent England. In the second round England went over to the offensive and tried to seize the crown of France.

The creation of Angevin power in western Europe occurred by stages. In 911 the King of France invested the Duke of the French Normans, Rollo, with the fief of Normandy. His successor, Duke William of Normandy, conquered England in 1066 and assumed the English crown. In 1135 his dynasty became extinct. Matilda, daughter of the last Norman King of England, inherited the crown. After her childless marriage with the Emperor Henry VI, she wed Count Geoffrey of Anjou-Plantagenet, heir to the provinces of Anjou, Maine and Touraine. Her son, King Henry III of England, married, in 1152, Eleonore of Aquitaine, the divorced wife of King Louis VII of France. By this nurriage Angevin territory was extended to include all south-western France. It now reached from the Pyrenees to the Scottish border. In France alone the

Angevin dynasty controlled more land than was administered directly by their liege lords, the Kings of France. War thus became inevitable.

France had to try to break the power of the Angevin kingdom, just as in Germany Frederick Barbarossa could not tolerate that his vassal, the Guelph Henry the Lion, should have more power at his disposal than the Emperor himself had. This was the beginning of the Anglo-French War, which was to be protracted, interrupted only by shorter or longer interludes of peace, for three centuries.

At first, France was victorious. After the death of Richard Cœur de Lion, Richard's brother John ascended the throne of England, having first eliminated the rightful heir, Arthur of Brittany, whom he had blinded and murdered. John was excommunicated by the Pope; and King Philippe Auguste of France, declaring that his vassal had forfeited his fief, seized John's continental territories and allowed his own son and heir, Louis, to be elected King of England. In despair John 'Lackland' made his submission to the Pope, and received as his fief from the King of France only the lands south of the Charente. Thus the Angevin kingdom was dismembered.

The turning point of the war came in 1328 when the last of the three sons of King Philippe le Bel died, and the senior branch of the House of Capet became extinct. On account of the Salic Law, which forbade inheritance through the female line, the House of Valois, a cadet branch of the Capets, succeeded to the throne, in the person of King Philip VI.

King Edward III of England now laid claim to the French throne, on the ground that he was the grandson of King

Philippe le Bel. This was the opening of the so-called Hundred Years War (1328-1453). This struggle for the throne of France between the Houses of Valois and Plantagenet reached its climax when the idiot Charles VI became king and the kingdom degenerated into a state of anarchic devastation. King Henry V of England invaded France at the head of his army and won the Battle of Agincourt (1415). Four years later the Treaty of Troyes was signed between him and the French representatives, according to which he became co-regent with Charles VI and was nominated his heir. He married Charles VI's daughter Catherine. The Dauphin Charles, whose legitimacy was held in doubt even by his mother, Queen Isabeau, was disqualified from inheriting. In 1422 both King Henry of England and King Charles of France died, and Henry's son, who was one year old (Henry VI of England), became the King of France. The old English dream of a Franco-English union seemed finally realized. But at this historic moment the miracle of Joan of Arc occurred, and European nationalism was born.

The disinherited son of Charles VI was living south of Loire, and laid claim to the throne with the title of Charles VII. Joan, a poor peasant girl from Lorraine, became the incarnation of French patriotism. She succeeded in reaching Charles, in convincing him of his legitimacy, and in inspiring him once again with the consciousness of his national mission as Charles VII. At the head of an army she led him to the relief of Orléans and thence to Reims, where he was crowned. Having been crowned, he was the gradually to reconquer his kingdom. Joan of Arc fell into the hands of the English, was convicted of witchcraft — a verdict in which she concurred —

and was burned at the stake; but she was to be canonized, five hundred years later.

After much fighting, the English were at last driven out of the whole of France. Only Calais remained in their possession, and that town too eventually fell to the French crown. France had won the war. The Channel became the natural boundary between the two nation states.

8. The Wars of Religion (1419-1648)

The great wars of modern European history are of divers natures. The religious wars at the beginning, and the revolutionary wars at the end, of the modern age, are wars of ideology. Meanwhile Europe has also had to fight external wars of defence against the invading Turks and against the pressure exerted by Russia. The discovery of the non-European world also led to a struggle between the Western powers for the mastery of the seas. Bourbon fought Habsburg for the hegemony of Europe. In addition there was a series of wars fought to establish or rectify frontiers as well as the various wars caused by problems of dynastic succession.

The European wars of religion were a revolution against the Church of Rome. Reformation and counter-reformation did not everywhere lead to war. In many countries, such as Spain and Italy, the struggles of the faiths were fought with torture and murder, the gallows and the stake — but there was no war. The principal theatres of war in the struggles of the Reformation and the counter-reformation were Bohemia, Germany, France and the Low Countries.

The father of the Reformation was the Oxford professor

and translator of the Bible, John Wyclif. Wyclif's two disciples, John Hus, and Jerome of Prague, spread his teaching throughout Bohemia; and when these two reformers were burned as heretics by order of the Council of Constance, the Hussite Wars broke out. Large parts of central Europe were devastated, and the Hussite armies were uniformly successful in defeating the armies of the Emperor. At the Council of Basel (1433) the Church of Rome realized that a compromise with the Hussites was unavoidable, but this decision was acceptable only to the moderate wing of the Hussite faction. Fighting broke out between the moderate Utraquists and the radical Taborists: but the Utraquists were victorious, and the Taborists were wiped out.

The second series of religious wars was launched in the sixteenth century, the cause being the appearance of Luther, Zwingli and Calvin.

In 1546 the Protestants first had recourse to arms in their struggle against the Catholic Emperor, Charles V. The Schmalkaldic League of Protestant Princes was defeated by the imperial troops at the Battle of Mühlberg. A 'cold war' between German Catholics and Protestants, which lasted for generations, was the result.

Meanwhile in France a religious war between Catholics and Huguenots had broken out (1526). Only after more than thirty years of fighting was religious peace re-established, by the succession to the throne of Henry IV, who had previously been an adherent of reform and who practised tolerance in matters of religion. The Edic: of Nantes finally allowed the Reformed Church to celebrate its rites without fear of persecution. But the Catholic nature of France had been preserved.

Simultaneously Catholics and Protestants were fighting one another in the Low Countries. This war raged from 1562 until 1648. Its causes were political as well as religious. It ended with a division of the Low Countries in two halves, a Catholic south under Spanish domination, and a northern half consisting of free states whose independence was recognized and whose inhabitants were in the majority Protestants.

The decisive struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism was fought in Germany, between the years 1618 and 1648. This Thirty Years War was begun when the Protestant diet of Bohemia rose against the Catholic Emperor and King of Bohemia. When this rebellion was crushed, the Danes came to the assistance of their German co-religionists. After their defeat King Gustavus Adolphus landed in Germany with a Swedish army, and put himself at the head of the German Protestants in their struggle against Rome and the Emperor. Gustavus Adolphus was victorious — but fell at the successful Battle of Lutzen. Sweden continued the war: she was the Protestant champion of Europe, as Spain was the champion of the Catholic cause. The decision went against the Emperor: this happened when Catholic France, for political reasons, took the lead with Sweden on the Protestant side and fought against the Habsburgs, Spain and Austria.

At last came the Peace of Westphalia, which promised equal rights and coexistence to the three confessions, Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist, and marked the end of the great wars of religion in Europe. The Protestants were able from then on to establish their equality of rights. But Europe did not become either Protestant or Catholic: the continent was divided into two spiritual camps which, though they did not again go to

war, continued their struggle; and this splitting of Christendom led to growing scepticism and loss of faith among European intellectuals.

9. Bourbon versus Habsburg (1521-1714)

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, France suddenly discovered that she was encircled by a brand-new world power. No defeat had led France into this impasse, but only a series of dynastic marriages. Charles von Habsburg had inherited half Europe: under his sceptre were united Spain, the Netherlands, Naples and Sicily, Austria and the independent county of Burgundy. The young King of France prepared his counterthrust: he intrigued to have himself elected Holy Roman Emperor, and thus to re-create the empire of Charlemagne. However, it was not he who became Emperor, but his rival, Charles V; and the encirclement of France was thereby completed.

Charles dreamt of leading a united Europe against the Turks. Francis I dreamt of a strong and independent France. A clash was inevitable. In the background was the European problem, in the foreground was the struggle for Milan, Burgundy and Naples, to which both dynastics laid claim.

Charles V made a present of his Austrian inheritance to his brother Ferdinand. Ferdinand's marriage brought him, on the death of his brother-in-law Ludwig, the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia. This division of the Habsburg Empire did not weaken the dynasty. The Austrian cadet branch remained at all times loyal to the senior Spanish branch, until the end.

France was now isolated. England's policy towards the two

great rivals on the Continent was undecided and vacillating. Francis I could find only one mighty ally, the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, the sole European monarch whose power was equivalent to that of the Habsburgs. Suleiman's armies overran Hungary and reached the walls of Vienna. Ferdinand was compelled to fight for his inheritance, and was thus unable to help his brother against France.

A decisive factor for France in her struggle against the House of Habsburg was the French alliance with the German Protestants. This alliance, which was to last for more than a century, began when Henry II, the heir to Francis I, gave his support to the Schmalkaldic League in their opposition to Charles V (1546-7). As a result of this alliance France acquired the bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun.

Towards the middle of the sixteenth century, after the death of Francis I and Charles V, France lost Italy to the House of Habsburg, but won Burgundy. More important than this was the fact that France had maintained her independence. Spain, though incapable of realizing her dreams of a Luropean hegemony, had become the leading power of the Western world. The acquisition of Mexico and Peru had made Spain the greatest, and American gold had made her the richest, state on earth. Soon the Spanish Habsburgs were to inherit the crown of Portugal, which gave them control of the Indian Ocean.

Meanwhile in France, civil war raged between Catholic and Huguenot. In this war the Spaniards did not imitate the French, who had allied themselves with the Protestants in Germany, but chose as their allies the ultra-Catholic party of the dues de Guise, a party for whom Catholic solidarity with their Spanish co-religionists meant more than national solidarity with their

Huguenot compatriots. When the House of Valois became extinct, Philip II of Spain attempted to put his favourite daughter, Isabella, on the throne of France, her claim being that she was a granddaughter of Henry II. Had this manœuvre succeeded, France would have been incorporated into Philip's sphere of influence. France retaliated by intervening in the war of liberation being waged by the Low Countries against Spain, and, when the Netherlands were freed, attempted to place a French prince, the duc d'Alençon, on the throne of the Low Countries.

At the end of the sixteenth century, France brought her civil war to an end. Within a few years the Thirty Years War, which provided the second act of the decisive struggle between Habsburg and Bourbon, broke out. France, led by two great statesmen, the Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, emerged victorious from this encounter. After the Peace of Westphalia the German Empire was left a living corpse. The Protestant Netherlands were free. Switzerland too broke away from the Empire. France's frontier was now the Rhine, and under Louis XIV she succeeded Spain as the foremost European power. Louis's attempt to become Holy Roman Emperor miscarried, but the encirclement of France from the east was now broken. In a series of vars France thrust her frontiers ever farther eastwards, and signed a pact of perpetual friendship with the Swiss Confederacy.

The last round of the struggle between Bourbon and Habsburg is known as the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14). When the Spanish House of Habsburg became extinct, an Austrian Habsburg and a Bourbon competed for the empty throne. The Bourbon cause won. Philip of Anjou,

a grandson of Louis XIV, became King of Spain. Austria received as compensation the Spanish Netherlands, Milan and Naples, though these two were soon all lost to the Bourbons. Thus ended the struggle between the Habsburgs and the Bourbons: and by the middle of the eighteenth century the two Houses were allies, against England and Prussia.

10. The Struggle for Supremacy at Sea (1588-1814)

The invasion of the non-European world by European adventurers began about the year 1500. For some four centuries Europeans descended like swarms of locusts upon America, Asia, Africa and Australia, seizing land and plundering cities, murdering and enslaving men, women and children. Whole civilizations were destroyed by these robber bands, including those of the Aztecs, the Mayas and the Incas. These excursions were a maritime version of the raids by the Hunnish hordes, only in reverse: Europe was now the hammer, not the anvil. This invasion was given a religious façade: one of the objectives of the invaders was the conversion of the world to Christianity. Another was the recapture of the Holy Land by means of a gigantic encirclement of Islam. For many Christians the heathens were subhuman. To dispossess and subdue them was to fulfil the will of God.

The Conquistadors regarded the non-European world as unclaimed property, legitimate booty for the conquerors from Europe. Such an attitude led inevitably to a struggle between the disunited nations of Europe for the partition of this booty, that is to say for the partition of the world. The result was a struggle for colonies, raw materials and markets: a struggle

for the mastery of the oceans of the world. Five powers were engaged in the struggle, the ancient sea-powers Spain and Portugal, which had discovered America and the Indies, and their younger rivals, England, Holland and France.

When Columbus discovered America for Spain, and six years later Vasco da Gama found the sea-passage to India for Portugal, it seemed that a world war between those powers for the partition of the globe must inevitably follow. The Papacy performed a lasting service by pronouncing a decree of arbitration which prevented this world war from breaking out; the struggle for supremacy at sea was thereby postponed for more than two generations. The Pope who carried out this arbitration was Alexander VI, Borgia. He divided the globe in two, as a man might slice an apple. The western half was awarded to Spain, the eastern to Portugal. The demarcation line was subsequently moved rather more to the west, and Brazil was then found to be no longer to the west of the line and thus became Portuguese, unlike the rest of America, which was Spanish. When the Portuguese dynasty became extinct in 1580, and Portuguese sovereignty was merged in that of Spain, both the overseas empires and both the navies were united in the hands of Philip II of Spain. The menace of a Spanish-Portuguese world war had been av. ded, thanks to the Papacy; and such a war was now unnecessary.

Four years after the Spanish-Portuguese union, the first rival appeared on the scene: Sir Walter Raleigh founded the colony of Virginia in North America, naming it in honour of his virgin queen, Elizabeth of England. The English fleet began to sail the oceans of the world. This navy did not at first wage war, but engaged in piracy. It lay in wait for the

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Spanish ships bringing gold, silver and other treasure from America to Spain, with the purpose of pillaging and sinking them.

Such brigandage at sea led to war. In 1588 Philip II sent the famous Hispano-Portuguese Armada into the North Sea with the intention of conquering and converting England. The Armada was wrecked by storms off the coast of England, and from this incident there later arose the legend of an English naval victory over Spain, a second Battle of Salamis.

Spain's global monopoly was broken. And soon a second rival appeared on the stage, namely Holland. Even while fighting for their freedom from Spain, the Dutch succeeded in building a fleet with which they seized a large part of Portugal's eastern colonial empire, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon and Java (1602). The aspiring sea powers, England and Holland, fought two wars against each other for the succession to the Spanish supremacy at sea. England was victorious, and Holland became her ally.

The decisive struggle between France and England for the mastery of the seas began during the reign of Louis XIV, when France first became a naval and colonial power. In 1689 France's most capable opponent, William of Orange, was crowned King of England. The English and Dutch powers, united in his person, declared war on France, and in 1692 destroyed the French fleet at La Hogue.

During the War of the Spanish Succession, England once again fought against France. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) secured for England Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and the Hudson Bay territories. From Spain England acquired Gibraltar, the key to the Mediterranean.

Throughout the eighteenth century a series of Anglo-French wars was fought for supremacy at sea. Spain, now ruled by its new Bourbon dynasty, was allied with France against England. The decisive phase of this struggle was the Seven Years War, in which France, as the ally of Austria, and England, the ally of Prussia, fought a world war in Europe, America and Asia. The outcome of this war was that in 1763 the French possessions in Canada and India became English property, and England thereby achieved the status of a world power. France sought vengeance for this defeat by supporting the United States in their War of Independence against England.

After the French Revolution, war broke out once again between France and England, and it was continued under Napoleon. Again Spain fought on the side of France. Finally the united navies of France and Spain were destroyed by Nelson at Trufalgar (1805); and the result of this victory was British supremacy at sea, which lasted for more than a hundred years.

11. The Turkish War (1420-1923)

After the migration of the peoples and the Arab invasion, Europe was subjected to only one more threat from Asia. This was in the mid-thirteenth century, when Genghis Khan's horsemen thrust into Silesia and Hungary. Europe, torn asunder and unarmed, seemed face to face with a catastrophe of apocalyptic proportions. Then a miracle happened; without a battle being fought, the victorious Mongols voluntarily withdrew from Europe, like a thundercloud that has not loosed its lightning. The world war that had seemed imminent did not take place.

Half a century after the Mongol withdrawal, a new Turkish state was founded in Asia Minor. Its first Sultan was Osman, who quickly conquered the greater part of what had been Byzantine Asia Minor. In the mid-fourteenth century the Turks crossed the Dardanelles, and in 1363 established their capital at Adrianople. The armies of Crusaders sent against them proved incapable of halting their advance. Constantinople appeared doomed. Suddenly help came, not from Europe but from Asia. Timur i Leng (Tamerlane) decided, far away in central Asia, that he would re-create the empire of Genghis Khan. After conquering Persia he hurled himself on Turkey. Sultan Bayezid I was defeated by Timur at the Battle of Ankara (1402) and taken prisoner.

But the empire of Timur did not endure. The Turks resumed their victories. They occupied all the Balkans, and threatened both Austria and Italy. In 1453 they took Constantinople by storm. The last Byzantine Emperor, Constantine XIII, died a hero's death at the head of his troops. Turkey inherited not only the Byzantine Empire, but also that of the Saracens in Asia and Africa, and became the mistress of the Mediterranean. Under Suleiman the Magnificent, the contemporary of Charles V, Turkish power reached its zenith. Hungary and Transylvania were captured, and Rhodes was taken from the Knights of St John. Turkish armies advanced into Austria, plundering as they went, and in 1529 they laid siege to Vienna.

When in 1571 Cyprus fell into the hands of the Turks, Europe armed for the counter-attack. The combined fleets of Europe were victorious at the memorable Battle of Lepanto, where they were led by Don John of Austria, the half-brother

of Philip II. But this victory remained without effect. The tide was not really to turn for a further century, when the Turks made a second attempt (1683) to capture Vienna and thus to batter down the gate that led to central Europe. Under the walls of Vienna the Turks were defeated by a German-Polish army led by the King of Poland, John Sobieski.

Austria went over to the counter-offensive, supported by the 'Holy League', which included the Papacy, Venice, Poland, and later Russia. The Austrian generalissimo, Prince Eugene of Savoy, liberated Hungary, Transylvania and Croatia. He also pushed into Serbia and Wallachia. Meanwhile the Venetians had occupied parts of Greece.

In the eighteenth century this Austrian offensive came to a halt. The Austrians suffered reverses. In 1787 Austria and Russia launched a joint war against the Turks, with the object of liberating the Balkan Christians. The Russian armies were victorious, but the Austrians were not, and henceforth the leadership of the struggle against the Turks passed from the Austrians to the Russians. The Balkan Christians were also playing a larger part in their own liberation, and they were more in sympathy with Orthodox Russia than with Catholic Austria.

The nineteenth century is filled with Russo-Turkish wars, interspersed with Balkan revolutions. In 1804 the Serbian Revolution began, and in 1821 the Greek, and by 1829 Greece, with Russian, English and French support, had achieved her independence. Next came the liberation of Rumania and Bulgaria. Cyprus became British, as did Egypt. Crete attached herself to Greece. Bosnia and Herzegovina were first occupied, and later annexed, by Austria. Italy took Libya.

In 1913 the Balkan War broke out. Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro formed an alliance with the purpose of driving the Turks out of Europe. Their victorious armies reached the walls of Constantinople before they were halted. Of all their European conquests, the Turks were now left with only a bridgehead on the Sea of Marmara. Albania and Macedonia were liberated.

During the First World War, Turkey was allied with the Central Powers. The Allies decided to liquidate the Osmanli Empire. In protest against the Treaty of Sèvres, there took place, among the Anatolian mountains, a national revolution which was led by the Turkish general, Mustapha Kemal Atatürk. He defeated the Greek army, which had penetrated into Anatolia for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the treaty, tore up the Treaty of Sèvres itself, deposed the Osmanli dynasty, put an end to the Caliphate, and founded a Turkish republic with a Western orientation. Constantinople, the Sultan's capital since the sixteenth century, became once again the mere provincial city it had been before the time of Constantine the Great. Ankara was the new capital of the Turkish state, and Atatürk its first president.

The Treaty of Sèvres was annulled, and replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). This treaty stipulated an exchange of populations: the Turkish inhabitants of Macedonia and Thrace were to be exchanged against the Greeks of Asia Minor. In this manner was solved a problem which had been in existence for two and a half thousand years, and which had once upon a time been the cause of the Persian Wars.

The road to a Turko-Greek reconciliation was thus opened. Atatürk determined to follow it, as did his Greek colleague,

Eleutherios Venizelos. Turkey became a European state, and, after the Second World War, joined the organizations for European defence. The Turkish War was ended, for ever.

12. Russia Thrusts West (1654)

Europe is a triangle. To the south and to the north-west there are natural boundaries; but to the east there is none: thence came the migration of the peoples, thence comes the Russian pressure. Russia has been thrusting westwards for three hundred years.

Once Russia was freed from the Mongol yoke, she began steadily attempting to advance her western frontiers. In so doing she came into collision with two great powers. The first was Sweden, which at that time controlled the Baltic coastline; the second was the Polish-Lithuanian Union, which stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Russia's initial task was the overthrow of these two enemies.

The first Russian victory was the attachment of the Ukraine, which had hitherto formed part of the Polish-Lithuanian Union. The Hetman of the Ukraine, Bogdan Chmelnycki, completed this anschluss with Russia in 1654, and by so doing laid the foundations for Russia's subsequent emergence as a great power. Half a century later the Northern War broke out between Peter the Great and Charles XII of Sweden. It ended with the defeat of Sweden, which then ceased to be a great power, and the annexing by Russia of the Baltic states (1721). Peter the Great assumed the title of Emperor: he was now the most powerful European monarch.

Russia's most decisive advance westwards was the partition

of Poland (1772-95). Russia obtained the lion's share, and could probably have annexed the whole of Poland; but this would have led to war with Prussia and Austria, and to the permanent support by those countries of the Polish nationalists. Russia cleverly preferred to involve Prussia and Austria as accomplices in her policy of Polish partition, rather than make enemies of them, and for more than a century the three empires were allied against Polish independence. The result of the Napoleonic Wars brought fresh benefits for Russia: the Grand Duchy of Warsaw became Russian, as did Finland when the Czar was declared Grand Duke of that province.

For one whole century the Russo-European frontier remained static. Russian expansion was directed against central Asia and Turkey; Polish uprisings were crushed. But during the second half of the nineteenth century relations between Russia on the one hand and Austria-Hungary on the other began to deteriorate. Panslav propaganda, encouraged by St Petersburg, began to undermine not only the Osmanli Empire, but also the Habsburg monarchy: two-thirds of the populations ruled by the Habsburgs were Slav.

Russia's intentions were obvious. She wished first of all to create Slav satellite states in the Balkans, which could be used to encircle Austria from the south; then she hoped to inherit the Slav peoples of the Habsburg Empire, should that empire eventually be liquidated.

First, Russia attempted to win Germany's agreement to a partition of Austria. But Bismarck wanted to maintain Austria, and had no wish to see that country partitioned. The Triple Alliance was constructed as a barrier to prevent Russia from advancing westwards. This barrier Russia had to break down.

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For this purpose she signed a treaty of alliance with France, to which England later adhered.

Then came the First World War. A Russian victory would have won for the Czar the protectorate of Bohemia and also of Yugoslavia. Instead of this, however, Russia collapsed, before the onslaught of the Central Powers. Lenin inherited the debris of this defeat. In order to end the war and maintain his government, he signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, by the terms of which Russia was thrown back to the frontiers that had been hers at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Russia signed this treaty in the hope that the world revolution, which her leaders believed imminent, would render it void. After the collapse of Germany, the Brest-Litovsk frontiers were somewhat revised: Russia regained the Ukraine, but still lost Poland, Finland, the Baltic states and Bessarabia. And the world revolution failed to materialize. Lenin's hope that in the near future Germany, Austria, Hungary and Italy would become part of the Soviet Union remained unfulfilled. Russia had to wait.

The Second World War gave Russia a fresh chance. There was the new partition of Poland, the annexation of the Baltic states, and the reacquisition of Bessarabia. Russia's attempt to conquer an unarmed Finland was defeated by the bravery of Mannerheim's army, but Hitler's attempt to conquer Russia also ended in failure, and the Russo-German war resulted in the occupation of Europe as far as the line Lübeck Trieste by the Red Army.

Stalin had thrust Russia's western frontier farther forward than had all the Czars. He annexed some of the Finnish provinces and made that country a dependency of the Soviet

Union. Half East Prussia, Eastern Galicia and Czechoslovak Carpatho-Russia were also annexed. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria went communist and became Russian satellites. Only Yugoslavia, under Marshal Tito, managed to shake off Russian domination without at the same time abandoning communism. The East German Republic, occupied by Russian troops, also became a communist satellite of the Soviet Union. The Russian thrust westwards into Europe had been triumphantly successful.

But the future remains uncertain. The question of the Russo-European frontier is still unresolved. It hangs over the world, like the sword of Damocles.

13. The Revolutionary Wars (1775-1918)

Every age has its own *idées fixes*, for which men will kill and die, start revolutions and launch wars. In the seventeenth century these were religious convictions; in the nineteenth, national ones.

The philosophy of the Enlightenment distilled a new theory of the State. The men in power were regarded no longer as the shepherds of their people by the grace of God, but as the recipients of a mandate from their nation. The source of sovereignty lay no longer with the king, but with the people. The two English revolutions gave currency to these ideas. The execution of Charles I and the deposition of his son James II contributed more than any other event to the undermining of the theory of Divine Right: and that, despite all the splendours of Versailles. The concept of the sovereign nation, and of that nation's right to freedom, gradually replaced the

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patriarchal theory of absolutism. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in his *Contrat Social*, expressed in its most extreme form the idea of the people's sovereignty.

These ideas of the Enlightenment were put into practice in America. The Thirteen Colonies demanded self-administration. King George III sent troops to crush this movement for liberty, and the colonies, led by George Washington, took up arms to secure their freedom.

Among the leaders of the American colonists there were two philosophers — Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson. They were not merely concerned with compelling English recognition of American autonomy: they had set their sights higher — they wanted to create, in the modern world, an ideal democratic state based upon the ideas of the Enlightenment: without the ballast inherited from the days of feudalism and absolutism: without a nobility, without militarism, without religious fanaticism, without a monarchy: a modern republic of free and equal citizens. The American Declaration of Independence (1776) was a declaration of war not only against England, but against the feudalism and absolutism of the Old World. It marks the opening of a new page in the world's history.

With French help, the An.erican revolutionaries defeated England. Frenchmen brought back the good tidings from the New World to the Old. Hitherto the fine ideas of the Enlightenment had seemed to be nothing more than a fruitful subject for debate in salons and clubs. Now a gre of people had been found ready to put them into practice. Most Europeans were convinced that such an experiment could only end in chaos, anarchy and bankruptcy, instead of which the new democratic

system of freedom and equality turned the 'United States', only recently devastated by war, into a land of order and well-being. Europe was to be equally astonished, a hundred and fifty years later, when it was made undeniably plain by the Russian experiment that an economy without capitalists was a viable concern, even though almost every politician and economist had categorically denied that this was possible.

The first reaction of Europe to the American Revolution was the French Revolution. French logic led to the conclusion that what was possible in America must also be possible in Europe: a state based upon the people's will, upon liberty, equality and fraternity. The French Revolution triumphed over absolutism and feudalism. In place of the nobility, the bourgeoisie assumed the leadership of the nation. The revolutionary armies conquered the armies of the kings, who attempted in vain to smother the Revolution. Far from the Revolution being smothered, it spread and created satellites in Italy, the Low Countries and Switzerland: there emerged the Cisalpine, Ligurian, Tiberine, Parthenopean, Batavian and Helvetic Republics.

The French Revolution seemed to be on the way to becoming a world revolution. This development was prevented by the rise of Napoleon to the rank of First Consul and, later, of Emperor; but Napoleon remained the soldier of the Revolution, the master of his country not by the grace of God but by that of the people — for it was the people which by means of a plebiscite had elected him Consul and Emperor.

Napoleon was at one and the same time a tyrant and the man who completed the French Revolution: even as, later, the tyrant Stalin was to complete the proletarian revolution. By

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means of the Code Napoléon the Emperor replaced the old and worn-out legal system of Europe. He encouraged the rise of talent, regardless of birth. The Napoleonic Wars were the continuation of the Revolutionary Wars. The Europe of the past remained united against the son of the French Revolution. In these wars Napoleon was fighting for the cause of the nineteenth century against that of the eighteenth.

Napoleon was defeated, and with him the ideas of the Revolution. The forces of European reaction were triumphant. The Holy Alliance was an attempt to reverse history, and to protract the eighteenth century by artificial means: a declaration of war against ideas — the ideas of human freedom and equality, of the people's sovereignty, and of the nation.

After the Congress of Vienna the continent of Europe became a community of more or less absolutist states, whose constitutions and boundaries were arranged without regard to the national aspirations of their inhabitants. Germany and Italy were split up into congeries of kingdoms and duchies. An entire century had to pass before the map of Europe could be redrawn in accordance with the principles of nationality, and Europe's constitutions could be revised in the spirit of popular sovereignty.

The principle of legitimacy, which underlay the actions of the Congress of Vienna, was in internal affairs the opposition to liberalism, while in external matters it was opposed to nationalism. These two ideas allied themselves now against the Holy Alliance. There arose what might be described as a Liberal International of Nationalists.

All Europe honoured the heroes of Greece and Poland in

their struggle for freedom, and the first triumph of the Revolution was the liberation of Greece (1829). This was followed by a new revolution in France, which threw out the reactionary House of Bourbon and replaced it with the liberal Orléans monarchy; and immediately after this, Belgium freed herself from Dutch rule.

Among the intellectuals of Germany and Italy, the revolutionary tide mounted steadily, year by year, until the fateful year of 1848. In 1848 King Charles Albert of Savoy attempted to unite Italy: he lost his war against Austria, and was compelled to abdicate. In Hungary, Franz Kossuth proclaimed a republic: but he too was defeated, by the combined armies of Austria and Russia. In Germany a constituent assembly met in the church of St Paul, at Frankfurt, and tried to create a united and democratic Germany: this attempt also was a failure.

Only in France was the Revolution once again successful. The Second Republic was proclaimed as heiress to the First: and though this republican dream was ended after only a brief existence, still, when Napoleon III founded the Second Empire, he espoused the two basic ideas of the French Revolution, liberalism and nationalism. When in 1859 Napoleon III allied himself with Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia against Austria, with the purpose of securing the unification of Italy, Austria was defeated; and a few months later Garibaldi and his volunteers landed in Sicily and in one glorious campaign liberated southern Italy.

With Italy united and free, Germany could not lag behind. The Prussian monarchy allied itself with nationalist liberalism. In 1866 Bismarck defeated Austria and so ended to the advantage of Prussia a struggle for the German hegemony that

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had been going on for one hundred and twenty-five years. Four years later came the Franco-Prussian War, which led to a unified Germany under the King of Prussia and a democratic Reichstag.

Meanwhile in the Balkans the struggle for the national liberation of the Slav peoples had made progress. Those Balkan states that had been set free by the Russians preferred to write their democratic constitutions after the Western, rather than the Russian, model. The Balkans too were organized nationally, and ruled constitutionally. At this same time Spain abandoned absolutism and opted for a constitutional monarchy. By the end of the century all Europe, with the exception of Russia and Turkey, was democratic; and ten years later Turkey had a democratic, Russia a semi-democratic, constitution.

Austria-Hungary had also become a democracy. But the very nature of this state contradicted the principle of nationalism. Inside Austria, nationalist propaganda became more vocal every year. Italy, Serbia and Rumania all supported these centrifugal forces, in the hope that when it came to a partition of Austria they might be able to increase their national territory at Austria's expense. Also, many German Austrians looked forward to the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire, for they hoped this would provide them with the opportunity to be incorporated into the German Reich. When the First World War broke out, the initial war aim of the Allies was the decentralization of Austria, though this was later replaced by the scheme for its dismemberment in favour of its national component parts. In a Europe organized on national lines, a supra-national great power seemed an anachronism.

Wilson's entry into the war transformed the war into a

crusade for the democratic and nationalist idea. The Wilsonian doctrine of national self-determination, as applied during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, marked the final liquidation of the legitimacy principle which had dominated the Congress of Vienna in 1814. Even before the collapse of Austria-Hungary the Czarist Empire was already in dissolution. A chain of national republics arose from the debris of Russia's western provinces, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Esthonia and Latvia: while from the ruins of the Habsburg monarchy came the republics of Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In Germany the Emperor, kings, dukes and princes were all deposed. The Reich became a republic, as Turkey and Russia did. The victory of the nationalist and liberal revolution was complete: Europe became a collection of national democracies, most of which were republics.

14. The Franco-German War (1813.)

A favourite cliché of political literature is 'the hereditary enmity between Germany and France', which is usually described as being of a thousand or eleven hundred years' duration. This 'hereditary' enmity belongs in the realms of mythology. The truth is that the enmity dates only from 1813: before then it did not exist. Throughout the Middle Ages the German Emperors were preoccupied with their campaigns against Rome, while the French kings were busy defending themselves against their over-powerful English vassals and rivals: so that during this period of history France and Germany, politically at least, turned their backs on each other. In more modern times the situation was changed in that the

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French kings were the allies of the German Protestants in their struggle against the Catholic Emperor. In the ages that followed there was no such thing as a united Germany. In every European war France was allied with one part of Germany and opposed to another part. In the first two Silesian Wars, France was allied with Fiederick II: in the third Silesian War, with Maria Theresa. In the Napoleonic Wars too the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine were Napoleon's allies. Until the Battle of Leipzig, Saxon and Bavarian regiments fought Napoleon's battles at the side of their French comradesin-arms. It was only at that moment of time that the national struggle between Germans and Frenchmen began. It started with the German War of Liberation from French domination, which in due course led to two occupations of Paris by German armies.

The enmity increased during the second half of the nine-teenth century. Napoleon III was the champion of the national-ist principle in general, and in particular he intervened to secure the national unitication of Italy; nevertheless he tried with every means at his disposal to prevent German unification—for fear of the power of his neighbours. The clash of Bismarck's policy, which brought about this national unification, and Napoleon's, which was unrected against it, led to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1.

The wounds inflicted by this war might perhaps have healed, had they not been kept permanently open by the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. For Germany this was the completion, for France the violation, of the national principle. According to the French view the nation is the historic entity regardless of the mother-tongue of its inhabitants: for the

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Germans, language is both the seed and the expression of the national idea. Alsace-Lorraine spoke German, but felt French; to the Germans it was therefore part of the German nation, to the French, part of France.

The damage thus done to the French people as a unit nurtured their hatred of Germany and their hope that one day they would regain the lost provinces. That day came, as a result of the First World War. In the war, northern France was partly destroyed, partly occupied for years on end, and this added fresh fuel to the hatred felt by the French for the Germans. The Treaty of Versailles ended the war, but not the Franco-German conflict, which simply took on new forms.

Alsace-Lorraine, amid scenes of rejoicing, returned to France. But now German hatred increased as a result of the protracted occupation of the Rhineland by French troops, and above all owing to the astronomic sums extorted by the French as reparations. The whole of Germany demanded the revision of the Versailles Treaty. Some would have brought this about by Franco-German agreement, others by the threat of war or by war itself. Stresemann represented the first method, Hitler the second.

It is far too frequently stated that Hitler and his colleagues were alone responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War. As King's evidence to contradict this theory, one can call the celebrated French historian and nationalist, Jacques Bainville. In 1919, that is to say at a time when Hitler was completely unknown, Bainville published his study *Les Conséquences Politiques de la Paix*. In this book, with a clarity that approaches clairvoyance, he described future events as they actually occurred twenty years later: the incorporation

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into the Reich of Austria and the Sudetenland, and the outbreak of war over the problems of Danzig and the Corridor. Bainville ascribes the blame for these tragic developments to the basically false concept at the root of the Versailles system, which destroyed the Danubian monarchy and thus surrounded Germany - now centralized, owing to the disappearance of its reigning families - with a net of third-rate powers. The inevitable result of this false policy, according to Bainville, must be the future attempt by Germany, a major power, to attract her smaller neighbours into her orbit, which would lead to catastrophe. Rainville saw only one possibility of preventing this catastrophe: a Franco-German reconciliation, and co-operation between the two nations. But it was precisely this solution that was rendered impossible by the reparations question. According to Bainville, a sensible peace would have been based on the decentralization of Germany by strengthening its provinces and reigning families, while a federal Austria, enlarged by the addition of Poland and allied with the West, would have provided the surest guarantee against a renewal of German expansionist policy.

To begin with, Germany followed the policy of Rathenau, Stresemann and Bruning, which was directed towards a revision of the Versailles Treaty through negotiation and collaboration with France. After ten years, when the economic crisis engulfed the country and millions were unemployed, Germany lost her patience and threw herself into Hiller's arms.

Thus came the Second World War and the occupation of France by the German army. The monstrous cruelty with which the Gestapo treated the men and women of the French Resistance poured fresh oil on the flames of national hatred.

After the war, it was the turn of French troops to occupy German territory. The unsolved problem of the Saar also reappeared, to add its poison to Franco-German relations.

But at the same time there was a reorientation of public opinion in both countries. The threat of Russian communism made it plain to sensible Germans and Frenchmen alike that the age of the Franco-German wars was over and done with. They saw that a magnanimous Franco-German understanding within the framework of a united Europe offered the only means by which Europe's freedom might yet be saved, at the twelfth hour, and with it the freedom of the world. In France, Robert Schuman laid the foundations of this policy; in Germany, Konrad Adenauer.

Hope for a lasting peace between France and Germany has greatly increased since de Gaulle again became undisputed leader of his nation. De Gaulle's meeting with Adenauer at Colombey-les-deux-Églises in September opened a new era in Franco-German relations, based upon friendship and solidarity, mutual respect and mutual confidence. Thus we may hope that the Franco-German conflict has ended for ever.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DREAM OF WORLD CONQUEST

1. Alexander - Omar - Genghis Khan

wing to technical progress and the contraction of the world, the theory of global domination is no longer Utopian: it is a definite possibility. Should there be a third world war, it will be fought not for the control of specific territories but for the mastery of the planet. The question will be which nation, or group of nations, will control the globe—and according to which ideology.

The first man we know of who strove for mastery of the world was Alexander the Great. It was his intention to march across the earth and continue his victorious advances until he reached the encircling oceans. He proposed, having conquered Greece, the Balkans, the Persian Empire and Egypt, Turkestan and western India, to circumnavigate Africa, and on the way home conquer Cartiage and the Mediterranean lands. Once he had discovered the sea route to India it would not have been too difficult for him to conquer the sub-continent with the assistance of his vissal Porus. An expedition to China by way of Turkestan would also have been a possibility. All these plans were nullified by Alexander's early death. His empire collapsed, his dream of world mastery faded away.

No Roman dreamt of mastering the world. Rome's objective was the creation and the strengthening of her Mediterranean empire. The Romans knew that the great Parthian

Empire lay to their east, with beyond it the huge and mythical land of India. They knew almost nothing about China. But they were well aware that the world was large and the dream of world mastery Utopian.

Not until a thousand years after Alexander did the dream of mastering the world reawaken, in the breasts of the first Caliphs. They brought a new religion to the world, and were simultaneously conquerors and missionaries. They wished to spread Mohammed's religion across the face of the entire globe and unite the world beneath the sway of Mohammed's successors, the Caliphs. The man who founded this new world empire, with the intention of mastering the world, was the Caliph Omar (634-44). He conquered Syria, Persia and Egypt. His successors extended the empire of the Caliphate to Turkestan and northern India, to North Africa and Spain. Within two generations an empire greater than that of Rome had reached its zenith. The Caliphs dreamt of conquering Europe, India and China. But this dream was soon ended by the schism which created a rival Caliphate in Cordoba and also by the adherence of Persia to the Shi-ite sect, a sort of Mohammedan Protestantism which denied the Caliphate.

The next attempt to master the world originated in eastern Asia. The Mongol tribal chieftain Temuchin (later known as Genghis Khan) united the nomads of Siberia and central Asia, in 1206, and at the head of this force deliberately set out to conquer the world. His armies of horsemen overran Turkestan, Persia, northern China, and Russia. He conquered and organized the greatest empire in history, held together by the finest cavalry in the world. The great steppe, which had hitherto divided the civilizations of the world, now became the bridge

that linked them together. Himself without any positive religion, but believing in a single God, he made religious tolerance the basic principle of his world power. He drafted a code of laws, which all men were compelled to obey.

After his death (1227) his sons and grandsons took over, in amity, his inheritance and his mission, the conquest and unification of the world. His grandson Batu pressed forward through Russia into Poland, Silesia, Hungary and Dalmatia. Meanwhile another grandson, the great Kublai Khan, completed the conquest of China. But gradually, Genghis Khan's empire was separated into its principal component parts, China, Persia and Russia; for these realms, while remaining in theory parts of the Mongolian world empire, became national states under Genghis Khan's grandsons and great-grandsons.

After the Mongol Empire collapsed, Tamerlane attempted to renew it from Samarkand. He dreamt of conquering Europe, India and China; but with his death, in 1405, the second Tartar world power collapsed, and the dream of mastering the world moved westwards, into Europe.

2. Charles V - Philip II - Napoleon

Charles V was the first European after the great Alexander to dream of mastering the world. He bore the proud title of the Caesars. Half Europe was at his feet. As a result of the Pope's arbitration decree, half the globe became his portion—that is to say America, with the exception of Brazil, which went to the Portuguese. The occurs of the world were open to his navies. The Pope had bestowed the other half of the globe upon Portugal, and the family ties that united Charles V

with the Portuguese dynasty were so close that the unification of the two empires by inheritance could be anticipated within the foreseeable future. Charles's son Philip married Mary Tudor, Queen of England. Only France offered resistance, and to break it, Charles acquired as ally the mightiest vassal of the French crown, the Connétable de Bourbon. King Francis I of France became his prisoner at the Battle of Pavia, and meanwhile Cortez in Mexico and Pizarro in Peru were conquering huge and fabulous empires with unlimited treasure of gold and silver and pearls. His was an empire on which the sun rever set.

Charles dreamt of uniting Europe beneath his sceptre: of a crusade against the Sultan and Caliph Suleiman the Magnificent: of the destruction of the Osmanli Empire, the liberation of the Holy Sepulchre, the breaking of Moslem supremacy in the Mediterranean and North Africa. But this dream faded, when Martin Luther's new gospel split Germany in two and weakened its strength. In disillusionment Charles V abdicated (1556), and died a hermit in the monastery of St Just.

Charles's son, Philip II, took up his father's dream of mastering the globe. When by the death of his childless wife Mary Tudor the English inheritance was lost to him, he attempted to wed Mary's half-sister and heiress, Elizabeth: but Elizabeth refused him. On the other hand the vast Portuguese inheritance became his, with its claims to all Africa and India, so the two halves of the extra-European world, the Spanish and the Portuguese, were united under his control. Already master of the oceans, he now felt that he was master of the world.

While his father had still attempted to reconcile the new Protestantism by means of compromise, Philip II contemplated nothing less than its extermination. He entrusted this mission

in the Low Countries to his most faithful paladin, the Duke of Alba. In Spain the fires of the Inquisition burned as never before. In France the mighty House of Guise was allied to him. He hoped that with their help he might place his daughter Isabella, the granddaughter of King Henry II of France, on the French throne in place of the heretical King, Henry of Navarre. While he was fighting a pitiless war in Europe against the heretics, his half-brother, Don John of Austria, led a Crusader fleet to victory over the Turks at Lepanto, and gained temporary control of Tunisia.

But Philip's dream also faded away. The mastery of the world slipped from his grasp. His former sister-in-law Elizabeth stood up to him, and behind her were all the Protestants of Europe; the proud armada which he sent against England was destroyed; the Low Countries, led by William the Silent, wrested their independence from him; and when he died, in 1598, the dream of Spanish world domination died with him.

The next man to dream this dream was the Corsican Emperor of the French, Napoleon Bonaparte. Even before being First Consul, he was already the uncrowned king of Egypt, and from that day on he lusted after the East. Mastery of Europe was not enough for him. From Egypt ne had attempted to conquer Syria, which would have been the springboard to Constantinople and India. Under the walls of Acre, Napoleon's dream of following in the footsteps of Alexander the Great was broken; but he never abandoned his project of one day striking a mortal blow at England and India. Hid he conquered Russia, then China and India would have lain open to his ambitions, and thus the road to the mastery of the world. Only in America did he have no interest, which was why he sold

Louisiana for a trifling sum to the United States. Napoleon's dream of mastering the world collapsed among the flames of burning Moscow.

3. Lenin

During the years that followed, both Napoleon III and Kaiser William II were accused of aiming at world mastery: which was unjust, for while they were both ambitious, neither of them thought of conquering the globe. It remained for a Russian to dream, in the twentieth century, the dream of world mastery, and this Russian's name was Lenin.

When the Russian democrats overthrew the Czar, Lenin represented only a small segment of Russian political life and public opinion. He conquered Russia by means of propaganda. His propaganda consisted of two words: 'peace' and 'bread'. While Russia's republican leaders felt themselves bound by the treaties that the Czar had signed with the Western Powers, and were therefore prepared to continue the war until final victory had been achieved, Lenin demanded an immediate peace, if possible with the Allies, if necessary without them. And while the Russian democrats drafted comprehensive plans for land reform, he simply urged his supporters to desert and go home to their villages and seize the land from the great landlords. The peasants, tired of the war and hungry for land, understood Lenin's programme better than Kerensky's. When Trotsky's coup d'état had succeeded, and Lenin had thereby achieved supreme power in the Republic, he immediately opened negotiations for a separate peace, despite the refusal of the Western Allies to participate in them. Under the most

unfavourable conditions, he now signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers. All the non-communist politicians in Russia were opposed to this treaty—but the people preferred a bad peace to a bad war. The civil war then began. Lenin's enemies were supported by the Western Allies, but Lenin won the civil war: and it was a victory for the Soviet system and for communism.

Lenin regarded the October Revolution as simply an incident in the world revolution. Immediately after his seizure of power he began to prepare the ground for world-wide revolution by founding the Communist International. The leaders of this organization were principally intellectuals, who had nothing to lose, and everything to gain, from world revolution.

Lenin hoped first to win over the war-weary soldiers of both sides to his cause, by means of a radical peace propaganda. Before this propaganda could take effect the Allies had won the decisive victory, and Germany had capitulated; but Lenin continued his propaganda, with the primary object now of branding democracy as the handmaid of plutocracy and capitalism: the proletariat of all lands was urged to seize power, not by means of the ballot box, but by direct action, and thus to realize socialism.

Lenin's ideas caught on, particularly in the defeated countries of central Europe and in impoverished Italy. In Budapest and Munich, soviet governments were formed. There were communist uprisings in Berlin, Vienna, Hamburg, Helsinki and other cities.

But whereas in Russia the Red Army defeated the counterrevolutionary generals, outside Russia the communist movement was crushed everywhere. Democracy owed this victory

primarily to the socialist parties, which refused to accept the doctrine of a united proletarian front and fought bitterly against their communist rivals in every land; but quite apart from this, the Bolsheviks lost a great deal of sympathy in the West by the cruelty of their methods, and many of their best supporters abandoned the cause when terrorism was accepted as an instrument of policy.

When Lenin's propaganda failed to take effect in the West, he turned it towards the East. The Congress of Asiatic Peoples, held at Baku in 1921, inaugurated this policy. While Lenin was calling upon the international proletariat in the West to rise against the nationalist capitalists, in the East he appealed to Asiatic nationalists, promising them support against colonialism and exploitation by international capitalism. The world revolution was intended to assume a double face: in the West it would be a revolution of the oppressed classes, and in the East of the oppressed races.

Lenin's appeal to Asia received a powerful echo from China. The father of the Chinese Revolution, Sun Yat Sen, made contact with Lenin, and when Lenin died, in the foundations had been laid for communal Russo-Chinese action in the service of world revolution. On his death-bed Lenin could reasonably hope that his successors would realize his dream of a global Soviet Union created by a world revolution.

4. Hitler and the Japanese

For some years after Lenin's death the will-o'-the-wisp of a world controlled by Moscow faded from sight. Stalin's programme of organizing communism within the Soviet

Union won the day against Trotsky's demand for the continuation of the world revolution. There were bitter struggles for power among Lenin's successors, from which Stalin emerged victorious. During his dictatorship the Soviet Union concentrated on building up Soviet industry and increasing the strength of the Red Army. Russo-Chinese friendship disintegrated when Sun Yat Sen died, and his brother-in-law, General Chiang Kai Chek, chose to follow an anti-communist course.

The dream of mastering the world passed at first not to Stalin, but to his bitterest enemy, Adolf Hitler. Hitler opposed to the programme of communist world revolution an alternative programme, of anti-communist world revolution under Germany's leadership: this was intended to usher in German mastery of the globe.

Whereas the communist ideology was based on economic theories, the national-socialist ideology was based on biological ones. Its kernel was the Aryan racial theory. Instead of the democratic idea of equality, Hitler adopted as his thesis the inequality of men and of races. According to him, humanity was a pyramid of different races, the levels of which were distinguishable by the colour of men's skin and eyes. At the peak of the pyramid stood the fair-skinned, blond Nordic race—at the bottom the Negroes. All the other human races had their places assigned to them in this hierarchy.

The end-product of this theory was that the Europeans were intended to rule the world, and the 'Feutons to rule Europe: and supreme among the Teuton. was the German master-race, itself led by the guardians of the racial faith, the National Socialists. Since there were no Negroes in Germany, Hitler

invented an *ersat*? Negro, in the form of the Jews. Antisemitism in Germany was to be a practical application of racial theory. The more deeply the Germans despised the Jews, the more exalted they would feel themselves to be. Thus did Hitler bestow upon every German of non-Jewish origin a patent of nobility: the Germans were intended to regard themselves as the aristocrat? of mankind, called upon to rule and lead the world.

In order to achieve power, Hitler employed two lines of propaganda: against the Treaty of Versailles — and against Bolshevism. The one procured him votes, the other, money for his electoral campaigns.

His external policy passed through numerous phases. Before obtaining power he outlined his ideas quite clearly in Mein Kampf. At that time his objective was an alliance with Britain and Italy against Russia and France. His subsequent alliance with Japan is also referred to. The idea of the fascist state was the link with Italy, the idea of Teutonism the link with Britain. He also hoped for British support in his struggle against Bolshevik Russia - the principal object of his external policy. He wished not only to overthrow Bolshevism, but also to turn Russia into a German colony. But first of all France must be compelled to surrender the rights she had acquired by the terms of the Versailles Treaty and let Germany succeed her as leader of the Continent. Only during the war did Hitler give up his project of an Anglo-German collaboration in which Britain would retain the leadership of her Empire while the continent of Europe was led by Germany. As late as the spring

Hess's sensational flight to Britain was inspired by the hope of winning Britain as an ally in the crusade against Bolshevik Russia.

During the course of the war Hitler changed his plans. He then contemplated the partition of the world into spheres of interest. At his conference with Molotov in November he proposed to the Russians that the world be divided along the following lines: Germany to be master of Europe and Africa with the exception of a North African enclave which was to be allotted in the first instance to Italy: Japan to be master of eastern Asia: Russia to be master of southern Asia. The United States was to be allowed to retain the two American continents as its sphere of influence. Officially these negotiations broke down because Molotov demanded that Bulgaria be included in the Russian sphere, a proposal Hitler would not accept. Actually the Russians were clever enough to see through Hitler's smoke-screen and to recognize his real plans: these were, first of all the conquest of Russia by means of an anti-Bolshevik crusade as soon as he had defeated the West; then the conquest of the Sino-Japanese realm by means of a campaign against the 'Yellow Peril' based upon the racial theory: once Hitler was master of the Old World, he would soon be in control of the New; his dream of mastering the world would then be calfilled.

Today, since Hitler has been defeated, this plan appears absurd, the brain-child of a madman. But it would have succeeded, had Hitler managed to produce the atomic bomb just one year before Roosevelt did. Had Hitler possessed that weapon, his dream of mastering the world would today be the reality.

At the same time as Hitler, P. leading Japanese militarists were also dreaming of world mastery. Japan had risen so rapidly from the status of a minor country on the outermost

fringe of the world to that of a great global power, that nothing seemed impossible to her leaders. Japan was the foremost power of Asia, the continent where half of mankind had its home. If Japan succeeded in uniting Asia under her leadership, she would become the mistress of the world. The Korean bridgehead was the first step in this direction, the Manchurian colonial empire the second. The third step was now being taken, the capture of China.

The Second World War seemed to the Japanese to open the road towards world domination. As seen through Asian eyes, this was a gigantic fratricidal struggle among the white peoples. The hour for world mastery by the yellow race, and the suicide of the white, seemed to have struck. The attack on Pearl Harbor was supposed to be synchronized with Hitler's capture of Moscow: Siberia would then fall like a ripe fruit into Japanese hands.

The German defeats at Moscow, and later at Stalingrad, destroyed Japanese hopes as well as German ones. The Japanese collapse followed that of the Germans: and Germany and Japan have now ceased to be candidates for the role of master of the world.

5. Stalin

After the collapse of Germany and Japan, Stalin was in a position to resurrect Lenin's plan for Russian-communist domination of the world. The Russians moved over from the defensive to the offensive. They now occupied half Europe, as well as Manchuria and northern Persia in Asia. Only a single power was still superior to Russia in military strength: the

United States of America, thanks to its monopoly of the atomic bomb.

With the assistance of the atomic bomb, the Americans at no great cost could have seized the mastery of the world. But no responsible leader in America even dreamt of exploiting this opportunity. The anti-imperialist tradition, as handed down by George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, was too deeply rooted in the American soul: the American statesmen could not even consider embarking their country upon a course of world conquest and world domination.

The Soviet Union was the second strongest power in the world. Though no longer possessing the explosive weapons of Lenin's propaganda, it had instead the Red Army, the most powerful ground force on the face of the earth. Strong and tightly organized communist parties existed in almost every country, financed from Russia. The dynamism of these parties, combined with the pressure and threat of the Red Army, might well spark off a chain of revolutions throughout Europe, Asia and Latin America, which must ultimately lead to Moscow's domination of the globe.

So long as Franklii, D. Rooscvelt lived, Stalin attempted to divide the world into Russian and American spheres of influence; this plan was directed against British and European colonialism. With Roosevelt's death a basic change in American foreign policy took place. The Soviet Union ceased to be an ally, and became Public Enemy Number One. The cold war began, between Russia and America.

The United States laid no claim to the mastery of the world, but it was determined to prevent the Russians from realizing their plan of global supremacy, and with this object it was

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prepared to use all the means at its disposal: if necessary it was ready to go to war. The entire world became the battlefield of the cold war. Everywhere the partisans of America faced the partisans of Russia. The *coup d'état* in Prague, which subjected Czechoslovakia to a communist government, was a triumph for Moscow. On the other hand the Red Army was forced to evacuate Persia and Manchuria. The communist ministers disappeared from all the governments of Western Europe. Catholics, social democrats, liberals and conservatives united to form an anti-communist front. Europe was on the way to unification and also to being incorporated into the American system of alliances.

The Russian counter-thrust was the communist revolution in China. China, which for years had been allied and intimately linked with the United States, went over to the communist camp. Finally Stalin succeeded in producing the atomic bomb, thus breaking America's global monopoly: Russia and America were now equivalent powers, enemies matched in strength. But meanwhile the second Russian attempt to seize the mastery of the world by means of world revolution had ended in failure.

6. America - Russia - China

Since Stalin's death, Russia has postponed the struggle for world domination. America, by her system of alliances in Europe and Asia, has become so strong that a Russian war against this coalition would seem to be a hopeless undertaking. Only a regrouping of the powers of the world would present Russia with the prospect of renewing her struggle for global supremacy. Nor do the leading statesmen

of America contemplate the opening of a third world war by an attack on the Russo-Chinese bloc. The problem of world domination is therefore not a real one in the immediate future.

But the problem will become real again, if a world federation is not brought into existence before it is too late. For the world has become too small for the coexistence of two hostile power groups. Just as in the third century B.C. the Mediterranean was too small for the coexistence of two major powers, Rome and Carthage, so today our planet is too small to permit a lasting Russo-American rivalry.

America, in the years immediately after the Second World War, could quite effortlessly have picked up the crown of world mastery. This she refused to do, just as George Washington declined to be crowned king of the United States of America. But should America one day find herself confronted with the choice of submitting to Russian world domination, or assuming the leadership of mankind herself, there can be no doubt what her decision will be.

Before the beginning of the Second Punic War, no Roman thought that Rome might become sole mistress of the Mediterranean. Rome recognized the necessity of retaining control of Italy, and the danger inherent in a fresh Carthaginian attempt at domination: but the Romans were peasants, not merchants, and Syria and Egypt were far away and meant nothing to them. But after their conquest of Carthage, they suddenly found themselves involved in further wars, against Macedonia and Syria, and for the sake of securing peace they had to overthrow those powers. Egypt was the ingreat power in the Mediterranean that remained independent, and it became a nest of intrigues directed against the over-powerful Rome. At last

Egypt too was turned into a Roman province. Then the Roman people were able to live in peace for generations.

If the Russian menace continues, the attitude of the Americans will follow the same course as the Romans'. America will snatch at the mastery of the world, in order to prevent it from falling into other hands.

As a result of the Chinese Revolution, a third contestant for the mastery of the world has now appeared on the stage: China. China's population is greater than that of America and Russia combined. China's civilization is mankind's oldest, and her people are probably more intelligent than those of any other great nation. It is small wonder that China feels she has a vocation one day to lead humanity. But China has time. She is not pushing; however, if she herself is pushed, she will react.

China's road to the mastery of the world is through a revolution by the coloured majority of mankind against the white minority. The first step in this direction was the conference of Asian and African peoples held at Bandung. Russia was not invited: China played the leading part, and by so doing, became Russia's coequal rival. She is Russia's ally, but not her satellite. Russia is the leader of the proletarian world revolution, but China is the leader of the world revolution of the coloured races.

In the event of a struggle for the mastery of the world that might one day break out, there is no telling what system of alliances would prevail: China and Russia might remain allies and they might not. A common ideology is a bond, but it is not the only one. Christian has fought Christian: Mohammedan, Mohammedan: democrat, democrat; there is no reason why communist should not fight communist, if their interests are

opposed. Had Russia and Yugoslavia been neighbours, the world might well have seen the spectacle of a war between Stalin and Tito.

There are great interests dividing Russia from China. Russia still holds Mongolia, which was Chinese for centuries. Turkestan is partitioned between Russia and China. Then the great empty spaces of Siberia adjoin the overpopulated Chinese lands. Will the Soviet Union open this territory to Chinese immigration? If so, Siberia will become Chinese in one generation. If not, the Chinese will contemplate the capture of those lands.

It is conceivable that a smaller nation might suddenly aim at the mastery of the world—who would have shought, at the time of Alexander the Great, that the little city of Rome would obtain the control of the Mediterranean? — but the fact remains that today there are only three candidates for world mastery: America, Russia, and China.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE MAJOR EPOCHS OF PEACE

1. Multiple Peace

It is remarkable that in most languages the word peace has no plural. We speak of war and wars — but not of peace and peaces. This linguistic anomaly has profound causes. Peace is regarded as the background, or prevailing melody, of history, interrupted by countless wars, as the heavens are dotted with stars. But in truth, war and peace are the heads and tails of the coinage of history. They are the two faces of Janus. We can regard peace as the front and war as the back, or vice versa, just as we choose.

Before China came into contact with the West, the Chinese would have been astonished if anyone had maintained that the oceans of the world were twice as extensive as all the continents put together. The Romans too believed that the seas were simply a sort of watery rim around the dry ground. They would have been equally surprised if they had been informed that in global geography water is the norm, land the exception.

According to the view of history that has hitherto prevailed, peace is regarded as the natural condition of man, though it has been constantly interrupted by wars of months' or years' duration: each of these wars has ended with the conclusion of a peace, that is to say with a return to the normal peaceful condition. But we must accustom ourselves to a new conception of history, as a chain of lengthy wars protracted over generations

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and centuries: against the background of this history of wars there emerge certain merciful exceptions, blessed periods which can be described as epochs of peace, which also last for generations and centuries, but which are less numerous than the great wars.

The epochs of peace have their own individual characteristics: they are born, they grow old, and they die; sometimes they die of old age, but usually they are murdered. Without understanding these epochs of peace, it is impossible to grasp what the peace problem is. Each of these spatially and temporally limited peace epochs is a laboratory specimen of world peace. It can teach us how peace arises, how it can be maintained, and what are the maladies it dies of. All the epochs of peace were mortal, because such epochs obey the laws of life. The future world peace, too, will not be an eternal peace: it may endure for centuries as many historic epochs of peace have done in the past, but one day it must die, like everything else here on earth. This world peace will, however, differ from past peace epochs in that it will not be limited to any specific region, but will embrace the whole globe. The limitation of past epochs of peace to particular regions has been due not to a natural law, but to the inadequacy of weapons and means of transportation. Had the great onquerors of the past possessed aeroplanes, humanity would have been united long ago.

The revolutionary developments in the field of transportation and communication have made the problem of world peace a topical one: for in the near future these developments will result in the creation of a world state and world peace—either by a peaceable understanding between the great nations, or by a third world war. In any case, sovereign states and

international anarchy are out of date: such conditions are anachronisms, in a period when technology has made it possible to circle the globe in three days.

The political and technical problems connected with a world state are easier to solve today than was the problem of creating a Mediterranean state, the Roman Empire, at the time of the Punic Wars. Just as that empire secured the peace of the Mediterranean for centuries, so a world state can secure centuries of world peace. For the Mediterranean in Roman times was larger than the combined oceans of the world are, today.

An analysis of the great epochs of peace is therefore a schooling for world peace.

2. The Persian Peace (521-334 B.C.)

The first great peaceful empire in history was that ruled by the Persian King of Kings. It occupied a vast area bounded by the Sahara, the Indus, the steppes of central Asia and the Greck islands. For thousands of years countless nations and tribes had fought over this territory. Empires had arisen and passed away: the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Hittites, the Medes, the Lydians, the Jews, the Philistines, the Phoenicians and many other nations, had all had their day. Cyrus united the Near Eastern world into a great empire (559-529 B.C.); to it his son Cambyses (529-512 B.C.) added Egypt and Cyrenaica. An empire at peace was thereby created which was to endure for almost three hundred years.

Cyrus, the founder of this empire, was one of the greatest figures in world history. The Greeks and Jews agreed about this. His fame was overshadowed by that of Alexander, the

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destroyer of his empite, but Cyrus's creation was more enduring than Alexander's. The Alexandrine Empire collapsed with the death of its founder, but the empire of Cyrus lived for centuries; and the nation which Cyrus actually created outlived not only Alexander but also the Scleucid dynasty and the Parthians, it arose again to play an outstanding part in the history of the world, and indeed it has continued to do so until today: the Shah of Iran is the successor of Cyrus.

The Persian peace begins with Darius, Cyrus's son-in-law, who followed Cambyses. His relationship to Cyrus is similar to that of Augustus to Julius Caesar: he completed his predecessor's work. Cyrus and Darius were confronted with a gigantic task. They found a chaos of nations and tribes, which had been fighting one another for thousands of years, and out of this chaos they proposed to construct a peaceful empire. They did not adopt the atrocious methods of Assyrian terrorism, which had made the Assyrians hated among nations and hastened their downfall. Instead, the Persian Empire tried, by means of magnanimity, respect for other peoples' languages and customs, and religious tolerance, to transform yesterday's enemies into loyal subjects of the King of Kings.

The Old Testament describes how Cyrus freed the Jews, who had been transported to Babylon seventy years before, and sent them home. And Herodotus tells how Cyrus forgave the King of Lydia, Croesus, who had invaded Persia, and appointed him his adviser. Such generosity, even towards enemies, seems to have remained the basic principle of Persian government. When Themiste 1s, the victor of Salamis and the destroyer of the Persian fleet, was banished by the Athenians, he found asylum in Persia.

The Persian Empire of peace was a sort of federation of twenty states, each of which was governed by a viceroy called the satrap, who enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. The old regional languages remained the languages of the administration, and religious traditions were respected; and though the satraps were frequently members of the local dynasties that had ruled their provinces before the Persian conquest, their independence was limited only by the unconditional loyalty they had to give to the King of Kings. Thus Persia was a model for all future peaceful empires: a unified state consisting of articulated parts.

The foreign policy of the Persian Empire was conservative and not imperialistic. After Cyrus's vain attempt to capture Transcaspia, and that of Darius's son Xerxes to conquer Greece, the Persian Empire was content to safeguard its frontiers and secure order within those frontiers. The stability of the regime depended upon an orderly succession to the throne by successive members of the House of Achaemenidae, disturbed only by palace revolutions. The empire was held together by a model civil service, a healthy system of taxation, a uniform currency, and a first-class road network. The Persian nobility, with its traditions of heroism, was the backbone of the army. Its philosophy was that of Zoroaster, who regarded the world as a battleground for the endless struggle between Ormuzd and Ahriman, between good and evil, light and dark; he had instructed the Persians that they must be good soldiers on the side of order and against chaos. So the Persian noblemen were brought up to speak the truth, to ride well, and to be skilled in the use of bow and arrow: the education, in fact, of a gentleman. The fact that the Persian Empire flourished for so long a

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period, and enjoyed so protracted a peace, was due to this combination of organization and ethics.

When this peace grew old and tired, it was broken by Alexander the Great. Alexander, son-in-law of the last of the Achaemenidae, Darius III Codomannus, was himself the last of the Kings of Kings. When he died, the empire fell apart. The result was war between those nations of Asia Minor that had been living together peacefully for centuries. These wars have not ceased, and continue even today.

3. Pax Romana (31 B.C.-A.D. 375)

It took Italy, under the leadership of Rome, two hundred years to acquire control of the Mediterranean. This Mediterranean empire was extended northwards by Julius Caesar to include Gaul, and eastwards by Pompey, who incorporated into it Armenia and Mesopotamia. Augustus completed their work, when in 31 B.C. he annexed Egypt; and at the same time he put an end to a century of Roman civil war by transforming the Roman republic into a constitutional monarchy of Emperor and Senatc. This empire soon contained all Western civilization, from the border of Ethiopia to Gibraltar, from the Sahara to the Caucasus. For the first time in their history, its peoples learned to know the blessings of peace, a peace based on might and justice.

In many respects the Roman Empire recalls that of the Persians. For the Roman Empire also was an articulated unity, a sort of federation, in which the provinces enjoyed a wide autonomy, their particular religions and traditions being not only tolerated but protected; and the Latin language was not

forced upon the empire, but simply spread gradually because of its practical usefulness, just as the Greek language did in the eastern provinces. This empire, too, enjoyed an orderly administration, a healthy currency, and a model legal system. The legions could be moved quickly, over the superb Roman roads, from one end of the empire to the other.

The miracle of the Roman peace was based upon a nonaggressive power policy. The legions were the best troops in the then-known world. Despite this, the emperors made no attempt to conquer the world. Julius Caesar's dream of following in the footsteps of Alexander, and invading the neighbouring empire of the Parthians, was abandoned by Augustus. Similarly, after the Battle of the Teutoburger Wald, no further attempt was made to conquer Germany. Instead, the Rhine and Danube frontiers were fortified and linked by the defensive system of the Limes. Another Limes was created on the British-Scottish border. Rome was satiated, and wanted no further conquests. Within the Pax Romana there were struggles for the succession between various pretenders to the throne, and there was frontier fighting in the north and east; but these battles were fought by the legions, while the people enjoyed the fruits of peace. It was only with the irruption of the Teutons, themselves driven forward by the Huns, that the Pax Romana ended.

But this end cannot be ascribed to purely military causes. The empire was worn out. The heroic traditions of early Rome, to which she owed her world supremacy, were a thing of the past. The currency had been shattered by a mounting inflation, due to the adverse balance of trade between the Roman Empire on the one hand and India and China on the other, for Rome

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imported cotton and silk from those lands and had no industrial products to export in their place. So there was a steady flow of precious metals eastwards, until the silver mines of Spain were exhausted. Rome could no longer pay her legionaries. She recruited Teutonic tribes, giving them land within the frontiers in exchange for their military service — until the day came when these Teutons founded their own states on Roman soil and burst the empire asunder.

The end of the Roman Empire meant the end of the Mediterranean peace and the end of the peace of Europe. Since then the West has been torn by a series of wars, divided by conomic barriers, and embittered by political rivalries. For many centuries a nostalgic longing for the Pax Romana lived on in Europe.

4. The Chinese Peace (221 B.C.-A.D. 220)

The great Chinese peace of the Han dynasty was contemporaneous with the Roman peace; nevertheless the two empires were completely ignorant of each other. While Carthaginians and Romans were disputing the sovereignty of the Mediterranean, the King of Ts'in, Shi Hoang Ti, united the civilization of China, which for two and a half centuries had been split into a number of warring kingdoms. He became Emperor of China, of the Imperium of the Orient.

Shi was an atrocious tyrant. Fven today the Chinese literati have not forgiven him the burning of the books, which was done with the object of blotting, and local and regional traditions and opening a new page of Chinese history. The literati who tried to save their books were themselves buried alive.

Apart from his book-burning, Shi is famous as the builder of the Great Wall of China, the largest piece of construction ever carried out in the world and one which for size far surpasses the Greek wonders of the world or the pyramids. This amazing undertaking served a practical purpose in that it protected China against invasion by the nomads in the north. Shi's defensive policy towards the steppe was followed by all the Emperors who succeeded him: none attempted to conquer Siberia. China adopted the same policy towards Mongolia that the Romans practised in their dealings with the Teutons, until after several centuries of peace, China was overrun by the Mongols, as Rome was by the Teutons.

With Shi's son, his dynasty came to an end. It was left to the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) to transform Shi's military empire into a generous and peaceful realm, whose culture was at least as valuable as its Roman contemporary's. The Han Emperors extended the frontiers of their empire towards the east, west and south-east, to include Korea, Turkestan and Indo-China; but despite their very great military strength, they did not try to conquer either Persia or India. Cut off from the rest of the globe by steppe, desert and mountain, China was a world of its own. It was united, and therefore at peace—despite occasional struggles for the throne, frontier wars, and one great revolution (A.D. 23-5).

The Han Empire was neither the first nor the last peaceful realm to arise on Chinese soil. Centuries before the Han period, the nucleus of China had been united until it was broken asunder by the fighting that broke out among its feudal potentates. After the Han dynasty, China's unity was destroyed and three empires arose in the place of one, and fought one

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another; and it was centuries before China was united again and enabled to enjoy another epoch of peace, under the Sui and the T'ang dynasties (589-906). Then again came centuries of division and discord, until Genghis Khan's Mongols captured China. Under the Mongol Emperor, Kublai Khan, China was once more unified, and enjoyed another flowering, which survived the expulsion of the Mongols by the nationalist Ming Emperors. In 1644 there was a new invasion from the north; the Manchus captured and united China, and yet another era of peace began, which continued until the nineteenth century, when the dynasty fell and the empire collapsed.

The history of the Chinese Empire is a living example of the fact that a civilization can exist in peace only when it is united. Division leads inevitably to war, unification to peace. China was repeatedly able to reunite after centuries of division, but Europe has never succeeded in reviving the Pax Romana and this has been Europe's tragedy, and the tragedy of the Western world.

5. The Latin-American Peace (1640-1810)

Latin America offers an example of a sustained and undisturbed period of peace in modern times. Before the arrival of the Europeans, the history of what is now Latin America was filled with wars. Two great wars were in progress: the expansion of the Inca Empire northwards, and a southward advance by the armies of the Aztecs. This series of wars was interrupted by the discovery of the continent by Columbus and its conquest by Cortez, Pizarro and other contemporary conquistadors less well known to history. By 1640 the conquest

had to all intents and purposes been completed, and from then on Latin America, stretching from Tierra del Fuego to California, was at peace.

This peace was due primarily to geographical isolation. Spanish America had only two frontiers — with Portuguese Brazil, from which it was separated by impenetrable jungle, and with the Red Indian tribes of North America. It was therefore unassailable. It had no wish to expand its borders by aggressive wars, and no need to fight defensive ones. The Wars of Religion, which were then tearing Europe asunder, found no echo in America, because the Inquisition there had never permitted any Protestant movement to arise. The ideas of the Enlightenment were similarly smothered. A strictly absolutist viceregal regime prevented all attempts at revolution.

This Latin-American peace through isolation and oppression would have lasted even longer, had not the spark of liberation been lighted from abroad. The deposition of the Spanish Bourbons by Napoleon caused the rebellion of Spanish America, and in wars that lasted for twelve years, Spanish America then secured her freedom. But a price had to be paid for this freedom, and the price was peace.

Today, where there was once a single Spanish colony, there are now eighteen sovereign states, and the century and a half that have passed since the liberation have been filled with revolutions and wars. The Latin-American peace was doomed as soon as the unity of the country was replaced by a plurality. Had Latin America become a federal republic, it would probably have enjoyed a new period of peace.

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6. The Japanese Peace

Japan is only a very small part of the world; nevertheless to the historian of peace it is an interesting country, because, of all the free nations of the earth, it enjoyed the longest epoch of uninterrupted peace in modern times: from 1637 until 1868. Japan was for centuries a world on her own, cut off by the ocean and by her geographical position. For the Japanese, her islands were almost synonymous with the world. For them, the Japanese peace meant almost the same as world peace. This prodigy of peace, carried out by a martial people with heroic instincts and traditions, proves that a peace lasting centuries is not a Utopian concept. It was created in Japan by isolation from the outside world, coupled with internal police control. By these means wars and revolutions were prevented.

The creator of the Japanese peace was the great statesman, Tokugawa Yeyasu, whose descendants inherited the office of the Shogun — a sort of Japanese Duce — and continued to hold it throughout the whole era of peace. The Shogun was in fact the most powerful man in Japan, for the Mikado, the descendant of the Sun Godiess, was regarded as too holy and too illustrious personally to carry out the frequently dirty business of government. Figuratively speaking, the Emperor wore the crown, while the Shogun wielded the sceptre.

The regime of the Shoguns was strict and authoritarian. Any attempt at rebellion was nipped in the bud. The ideological unity of the empire had been ensured, before the beginning of the peace epoch, by a war of extermination which Yeyasu's son had waged against the Christians. For centuries the feudal lords of Japan had fought among themselves — they had

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behaved exactly as the great princes of the Holy Roman Empire had done, in defiance of the Emperor; but the new government of the Shoguns made such civil wars an impossibility, for all the princes were obliged to spend half of each year at the Shogun's court, as hostages for their own loyalty.

Shortly before Yeyasu's seizure of power, Japan had attempted to conquer Korea and thence China. Yeyasu put an end to this policy of imperialism. All Japanese were forbidden, under penalty of death, to leave their country. Foreigners were allowed to land only on the little island of Deshima, off Nagasaki, and that solely for purposes of commerce and under the strictest supervision; the rest of Japan was, with rare exceptions, barred to them.

By means of his internal and foreign policy Yeyasu's dynasty succeeded — after crushing a final rebellion in 1638 — in securing many generations of internal and external peace for Japan. This was not a relative peace, like the Pax Romana, which was interrupted by frontier wars and struggles for the throne, but a true and undisturbed peace. It was based on strength without aggressiveness.

This peace might have continued for generations, had it not been destroyed from without by the appearance of an American fleet which compelled Japan to open her ports and sign a trade agreement (1854). Trade agreements with the principal European states followed. Contact with foreigners, and the humiliation suffered by the Shoguns when they were compelled to open their country to white men, led to revolution. The objects of this revolution were state reform under the leadership of the Emperor and the modernization of the country according to the Western model.

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The revolution succeeded (1868). The young and brilliant Emperor Mutsuhito (Meiji) personally took over power from the fallen Shoguns. Within a single generation he transformed his country into a modern great power. After a final revolutionary attempt by the adherents of the old order, in 1877, Japan embarked upon a policy of expansion, with the occupation of the Bonin and Riu-kiu islands. In 1894 she declared war on China, which won her Formosa and the key position of Korea. Ten years later the war against Russia began. The sons of isolationists had become the most fanatical imperialists.

The Japanese peace was over. The Japanese war for supremacy in China and Asia had begun. It ended when the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

7. Pax Britannica (1815-1914)

The century of British peace was the first blueprint for a world-wide peace. The older generation can still recall the days when it was possible to book a berth for Africa, Asia or America without bothering to procure a passport or an identity card. Without a perm.t, anybody could change as much money as he wished into another currency. The whole world was open, to any man who was not actually wanted on a criminal charge. Russia and Turkey were then regarded as barbarous states because they insisted on travellers being equipped with passports. Such freedom of movement and such global peace have existed only once in the course of history; that they did so at all was thanks to the Pax Britannica.

The century of British peace was based on Britain's supremacy at sea. This meant that two-thirds of the surface of the

globe was British. In addition there was the British Empire on land: the United Kingdom, Canada, India, Australasia, South Africa, Egypt, Rhodesia, Kenya, the Gold Coast, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Jamaica, British Guiana, not to mention countless smaller territories and islands such as Cyprus, Malta, Hong Kong, Singapore, Gibraltar, Aden.

With this Empire behind her, Great Britain served the peace of the world. Every war was for her an interruption to her commercial life. Britain became the guardian of the peace of Europe. She had long ago abandoned her dream of creating an empire on the European continent. The Channel linked her with, but also separated her from, Europe. She was unassailable so long as no Continental power possessed a navy of equal power to her own.

Only once in the century did Britain become involved in war against another great power: this was the Crimean War. Britain had to prevent a Russian thrust to the Mediterranean, and possibly also to the Indian Ocean. But the Crimean War was a small war fought by great powers. It was limited to the minimum, both in time and in space. Once Britain's objects had been achieved, she made peace as quickly as possible.

For the Continent the Pax Britannica did not mean one long period of peace, but rather two shorter peace periods separated by a series of smaller wars. The first peace period lasted from the fall of Napoleon, in 1815, until the year of revolution, 1848. Then the wars for the unification of Italy and Germany began, which were brought to a conclusion in 1871. The second period of European peace under the Pax Britannica lasted from 1871 to 1914. As it happens, the two greatest non-European wars of the century, the Taiping Rebellion in China and the War of

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Secession in America, also both took place during these war years, 1848-71.

In the shadow of the Pax Britannica there was also the Indian peace, which lasted from the great Mutiny of 1857 until the birth-pangs of Pakistan and the resultant massacres.

This is the only period of peace in all India's long history — and it happened because this was the only epoch in which India was united.

The Pax Britannica relied, like most of the peace epochs, on non-aggressive power. The British fleet was at the service of world peace, as a sort of international naval police. Great Britain gave the members of her Empire a maximum degree of autonomy and a first-class legal and administrative system based on justice and honour. British judges were respected throughout the world for their incorruptibility. The English gentleman was held up as an example, not only to the Western world, but to civilized mankind as a whole. Britain led the world for three generations, without attempting to rule it. Thus the golden age of the nineteenth century came about.

8. Pax Helvetica (1,15-?)

Switzerland is only a spect on the map of the world, but despite this she is morally a great power. Living in the centre of a worn-torn Europe, she can look back on four and a half centuries of peace. Only a great nation could bring about such a miracle.

It began with the Battle or hardingnano (1515). Switzerland, relying on the best army in Europe, was attempting to capture Milan, reach the Mediterranean, and become a great power.

This army was defeated by the French. Switzerland abandoned her dream of greatness, and from then on, pcace has been the aim of her policy, peace at home and pcace abroad.

Only once in these centuries did Switzerland become the victim of foreign aggression—in 1798, when the French revolutionary army occupied Berne. Apart from that, there were isolated fights between Catholic and Protestant cantons, first of all during the period of the Reformation, and secondly in 1848, at the time of the so-called *Sonderbundskrieg* or Separate League War; but these struggles never developed into proper wars, and in the Separate League War the total casualties did not exceed the number of people killed in a serious train crash. Even the Thirty Years War remained remote from Switzerland. Only in Graubünden, which was not a part of Switzerland then, was there any fighting, when the French and Spaniards contended for control of the Alpine passes.

Since the French Revolution, Switzerland has enjoyed uninterrupted peace abroad — and since the Separate League War, equally uninterrupted peace at home — despite the two world wars. That Switzerland should have been spared the Second World War, when living in the very centre of a Europe cleft in two, is the greatest achievement, and also the greatest miracle, in the country's long history.

Anyone occupied with the problem of peace must stop and wonder how Switzerland managed to avoid becoming involved in the Second World War. The answer lies in Switzerland's neutrality; in her democratic and federal constitution; in the patriotism of her citizens; and in her military strength.

The Swiss policy of neutrality and the absence of all imperialist ambition were made plain after the First World

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War, when the Austrian province of the Vorarlberg requested with a majority of 95 per cent that it be incorporated with Switzerland. Geographically, the Vorarlberg would have rounded off the Swiss territories. Both in origin and in attitude, the inhabitants of the Vorarlberg are closely related to the Swiss. Any other state would have been happy to accept such an increase to its territory without having to fight a war. But to the amazement of the world the Swiss Federal Council declined the request of the Vorarlberg for incorporation. It was not until fifteen years had passed, and Hitler was in power, that the wisdom of this decision became apparent: Hitler would probably have demanded the return of this former Austrian province, and would have provoked a quarrel with Switzerland in order to obtain it.

The patriotism of the Swiss, which transcends all language differences, also enabled Switzerland to maintain her neutrality during the war. Had Hitler succeeded in creating a National Socialist Party in Switzerland, which would have been vocal in its demands for incorporation with the Reich—as he did in Austria and Czechoslovakia—the maintenance of Swiss neutrality would have been an impossibility. All Mussolini's attempts in the Ticino to organize a movement for unification with Italy were similarly a complete failure from the very beginning.

But all this would have availed Switzerland nothing had it not been for the relative size, armament and combat ability of her army. Had Switzerland possessed as weak an army as Norway, Hitler would undoub. .lly have attempted to march through western Switzerland with the purpose of rolling up the Maginot Line from the south instead of attacking it

frontally: and had Norway possessed as strong an army as the Swiss, Hitler would never have tried to overrun that secondary theatre of war.

Apart from these political reasons which ensured the peace of Switzerland during the Second World War, there were also geographical factors that contributed to it. The mountainous terrain facilitates the defence of Switzerland and makes its conquest more difficult. The natural poverty of the soil has been a contributory factor in protecting her from invasion; rich gold mines or oil wells would have spelt disaster for Switzerland.

The Swiss national character has also played its part in securing the neutrality of the country throughout generations. The Swiss are probably the most reasonable people in Europe, and perhaps in the world. They are not to be lured into taking part in ideological crusades. They know the value of peace, and they are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices in order to have it.

Fundamentally the Pax Helvetica can be traced to the same factors as are present in every other peace epoch: a policy of non-aggression, linked with military strength. The miracle of the Swiss peace is a source of hope for all Europe. It proves that Europeans speaking different languages can live peaceably together, provided that such cohabitation is sensibly organized on the basis of a federal constitution. What Switzerland has succeeded in doing for so many generations, in the centre of Europe, must also be possible for the rest of the continent — provided that Europe is prepared to learn from Swiss history and to draw the necessary practical conclusions.

CHAPTER SIX

THE VISION OF PEACE

1. Buddhism and Christianity

The vision of peace is as old as mankind. While the generals and statesmen have waged war, the founders of religions, and poets, have dreamed of peace, of a finer world in which men might love and not hate, might assist instead of killing one another. There are two roads to peace, the religious and the political: the one would bring it about by changing men, the other by changing the relationships between men. The religious vision of peace has existed from time immemorial, the political is modern.

Religious pacifism would create peace by mastering the bellicose instincts within the soul of nan. It derives from the belief that peaceable men do not go to war, whereas bellicose men will fight even though bound by agreements not to. Most of the founders of religions preached peace, harmony with oneself, with God and with one's fellow men, brotherly love and peaceableness. One of the Fen Commandments lays down: Thou shalt not kill. This is intended to forbid murder, but it leads logically to pacifism and the condemnation of war.

Among the greatest pacifists of all time was Gautama (or Buddha), the founder of the gentle religion of peace in the Orient. He forbade killing, not only of men, but also of beasts. He demanded the suppression of all bellicose instincts, lust for power, greed and ambition. A Buddhist ruler or statesman who

adhered strictly to his faith must be a pacifist. If the world had then become Buddhist, and if the Buddhists had followed the teachings of the founder of their faith, the world would now have been at peace for two and a half thousand years. In Asia, Buddhism has always been a powerful factor for peace, though it has happened that even Buddhist monks, particularly in Japan, have been heroic warriors—like the members of the orders of chivalry in the Christian Middle Ages.

Christianity has preached a similar mission of peace in the West. The Christian vision of peace was foreshadowed by the Prophets, who taught belief in the Messiah, that Prince of Peace of the House of David who would found the Kingdom of Peace.

The pacifism of the earliest Christians was close to that of the Buddhists. It derived from the Gospels, whose good tidings opened with the chorus that the angels sang at the birth of Christ: 'On earth peace, good will towards men.' In the Sermon on the Mount the peacemakers were declared to be blessed. Love of one's neighbour, and brotherly love, were the hub of the new doctrine, which regarded mankind as a single family, the children of a divine Father. In this Christian vision of the world there was no place for hatred, conquest or war.

The early Christians remained true to this doctrine of peace. They refused to draw the sword against their Roman persecutors. They remembered Christ's words to St Peter, when on the Mount of Olives the apostle drew his sword in defence of his master and cut off the ear of the servant of the high priest: 'Put up again thy sword into his place; for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword.' True to their master's example, the early Christians allowed themselves to

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be tortured and killed without attempting to defend themselves or considering an act of revolution to establish Christianity as the state religion. The pacifism of the early Christians was one of the reasons for their persecution by the Roman Empire, normally so very tolerant in matters of religion. Many a Roman may have feared that the introduction of Christianity might lessen the martial spirit of the legionaries, on whom the security and peace of the empire depended.

When Christianity became a state religion it shed its pacifist character. Had it not done so, Europe would have been conquered by the Huns. During the centuries of the migration of the peoples, pacifism would have meant suicide. One people stood against another, one man against another. He who did not fight was slaughtered. Struggle was the condition of survival. Nevertheless it was during that period of universal war that St Augustine had his great vision of peace, *De Civitate Dei*.

Throughout the Dark Ages Christianity could not alter the status of war, but attempts were made to make it less frightful. At no time was the message of peace, as preached in the Gospels, forgotten. The greatest success achieved during the Middle Ages was the *Treuga Dei*, the Peace of God, which compelled all Christians to lay aside their weapons for three days in each week. The Papacy again and again assumed the initiative, and offered, by its mediation as arbiter, to prevent wars or put an end to them.

The Holy War of Islam against Christianity placed Christendom in a paradoxical posit. Had Christendom offered only passive resistance, in the spirit of the early Christians, Byzantium, Rome, Aix-la-Chapelle and Paris would soon have

become Mohammedan cities. To prevent this, Christianity, and above all the Papacy, answered the Holy War of Islam with a Holy War of the Church. War against the unbelievers not only was tolerated but was actually promoted. Orders of chivalry arose which, in their fight for the Christian faith, employed the martial spirit of the heathen. The vision of peace withdrew into the monasteries, which became oases of peace in an age of war.

2. European Union and the Concept of Peace

During the fourteenth century the concept of a European league of peace first appeared. Its original spokesman was the French royal advocate, Pierre Dubois. In his treatise On the Recapture of the Holy Land he linked the concept of European peace with the idea of the Crusades. His book appeared soon after the evacuation of Acre, the last Christian strong-point in the Holy Land. It had probably become clear to Dubois that Europe had lost the struggle for the Holy Land because of European disunity. He therefore proposed that a European Union be formed, with an assembly containing representatives of all the princes and city-states, and with a court of law qualified to provide a peaceable solution to all quarrels arising within Christendom. Thus it ought to be possible to create a European army, with which to conquer first of all the Holy Land and later all the Mediterranean littoral.

Dubois's proposal was regional pacifism for imperialist purposes. He had probably heard of Marco Polo's reports concerning that great empire in the Far East, where civilization was incomparably more advanced, and the peoples enjoyed an

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incomparably higher-standard of living, than in the countless splinter states of divided Europe. Through unification, Europe ought to recover that internal peace, order and well-being which had been lost when the Roman Empire collapsed. At the beginning of the fourteenth century Dubois's contemporary, Dante, in his treatise *De Monarchia*, was also proposing the renewal of the Roman Empire, beneath the sceptre of the Emperor.

The first statesman who tried to put the theories of Dubois into practice was the Hussite King of the Bohemians, George of Poděbrad, a decade after the fall of Constantinople (1464). All eastern Europe was threatened by the Turks, and it seemed that only a pan-European power could prevent their further advance. It was therefore not difficult for him to persuade his two colleagues, the Kings of Poland and Hungary, to accept his proposed plan. The three kings sent a joint embassy from the east to Paris, where a request was laid before King Louis XI that he take the initiative in creating this European peace league. But Louis XI, who did not feel himself threatened by the Turks, dismissed the delegation with polite phrases and sent its members home.

For a century and a half the concept of a European peace slumbered. During this time the Reformation tore Europe asunder. By the end of it, the continent was far more disunited than ever it had been in the age of Poděbrad. While the Thirty Years War was raging, the due de Sully, one of the closest collaborators of King Henry IV of France, published his plan for a European peace, which has gone down in history under the title of the *Grand Dessein*. What was new in this plan was

the proposal that Europe's religious struggles be ended by the promulgation of freedom of worship for Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists alike. For the rest the *Grand Dessein* relied on Pierre Dubois's federalist ideas — for Sully, like the others before him, did not contemplate a world-wide peace, but only a European peace. A united European army would then capture North Africa.

The English Quakers, imbued with the ideals of the early Christians, were the first people to reconcile the European concept with the concept of peace. William Penn's Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe is directed not against the Turks, but only against war. Penn, the founder of Pennsylvania, demanded the creation of a European union, not for the purpose of liberating Constantinople or Jerusalem, but with the intention of ensuring peace in Europe and preparing the way for a universal peace. For him, pacifism was not simply a political, but a moral, question, and one deeply rooted in the Christian religion and in Christian ethics. Thus the Quaker movement became the first pacifist movement of modern times, and it still preserves this character today.

3. Pacifism Before the First World War

In the eighteenth century the concept of peace steadily gained adherents among the spiritual leaders of Europe. The Turkish peril had been dispelled. The Wars of Religion were over. Europe was a collection of absolutist states. The choice between war and peace depended solely upon a handful of European potentates. If it proved possible to persuade these monarchs of the blessings of peace, then it would be possible

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to secure the peace of Europe. This was the conviction of the German philosopher Leibniz, whose European Peace Plan received the backing of Austria's leading statesman, Prince Eugene of Savoy.

The champion of this concept during the first half of the century was the French Abbé de St-Pierre, who travelled from capital to capital trying to convince the kings and their ministers of the usefulness of a European union. He found two disciples whose importance surpassed his own; these were Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant.

Kant, in his femous treatise On Eternal Peace, advocated a league of nations for the maintenance of peace. But shortly after the publication of this treatise, the French Revolution broke out, and with it a fresh series of wars between the old Europe and the new; and it was only when the Napoleonic Wars were over that pacifism could be revived. Its theme is to be heard in the 'Holy Alliance'.

The reactionary tendencies of the Holy Alliance were condemned by the progressive intellectuals of Europe—but the pacifist movement lived on. Its most outstanding exponent was the Italian philosopher and fighter for freedom, Giuseppe Mazzini, the founder of 'Young Europe'. He proposed European revolution as the means, with European peace as the end. He dreamt of a United States of Europe, modelled on the United States of America and living in freedom and peace. Each of the European nations should create her own nation-state—internally free but externally united. This ideal was shared by a large proportion of ' ...ropean intellectuals. Victor Hugo was the most outstanding of the French pacifists. He opened the First European Congress of Pacifists, in 1849, with

a speech which remains even today as one of the finest documents of pacifist literature.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the socialists were the principal exponents of the concept of peace. The First and Second Internationals were both pacifist. Their slogan: 'Peace to the cottages — war to the palaces!' crystallizes their programme. Socialism turned against the nationalism and imperialism of the bourgeois world and wanted to impose a people's peace, if necessary by means of a general strike. It demanded general disarmament and a system of international arbitration. When the socialists found pacifism it was only an intellectual theory, but they turned it into a popular movement.

In liberal circles too the concept of peace spread steadily. Towards the turn of the century a remarkable woman — an Austrian, Bertha von Suttner — championed the concept of peace, and her book *Die Waffen nieder!* had a great effect upon world opinion: the Czar Nicholas II was attracted by her ideas, and summoned the Hague Peace Conference, which resulted in the creation of the permanent International Court; Andrew Carnegie endowed the Hague Palace of Peace and the Carnegie Peace Foundation; Alfred Nobel, also under her influence, founded the peace prize that bears his name. During the Russo-Japanese War, Russia's greatest writer, Leo Tolstoy, spoke out against war, and became the outstanding representative of that religious pacifism which has its roots in early Christianity. However, this strong pacifist movement was not capable of averting the catastrophe of the First World War.

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4. Pacifism After the First World War

By the end of the First World War, war-weariness was so pronounced that pacifism became a world-wide movement. Two men drew their own conclusions from this longing for peace: Lenin and Wilson. Lenin signed a peace-at-any-price, and called upon the soldiers of all the nations to end the World War by mutiny and desertion: the whole world should be united, under the leadership of the workers and peasants, into a single Soviet Union which would simultaneously abolish war and capitalism. The main desire of Wilson was not to end the war but to win it, and by so doing close the era of wars and inaugurate an age of world peace: the coming peace should mark the end not only of the World War but of all wars, and in future, disputes between states should be solved peaceably, by means of a universal League of Nations.

Wilson's ideas carried the day against Lenin's, in winning popular approval. The terror and chaos created by the new force of Bolshevism frightened not only the Western, but also the Central, Powers. The Western Powers were determined not to renounce their aim of final victory. The Central Powers hoped for just peace terms based on Wilson's ideas. On both sides of the front the figure of Wilson assumed a super-dimensional importance. He was seen as heralding in the new age of world peace. Germany and Austria surrendered not only to the armies of the Allies but also to the Wilsonian ideas which compelled them to seek an armistice. At this moment Wilson was the most popular man in the world. He embodied the hopes of all mankind (apart from the Soviet Union).

These hopes were soon disappointed. At the Paris Peace

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Conference, Wilson, who had seemed such a strong man in the White House, showed himself to be both weak and lacking in skill. He was in no way capable of dealing with his nationalist colleagues Clemenceau and Lloyd George, in the discussions that now took place. His basic theories were modified until they became unrecognizable, and in some cases were actually turned topsy-turvy. Instead of the peace by agreement that Wilson had offered the world, the Treaty of Versailles was in fact one of the harshest peace treaties in history. Instead of the peace without annexations or levies that had been promised, the treaty involved the annexation of Germany's colonial empire and a bill of a fantastic size for reparations. Wilson proved himself incapable of mediating between the Allies. In the disagreements over Dalmatia and Fiume the seed was sown of the future Italo-Yugoslavian war. The Habsburg monarchy was dismembered not only politically but also economically, an injury to her inhabitants and to the world at large.

The peoples of central Europe accused Wilson of having swindled them with his promise of a just peace. The Western Powers accused him of having deprived them of the fruits of victory by his dogmatic idealism and obstinacy. Meanwhile the United States Senate rebelled against Wilson's policy, which was opposed to the isolationist tradition handed down by George Washington. While Wilson in Paris fought for the League of Nations as the supreme objective of his policy, he was being sniped at from the rear in his own country. Within a few months his unparalleled popularity was a thing of the past, on both sides of the Atlantic.

The peace treaties contained the seeds of the Second World

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War. But Wilson hall saved one solitary ray of hope at the Paris Peace Conference, the League of Nations, and he trusted that when the hatred engendered by the war had faded, the League of Nations might serve as the instrument for revising the treaties and modifying the harshness of the terms imposed. The conference was followed by the sickness and collapse of Wilson, and America's refusal to ratify the Paris treaties or to join the League of Nations.

From now on, pacifism in the non-Bolshevik world was closely linked with the League of Nations. For a decade the foreign policie of the great powers were pacifist. The world believed that the era of peace had already begun. Only the blackest pessimists recognized the shadow of the Second World War. During these years the Soviet Union was too busy rebuilding the ruins left by her civil war to constitute a serious danger to the peace of the world. As a result of its unsuccessful attempt in 1921 to seize Polish territory, the Soviet Union had lost its pacifist aureole. It abandoned parifism in its propaganda and declared its readiness to use force, and even to go to war, should this prove necessary in order to free the working class from capitalist oppression.

Meanwhile the United States pursued its policy for peace outside the League of Nations. In 1921 President Harding summoned the Naval Disarmament Conference at Washington. It was completely successful. Secretary of State Kellogg proposed to the world that it renounce var as an instrument of policy. The Briand-Kellogg Pact was a noteworthy document in the history of pacifism.

In Europe the Paneuropean movement, for the creation of a United States of Europe, was founded in 1923. Its principal

object was the prevention of a second world war by means of a Franco-German reconciliation; further, it planned to raise the living standard of the inhabitants of the Continent by means of a European customs union; also a Paneuropean defensive alliance would safeguard Europe against invasion from the East.¹

The Paneuropean movement expanded rapidly. From its headquarters in Vienna it soon acquired adherents in all nations and classes of Europe. In America too it met with understanding and support. Many leading European statesmen joined the movement, as did almost all the intellectual leaders of the Continent. In the first congress of the movement was held in Vienna, with a large attendance. A year later the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand, became honorary president and tried to put the ideas of the movement into practice, but his attempt to take the initiative in Europe did not succeed.

The victory of German National Socialism in split the peace movement. In Germany pacifists were silenced, persecuted and punished. In the rest of the world there were two opposing points of view: one demanded that Hitler be met half way, so that he might fulfil his national foreign programme without having recourse to war; the other demanded massive rearmament and the isolation of Hitler, in the expectation that the failure of his foreign policy would lead to his fall and thence to the possibility of a German-European reconciliation. The Paneuropean movement adopted the policy of resistance

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to Hitler, but found itself in opposition to the majority of pacifists, who hoped to avoid war by appearing him.

The appeasement point of view led to the Munich conference of 1908. By most pacifists throughout the wor! 1, Neville Chamberlain was regarded as a hero, the saviour of mankind from the menace of world war. It needed Hitler's occupation of Prague to open these people's eyes. Even the blindest among them realized then that only a policy of rearmament and alliances could save Europe from being conquered by Hitler's brown armies.

5. Pacifism After the Second World War

The outbreak of the Second World War, which was followed immediately by the collapse of the League of Nations, marked the end of a period of optimism in the history of European pacifism. During the first few years of the war there was no pacifist movement of significance anywhere. The Paneuropean movement, from America, was working for a federal organization of Europe after the victory of the Allies; but victory tay in the remote future, and was problematical. Only with the turning-point of the war, in November, did the governments begin to occupy themselves with the problems of peace and so with organizations for peace.

The main problem was less one of co-operation with a conquered Germany and Japan than one of future collaboration between the West and the Soviet Union; it was a question of re-creating the League of Nons with a new name and a new covenant. As Wilson had championed the League of Nations, so Roosevelt now championed the United Nations

Organization, which, immediately after his death, came into existence at the San Francisco Conference. Its foundation coincided with the collapse of the Third Reich.

As soon as the Second World War ended, with the capitulation of Japan, the 'Cold War' between the Soviet Union and the United States began. A third vorld war appeared imminent. The United Nations Organization was crippled, but the Paneuropean idea made progress. As had happened during the Middle Ages, the idea of European peace was now linked with that of European defence. In Winston Churchili took the initiative in reviving the movement for the unification of Europe, which was now called 'The European Movement'. At the same time those parliamentarians who accepted the European idea formed the 'Union of European Parliamentarians'. Both these organizations brought pressure to bear on the various governments, with the result that in the Council of Europe was founded at Strasbourg, an embryonic United States of Europe.¹

This new European movement regarded as its prime task, not the securing of world peace but the defence of Europe against the imperialism of the Soviet Union and the liberation of the oppressed nations of eastern Europe. It received the wholehearted support of the United States, implemented by the Marshall Plan. Thus it forms a part of the anti-Bolshevik system of alliance organized in the East and the West under American leadership.

Russia's reaction to this anti-Bolshevik European movement was to promote the Stockholm peace movement. Stalin

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was skilful enough, to organize the pro-Russian pacifist conference not in Moscow or Prague, but in neutral Stockholm. The naive pacifists of the West were to be led to believe that this was no communist, but a neutral, peace movement, which would bring together prominent representatives of pacifism from both camps.

The Stockholm movement, acting under the shadow cast by the atomic bomb, evoked a great response. By means of it, Stalin weakened the powers of resistance of the West, and moreover won the friendship of Western pacifists who were not communists. The movement broadcast the liew that Stalin's policy aimed at world peace but was everywhere confronted by the imperialist policy of America and her satellites, who were preparing an anti-Bolshevik crusade. This propaganda line was the exact contrary of the truth — but it was effective nevertheless, and the result was that international pacifism, working for an understanding between Fast and West, became either dependent on Moscow, or suspect of such dependency.

To this attempt of Moscow's to corner the vision of peace, the reaction of the West was to renew religious pacifism. Pope Pius XII mobilized the Catholic Church for the concept of peace, and he was to the end of his life the outstanding figure of Western pacifism. The value of this Catholic peace movement is all the greater in that it is free from all taint of communist infiltration. Without abandoning its fundamental anti-Bolshevism, the Vatican will not now accept the policy of crusades, but adheres instead to the first traditions of early Christian pacifism, based not on treaties but on the hearts of men. The Protestant Churches too are striving in the cause of the concept

of peace, as is the so-called Oxford Group for Moral Rearmament, which, from its headquarters at Caux, works for humane understanding between various nations, classes and races, and thus serves the interest of world peace.

Nowadays the concept of peace is better served by the foreign policy of the United States than by all the pacifist movements. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower learnt from the tragic example of European policy towards Hitler. They were not prepared to repeat this policy of weakness and disunity when confronted with Stalin. Recognizing that dictators will listen only to a voice backed by strength, the United States has replied to the Russian threat of war by creating a power bloc such as the world has never before seen in time of peace; this has been done by rearmament and alliances. In the West this power bloc is based on NATO, in the East on SEATO. It has become clear to the Soviet leaders that they must inevitably lose any war fought against this coalition, and that after such a defeat their country must suffer the fate of the Third Reich and of Japanese militarism.

American policy has prevented a third world war. Paradoxically enough, it has resulted in an improvement of relations between West and East. On it depends, and will continue to depend, the peace of the world, until the day comes when there is true understanding between West and East thanks to the creation of a world-embracing federation for peace.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THREE ORGANIZATIONS FOR PEACE

1. The Holy Alliance

AFTER the great flood, mankind attempted to banish the danger of such natural catastrophes by building a sky-scraper. Similarly after each of the last three great wars, mankind has attempted to create a world alliance for the prevention of new wars: first the Holy Alliance, then the League of Nations, then the United Nations Organization.

The Holy Alliance has been saddled with a worse reputation than it deserves. For this it can thank its liberal contemporaries and those liberal historians who have regarded it not as an organization for peace but simply as the bulwark of reaction and an instrument for national oppression. It was undoubtedly reactionary: but it was at the same time the first practical attempt to abolish war. This ought to win it an honourable place in world history, despite all its mistakes.

The idea, like the text, of the Holy Alliance originated with the Czar Alexander I. The other founders, in addition to the Czar, were the Emperor Francis of Austria and King Frederick-William of Prussia. The text of the agreement was signed by the three monarchs in September 1815, in Paris.

The point of departure of the Holy Alliance is the thought that Christendom constitutes a single nation. The rulers of Christendom are morally under an obligation to govern this nation in the Christian spirit of brotherly love, peace and

justice, and according to the tenets of the Christian faith. The same moral bases which prevail in private life ought now to apply in political, and above all in international, relations. The Holy Alliance was conceived as an indissoluble alliance between the rulers, who bore the same responsibilities towards their peoples that a father has towards his children.

This religious aspect of the Holy Alliance derives from the mysticism of the Czar Alexander. The cynical Prince Metternich thought nothing of this document. He advised his king to sign it, out of politeness, after he had first made a few significant alterations to the original text. In the first draft Alexander had spoken of fraternity not only between rulers but also between peoples; it was Metternich who limited the principle of fraternity to monarchs. Alexander had proposed in his draft that the various armies of Europe should henceforth be regarded as the component parts of a single army; Metternich deleted this clause too. Alexander had suggested that from then on Austria, Prussia and Russia regard themselves as three provinces of the Christian nation; for 'provinces' Metternich substituted the word 'branches'.

The three monarchs invited all the European sovereigns, including the Swiss Confederacy and the Pope, to join the Alliance. Only the Pope refused. King George of England accepted in principle, with the reservation that by the nature of the British constitution it was not possible for him formally to join. In all, forty-five states expressed their willingness to sign.

The Alliance was a bright omen, in that for the first time the various Christian faiths found a common ground in their Christianity. Alexander, Francis and Frederick-William, so far as this document was concerned, regarded themselves not

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as Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant, but simply as Christians. After all the centuries of religious wars, the description of Europe as a 'Christian nation' was a great step forward. It was probably because of this supra-denominational formula that the Pope did not join.

The political aim of the Holy Alliance was to perpetuate the new European order, brought into being by the Congress of Vienna, on the basis of the principle of legitimacy. The Holy Alliance was a pact of mutual insurance, by and for the rulers, against wars and revolutions. All those rulers had been alive when the King and Queen of France met their tragic fate on the guillotine. Nothing was more natural than that they should now adopt a counter-revolutionary attitude. They were perfectly well aware that the wars of Napoleon were the continuation of the revolutionary wars. Every revolution seemed to them to be a potential breeder of fresh wars, and they hoped, by suppressing the revolutionary and nationalist movements, to nip these menacing wars in the bud. Apart from this basic attitude towards the new ideas of liberalism and nationalism, Alexander was determined that an independent Poland should not be allowed to exist; and the Emperor Francis and Metternich were equally against the idea of a free, united Italy.

The Holy Alliance was a sort of plaster cast in which the rulers planned to set the bones of the peoples of Europe, broken and fractured in the long wars. History was to be made to stand still, so that the peoples might make up the sleep they had lost. Naturally the kings and their statesmen were well aware that sooner or later the peoples would rise up against the reactionary system of the Holy Alliance; but for the moment, peace was preserved, and a relapse into revolution prevented.

Europe was enabled to recover from the losses and devastation caused by twenty-three years of war.

The system of the Holy Alliance stood the test of the Spanish and Neapolitan liberal revolutions. In Naples, Austrian troops restored the reactionary order; in Spain, French soldiers did the same. The solidarity of the rulers against the people had been proved.

The first blow suffered by the Holy Alliance came from America. The young American republic had not been invited to join the Alliance. The United States seemed both insignificant and remote. In any case, such an invitation would have been refused, since the concepts of liberty on which the United States was based were incompatible with the reactionary tendencies of the European monarchs.

When the Holy Alliance planned a campaign against the revolutionaries in South America, and Russia attempted to push forward her Alaskan frontier as far as California, then a province of Mexico, America reacted by propounding the Monroe Doctrine in 1821. Henceforth the United States would tolerate no interference by any European power in the affairs of the American continent.

Behind America stood England, which saw with disquict a united Continent across the Channel, a system of alliances reaching from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Alaskan border of Canada. So England became the opponent of the Holy Alliance, and allied herself with every liberal movement among the peoples of Europe. Supported by English maritime supremacy, little America dared to defy the Holy Alliance. Europe had no choice but to make what adjustments it could, to fit the new situation in the Americas.

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The crisis for the Holy Alliance was brought about by the Greek uprising against the Sultan. The Sultan was not a member of the Holy Alliance, so the Holy Alliance was not obliged to support him against his rebellious Greek subjects; nevertheless Metternich came out on the side of the Sultan, and against the revolution. But the Czar was for the Christians, in their revolt against their Mohammedan oppressor. As the Holy Alliance was intended to ensure the solidarity of monarchs as well as the solidarity of Christendom, both Austria and Russia were acting in the spirit of that alliance — each according to her light. In 1828 occurred the naval battle of Navarino; and the Russian fleet, together with British and French squadrons, destroyed the Turko-Egyptian fleet. Greece was free — but the Holy Alliance was shaken to its foundations.

This was followed in 1830 by the revolution in France, and the revolt of the Belgians against the Dutch. In Paris and Brussels, liberal and constitutional ideas were victorious. The France of Louis-Philippe adhered to England instead of to the Austrian Emperor. The Holy Alliance had degenerated into a triple pact, uniting Russia, Prussia and Austria. Its character as an organization for peace had gone.

But the spirit of the Holy Alliance came alive once more. In 1848 the Hungarian revolution against Austria broke out, and in 1849, the Czar Nicholas I, without being asked, and simply in the spirit of monarchical solidarity, sent an army over the Carpathians to help the Emperor Franz Joseph crush the rebellion. The Hungarian army of liberation surrendered to the Russians, and the Russians than withdrew, without making any demands of Austria. Four years later, when the Crimean War began, Russia found herself fighting Turkey, England,

France and Sardinia, and she reckoned at the least on Austria's adopting an attitude of benevolent neutrality. But instead, Austria signed a pact with Turkey, and compelled the Russians to evacuate the Danubian principalities, and then proceeded to occupy them herself. Thus the route to Constantinople was closed to the Russians. Shortly after this the Czar Nicholas I died — of fury, it is said, at Austria's ingratitude. And that was the end of the Holy Alliance.

2. The League of Nations

At the close of the First World War the peoples were just as weary of fighting as they had been after the Napoleonic period. Once again the attempt was made to banish the menace of war for ever by means of a world organization. The part previously played by the Czar Alexander now fell to President Wilson; the League of Nations took over the role of the Holy Alliance. The new enduring peace was to be based on the solidarity not of the rulers but of the peoples: not on the principle of legitimacy, but on the right to self-determination: not on the grace of God, but on democracy.

Wilson had already announced his programme for peace while the war was still going on: the 'Fourteen Points'. These were intended not only to end the war but also to provide the cornerstone for a community of peoples that would henceforth guarantee the preservation of world peace. This idea had an enthusiastic reception; at last a war-weary humanity could hope that the way to peace had been discovered, the way to life and to disarmament.

The conditions for the creation of an enduring peace based

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on democracy seemed more favourable than ever before. The whole world had accepted the democratic principle. A few weeks before America declared war on Germany, the Czardom had collapsed and democracy had been introduced into Russia. This transformed the First World War into an ideological war: on the one side were the democracies of East and West, on the other the three emperors at Berlin, Vienna and Constantinople. The whole world seemed to be becoming democratic. Even reactionary China had for the past few years been a republic under an extremely progressive president, Sun Yat Sen. Japan appeared to be developing steadily towards a constitutional monarchy. It was plain that after the final victory of the Allies, the Central Powers would have to scrap the last remnants of their militarism and feudalism and fit themselves into the democratic-republican pattern. For the first time in history the world seemed to be ideologically one. The danger that a monarch would ever again start a war, in defiance of the people's will for peace, had evidently been banished. President Wilson's prestige appeared to guarantee that the ideas of the American Revolution had now become the common property of mankind, the laws by which our planet was to be governed.

Across this optimistic vision there fell a sinister shadow, the Russian October Revolution; this was the victory of anti-democratic Bolshevism over Kerensky's democratic regime. Despite this incident, the West did not abandon its hopes for an era of global democracy. After Lenin's defeat by the advancing German troops, and his signing a peace of capitulation at Brest-Litovsk, the whole Western world reckoned on the imminent collapse of communism in Russia. When the

Central Powers had surrendered, some Allied statesmen wished to send troops to Russia for the purpose of assisting the counter-revolution and overthrowing Bolshevism. They refrained from so doing, because they calculated that so absurd a system as communism must break down of its own. This collapse of communism, owing to its inherent senselessness and incompetence, would then act as a salutary lesson for the rest of mankind; and such a warning example was not to be deprived of its full effectiveness by the intervention of foreign troops. When in 1919 the League of Nations was founded, a place on the Council was left empty for the representative of a democratic Russia. But instead of collapsing, the revolutionary army forged by Trotsky defeated the armies of the counterrevolutionaries, even though these were supported by the Western Powers. The young Soviet Union became not a member of the League of Nations, but its bitterest enemy.

The second blow suffered by the League of Nations was America's refusal to join. The United States had emerged from the war as the greatest power on earth, materially, militarily, economically and morally. Its armies had suffered only light losses, its naval and air fleets were the strongest in the world. It seemed as though a Pax Americana would succeed the Pax Britannica, which had lasted for a century. President Wilson was the world's arbiter and peacemaker. Mankind expected America to take over the leadership of the League of Nations which President Wilson had founded, and to be both its buckler and its backbone. The strongest peace ideology in the world would then be united with the world's greatest power. America would be the principal support of the League of Nations, even as the Soviet Union was of World Revolution. These hopes

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were dashed, when the American Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and by so doing prevented signature of the League of Nations pact. Wilson was seriously ill and no longer capable of continuing his fight for the League of Nations in the United States. The American isolationists overcame the internationalists. In the presidential elections Wilson's adherents were defeated.

Thus when the League of Nations was born, at Geneva in 1920, the two strongest powers in the world, Russia and America, were absent. All the same, the League of Nations was a powerful collection of states. It represented more than half of mankind and of the globe: Great Britain with her Dominions and India; France, Italy, Spain, Standinavia, and most of the other European states; all Latin America; Japan, China, the Near East, plus a few isolated African or Asian nations.

From the very beginning, France and Britain were the two undisputed leaders of the League. The secretary-general, Sir Eric Drummond, was an Englishman, and Albert Thomas, who ran the associated International Labour Office, was a Frenchman. It France and Britain were united, the League of Nations was strong. If they were divided, it was impotent.

The League of Nations suffered a severe setback in 1922, with the victory of fascism in Italy. Its moral unity, which had been founded upon a common principle of democracy, was broken. Mussolini, though he remained a member of the League, missed no opportunity a showing his contempt for it; and soon Spain, under General Primo de Rivera, became the second dictatorship within the League.

One year after Mussolini's seizure of power, Italian officers of the Greek-Albanian frontier demarcation commission were murdered by unknown assassins, and as the murders had taken place on Greek soil, Mussolini occupied Corfu. The League of Nations concerned itself with the incident, but only when Greece had been declared the guilty party did the Italians evacuate Corfu. By its action the League prevented the secession of Italy — but it lost its own moral authority.

In France attempted to turn the League into an effective organization for peace, by means of the so-called 'Geneva protocol for the peaceful settlement of international disputes'. The protocol was unanimously accepted, but subsequently foundered when the British Government refused to sign it; and once again the League of Nations had only a loss of prestige to show.

The highest point in the history of the League was reached with the admission of Germany. This success was, it is true, arranged outside the League of Nations, at the Locarno Conference; all the same, Geneva now became the scene of brilliant duels of oratory between Briand and Stresemann, the two stars of the Geneva world theatre. Germany's entry made it possible for Briand to bring the question of the unification of Europe into the Geneva forum, but this initiative of his was nullified by Britain's unwillingness either to join a European union or to agree to the creation of such a union from which she herself was absent.

The true crisis for the League of Nations began when Japan invaded Manchuria. This led to war between two members of the League, Japan and China. Instead of intervening energetically on the side of China, the League attempted

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to mediate; but despite its weak and divided attitude, the League lost Japan's membership. In that same year, shortly after the victory of National Socialism, Germany also withdrew from the League. Two of its American members, Bolivia and Paraguay, were at war with each other, and the League could not prevent it. The International Disarmament Conference, which the League had called at Geneva, went its fruitless way.

The only apparent success Geneva had to show during these years was the admission of the Soviet Union. Till then the League of Nations had been an outspokenly anti-Bolshevik organization. With the departure of Japan and Germany, and the entry of the Soviet Union, it became anti-fascist, though Italy remained a member.

In Italy attacked Abyssinia. For the first time in its history the League imposed economic sanctions against the aggressor, but it could not steel itself to take the two decisive steps that would have brought about the end of the war and the collapse of fascism: the closing of the Suez Canal, and the oil embargo. Mussolini conquered Abyssinia despite the League's sanctions, the League failed to support the defeated Negus, and Italy walked out of Geneva, having dealt it a moral and mortal blow.

The three great powers that had withdrawn from the League, Germany, Italy and Japan, now formed a rival organization, the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact, theoretically directed against the Soviet Union, but in fact aimed at the democracies as well. Once again the world was split into two camps. Once again the spectre of world war threatened. This division of the world became apparent during the Spanish Civil War, when

Germany and Italy sided with Franco's party while Russia and France backed the united democrats and communists.

The League of Nations was powerless. When in Germany annexed Austria, and Italy Albania, the League of Nations did not raise a finger in support of its two victimized members — for fear of reprisals by Hitler and Mussolini. It remained equally passive during the double crisis that led first to the annexation of the Sudetenland and later to the occupation of all Czechoslovakia. When the Second World War began, the League of Nations seemed as impotent as a rabbit confronted by a cobra.

Only once more did the League stir itself to act; this was when the Soviet Union attacked Finland. The League expelled the Soviet Union. Then it passed away, unwept, unhonour'd, and unsung.

3. The United Nations Organization

During the first few years of the Second World War it seemed not only that the League of Nations was dead, but that the idea of such a league had died with it. The world was hopelessly divided into three ideological groups, which confronted one another with arms in their hands and a total lack of understanding in their hearts. Only when Germany attacked Russia, and America came to the aid of Britain and Russia, did it become necessary to consider the future of this great coalition, which went by the name of 'the United Nations'.

In August, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met in Newfoundland Bay. They published the

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'Atlantic Charter', a blueprint for the coming peace. This document assumed the same importance in the Second World War as Wilson's Fourteen Points had had in the First. Within a few months it was countersigned by the representatives of fifty Allied states.

The Atlantic Charter marks the foundation of a new league of nations. But no one contemplated resurrecting the old one: the Soviet Union wanted no part of an organization that had shown it the door, and America remembered the campaign against the League of Nations that her isolationists had waged after the First World War. Nevertheless, what in fact happened was that the old League of Nations was revived under a new name, uno, or the United Nations Organization; and in April

a world conference assembled at San Francisco to work out the statutes of the new organization, which in essentials were similar to those of the League.

The United Nations Organization at the time of its birth had one great advantage and one great handicap. Compared with the League of Nations, it had the advantage of having the two most powerful nations in the world, America and Russia, as members. Compared not only with the League of Nations but also with the Holy Alliance, it had the handicap of having no common ideolog v. From the very beginning the United Nations Organization was split into two hostile camps, a democratic party under American leadership, and a communist one which the Russians led and lead. From the beginning the organs of the United Nations — the Security Council and the General Assembly — w. e turned into battlefields of the cold war between East and West. The Russians, by using their veto, have sabotaged every resolution not to their liking:

only thus have they been able to resist the great numerical majority America has won and controls!

In the United Nations Organization faced a test that would decide whether or not it was fit to survive. Communist North Korea attacked non-communist South Korea, which thereupon appealed to the United Nations. The United Nations intervened. A uno army, consisting principally of American divisions, went to the help of South Korea and drove back the North Korean aggressors. But when the uno army pursued the North Koreans to the Chinese border, a strong Chinese force marched across the frontier and drove the uno army back to the old demarcation line between North and South Korea, the thirty-eighth parallel. Despite this, the object of the United Nations action had been achieved: the communist attack on South Korea had been repulsed. Where the League of Nations had failed, the United Nations had succeeded: uno had not repeated its predecessor's fatal error.

All the same, the activities of the United Nations have been hampered from the start by the Russo-American conflict. America has drawn the necessary conclusions from this, and has created a system of alliances uniting her friends, both in the East and in the West, into a single, unified front: in the West this is called NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), in the East SEATO (the South-East Asia Treaty Organization).

This double system of alliances today embraces more than half the world, and constitutes the seed of a new and mighty world organization. But on the other side of the Iron Curtain there is the Russo-Chinese alliance, amplified by Russia's European satellites, and this system of alliances too is a sort of

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league of nations, based upon a very real power organization. And between these two mighty blocs there is a chain of neutral states such as India, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria.

So today, despite the United Nations, the world is more fundamentally split in two than ever before. The very phrase 'United Nations' is a mockery of the world situation. Like the two previous attempts to bring the world into a united organization for world peace, this third attempt also has failed.

CHAPTER EIGHT

WORLD FEDERATION

I. Global State or Global War?

COMEWHERE, on a remote island in the Pacific, there live Seventy families. They are descended from the survivors of shipwrecks, and some are Europeans, others Chinese. One day they decide to scrap the police, justice, law, and all authority. Each family is entitled to do exactly as it pleases. Should the head of the family or the family council so decide, each family, alone or in alliance with other families, may fall upon its neighbours, kill them, rob them, or even exterminate them. No one can doubt that murder and violence must soon break out on this island, for the sake of houses and fields, bread and guns, men or women: from the lust for power or from wickedness, from the desire for adventure or from injured pride, from greed or from folly. There will also be fighting to decide whether the Chinese should be considered the equal of the Europeans, and whether they, or perhaps some other race, should be forbidden to own land. Finally the inhabitants of this unfortunate island will kill one another during a dispute as to whether this anarchy should continue or whether they should organize themselves: more deaths will occur while they are deciding what form an organization should take, and under whose leadership it should be placed. These fights, murders and plunderings will last until the island's population has been eliminated, or until it is united under the rule of law. This rule

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of law can be brought about by an assembly of the islanders and the election of an administration, police and judges; or else a single family, with the help of allied groups of families, can seize power, and, by force, impose a constitution, laws and peace upon the island.

Our planet is just such an island today, without laws, without a constitution, without a system of justice, without a police force. The sovereign states that inhabit the planet, and that have shared out its surface among themselves according to the laws of the jungle, recognize no authority save that of the mailed fist, the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. The natural result of such a state of affairs is chronic mass-murder, or what we call war. The only remarkable thing is that on such a planet there are any periods of peace at all.

Only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as a result of fabulous progress in the technique of transportation and communication, has our planet become one small island. Before them there were large and small oases of civilization, separated from one another by seas, mountains, deserts and steppes. Each of these oases was a world on its own and had to cope with its own particular problems of regional organization, putting an end to its own wars and raising the standard of living of its own inhabitants. All these oases of civilization experienced the same fate: peace through unification, war through division.

Before Cyrus, Asia Minor lived in a condition of chronic wars. The empire of the Achaen unidae produced relative peace. With its collapse a new series of wars began, which has continued until today.

In the Mediterranean, chaos among nations was the rule, for thousands of years: a perpetual war, until Rome created an empire of peace. After the fall of the Roman Empire a new war began, a free-for-all which has lasted until our time.

In China there was peace when the country was united, war when it was not.

For thousands of years Central and South America were the theatres of chronic wars. After the Spanish conquest of the Inca and Aztec empires, there came six generations of peace. With the liberation and breaking up of South America, the original state of affairs, in which wars are periodic, has returned.

What areas such as the Near East, the Mediterranean, China and Latin America represented in the past, the surface of the globe is today. Our planet is now smaller than was the Persian Empire at the time of the Achaemenidae, the Roman Empire under the Caesars, the Chinese Empire during the Han period, or South America when the Spaniards ruled it. All the peoples of the world are in contact with one another, bumping into one another, constantly treading on one another's toes in this modern crush of nations. The alternatives are plain to see: the end must be either a world state, or mutual extermination through atomic war.

There is another pair of alternatives. Will the necessary unification of mankind be forced on it by one power or group of powers, or will global amalgamation be brought about by the methods of free discussion? On the answer to this question depends whether twentieth-century mankind endures the apocalyptic frightfulness of a third world war or succeeds in preventing it.

History shows that unions between states have usually been

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brought about by force and not by voluntary action. The great peaceful empires, and mankind's major epochs of peace, have been the products of great wars. There are, however, examples of peaceful and voluntary union between independent states, though it must be admitted that such unions have always arisen in opposition to a common enemy.

In the ancient world the Attic Maritime League, directed against the Persian Empire, was successfully created by a voluntary union of Greek cities and islands. In the Middle Ages, the foundation of the Swiss Confederacy is the finest example of association by free choice. In 1291 the three cantons, Schwyz, Uri and Unterwalden, joined together in an 'eternal union', to which the town of Lucerne soon adhered, and gradually all the rest of Switzerland. The seven provinces of the Low Countries, and the thirteen colonies of North America, became united in much the same fashion. Each of these unions was a community for waging war, but they all survived the period of their war and transformed themselves into communities for peace. The unification of Italy in the nineteenth century was also freely accomplished without pressure from abroad - though it was directed against Austria and the Church State.

There are, as well, numerou examples of the free association of peoples and states through marriages and inheritance. The union of England and Scotland was accomplished without bloodshed; so was that of Castile and Aragon, which produced the great power of Spain. The Habsburg monarchy owed its very existence to one marriage, and so did the union between Poland and Lithuania, which lasted for centuries. Each of these unions put an end to a series of wars.

The greatest problem confronting the younger generation today is how the two thousand five hundred million inhabitants of our planet are to be united in a single world state. The technical prerequisites for such a union are already to hand—only the psychological ones are not.

The structure of this world state can only be a federation. All the great powers of the world are federations: the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union, the French Union, the Chinese People's Republic, the United States of India — to mention only some of the greatest. A centralized solution to the problem of a global state is not possible, in view of the cultural diversity of mankind.

2. Global Police and Global Justice

In order to ensure world peace the global federation will need two organs: a world court for the peaceful solution of supra-national disputes, and a world police to protect its members against the danger of attack and to enforce the decisions of the world court. The problem of a world police is an easy one to solve: that of a world court is difficult.

As soon as the great powers agree, all heavy weapons, such as bombers, rockets and aircraft carriers, can be entrusted to a central global police authority. Such an arsenal would also, of course, include the atomic weapons if it had not been found possible to destroy them completely. All other weapons could be left to the national armies, under international control, since no state would be in a position to wage war against the global federation in view of the federation's crushing technical superiority.

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The obstacles to the creation of this world police are not technical, but political. The supreme commander of the world army would be the most powerful man on earth. Who should appoint him?

In an ideologically unified world this problem is soluble. NATO has found the answer, and so has the Warsaw Pact Organization. Only in a world that is ideologically split is it insoluble. The Western world would refuse to accept an Eastern supreme commander, and vice versa. Were the supreme command entrusted to a committee on which both East and West were represented, such a committee would be incapable of action in a major crisis. Apart from that, in a real crisis the world police would probably be split asunder by mutiny, and two armies, one Eastern and the other Western, would fight one another instead of co-operating as a police force.

More difficult than the organization of a global police would be the setting up of a world court. Such a court is needed for the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations. But for this purpose it would require recognized rules of international law — which do not exist.

There is only one, very unsatisfactory, way of circumventing this difficulty, and that is the division of political problems into two categories, the solubil and the insoluble. The soluble should be decided by an international court, such as the Hague Court or a court of arbitration; the insoluble will have to be postponed until an alteration to the global situation makes their peaceful solution possible.

This principle has led to the so ival of the British Commonwealth, which may well claim to be the pilot model for the future world organization. It includes men of every race,

philosophy and religion. It does not pretend to be able to solve every question that arises, but is content to ensure the peaceful coexistence of its members in a spirit of mutual tolerance. It is a masterpiece of political wisdom, and at the same time a bulwark of world peace.

3. Disarmament

There is a widespread superstition, that armaments are the cause of war and disarmament would therefore be the way to peace. Such an opinion shows a confusion of cause with effect: armaments are the effect, and not the cause, of international tension. Power is neither good nor evil: whether it is good or evil depends simply on how it is employed. Armaments can promote war but can also promote peace, they can heighten or lessen the danger of war.

The Roman peace was maintained thanks to the strength of the legions; the weakening of the legions led to the irruption of the Teutons, the migration of the peoples, and war. The British peace was maintained by the strength of the British fleet. The disarmament of the Allies after the First World War was among the causes of the outbreak of the Second. American disarmament immediately after the end of the Second World War conjured up the menace of a Russo-American war; it is only America's massive rearmament during and since the Korcan War that has led to the partial decrease of that peril.

So long as the world remains split, there can be only one guarantor of peace, non-aggressive power. Only power coupled with the will for peace can maintain peace. That was the secret of the Pax Romana and of the Pax Britannica.

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Power linked with a desire for aggression leads to wars of conquest. Weakness linked with a desire for peace is an invitation to the aggressors. Only when those who desire peace are stronger than those who desire aggression, can peace be secured.

So long as the tension between East and West continues, the military superiority of the West, coupled with its peace policy, provides the only practical safeguard against the outbreak of a third world war. A decrease in the strength of the West's armed forces would heighten the danger of war, rather than lessen it.

It is true that the problem of armaments has not only a political, but also an economic, aspect. Competitive rearmament, if it can be avoided, is nonsensical. East and West should realize that a decrease in armed strength would save both sides billions, without in any way altering their relative strengths.

Such reciprocal disarmament presupposes the existence of some sort of international control. Any uncontrolled disarmament would be binding only on the democracies, which are already nationally controlled by their parliaments and by a free Press, and meanwhile the totalitarian states would have every opportunity of circumventing the disarmament agreement. This would alter the balance of power in favour of the East and would therefore increase, not decrease, the dangers of war. On the other hand a general lowering of the level of armaments, under international or reciprocal control, would be a blessing for mankind.

4. The Nucleus of World Federation

It is not the United Nations that provides the nucleus of a future global union, but NATO; for UNO is powerless, whereas NATO possesses a power organization that serves the cause of peace. SEATO constitutes the South-East Asian wing of NATO. In due course these two organizations should be united. The military pact, which is NATO, should be enlarged by the creation of a political joint authority which could solve peacefully all disputes arising between members of the NATO-SEATO group — either in an international court of law or by arbitration.

This community of peace-loving states, animated by the Western ideal of personal freedom, has the mission of attracting to itself most of the non-communist states. Simultaneously it has the task of maintaining the most peaceful possible relations with the Eastern bloc for the purpose of ending the cold war.

So long as the ideological split between East and West continues, and world federation is therefore impossible, the democratic states must at least create a league of peace among themselves; this will be able to safeguard peace based on justice among its members, and by means of superior armed forces supplemented by a policy of understanding, will ensure peace with the Eastern bloc. This must continue until the ideological contradictions between East and West have decreased sufficiently to permit the negotiation of a global federation in which power and justice are united.

CHAPTER NINE

WAR AND REVOLUTION

1. Ideas are Time-bombs

The same time-bombs; they injure human beings, and through them the world. They arise in the head of some dreamer who may live anywhere, unobserved by the great world: a group of disciples are captivated by his ideas, and spread them abroad. A single snow flake becomes an avalanche, a breath of breeze grows into a hurricane. Ideas are not discouraged by mockery or intimidated by persecution. They overthrow and found empires, cause revolutions and wars—until they too grow old, and die, and are replaced by new ideas.

In 627 the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius, after long wars culminating in the glorious victory of Nineveh, had inflicted an annihilating defeat upon the Persian Empire of the Sassanids. He was at the pinnacle of his power, the future of his empire seemed assured. Perhaps at that time one of his ambassadors may have told him along with more important matters, that somewhere in remote Arabia a dreamer was attempting to convert the heathen tribes of the desert to a new doctrine that combined elements of Judaism and Christianity. The Emperor Heraclius could not have guessed that this doctrine was soon to mould the fate of his empire; that the adherents of this prophet, forming a new Arabic great power, were to conquer Syria and Palestine within a decade, and later Egypt, and all his other imperial possessions in Africa: that in this same

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century they were to besiege Constantinople, and in the distant future take his capital by storm.

In 1519 Charles V, the mightiest ruler in the world, went to Germany as its new Emperor. In the recent electoral campaign he had defeated both his rivals, Francis I of France and Frederick the Wise of Saxony. Now, with this additional dignity of becoming Holy Roman Emperor, his power was to receive the highest consecration. Not only was all Europe at the young Emperor's feet, but also a fabulous world across the seas; he dreamt of overthrowing France and of leading the last and greatest crusade of all, of capturing Constantinople, Jerusalem and Cairo, of refounding the Roman Mediterranean Empire beneath his crown and his dynasty. His councillors reported to him on the latest developments in Spain, the Low Countries, Italy and America. They also happened to mention certain events in Germany. One of the Emperor's German councillors spoke of a former monk, a man named Luther, who was quarrelling with the representatives of the Papacy at Wittenberg concerning the question of indulgences. Charles paid scant attention. He was not particularly interested in theological disputes. His thoughts wandered to the Far West, to those fantastic realms of gold that were to provide him with the means of realizing his Crusader's dream. Neither Charles nor his colleagues could then guess that the Emperor's dreams and plans were one day to be shattered by this obscure agitator; that after thirty-five years of fruitless struggle against Luther's ideas, he was to retire into a monastery, a disappointed man who had never realized his life's destiny; that it was his fate to be defeated not by Suleiman the Magnificent nor by Francis I, but by this stubborn monk, Martin Luther.

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It was 1848. The Czar Nicholas I of Russia, now at the height of his power, was thumbing through dispatches sent by his ambassador in London. The ambassador had included, as a curiosity, a report of a recently published pamphlet, written by a German Jew and entitled *The Communist Manifesto*, which demanded a world revolution by the workers for the purpose of abolishing private property. Nicholas shook his head over such nonsense and was astonished that England should tolerate impertinence of that sort on the part of a Jewish énigré. He could not guess that seventy years later his own heirs and successors would be murdered and his empire captured, by the disciples of this Utopian dreamer, or that within a century the ideas of Karl Marx and his Communist Manifesto would be ruling half mankind and preoccupying the whole of it.

It is impossible to overestimate the effect of the power of ideas upon the course of history. World history is the history of ideas, of their birth, development, decline and death. It is impossible to calculate which ideas will triumph. It is often not the most sensible ones, but the most absurd, that are victorious: Hitler's racial ideology is a modern case in point. No world federation and no world peace can be certain that it will not one day be burst a under by the ideas that some enthusiast has dreamt up.

2. Revolutionary Wars

A world federation would effectively diminish and postpone the danger of a third world war, but it would not eliminate it absolutely. For there is no preventing the occurrence, within

the federation, of revolutions or secessions, that would start wars between the members of the federation.

The American Civil War is one of many examples. The founders of the United States - Washington, Franklin, Iefferson, Hamilton, Madison - had endowed the new federal union with a model constitution that had been tested and reinforced during the course of three generations. The young republic had reached the Pacific; growing steadily richer, it had become a great power. Suddenly this federal republic was split by the question of slavery. For the North, slavery was a national disgrace, for the South a national necessity. The result was a civil war between the Northern and the Southern states, a struggle in no way different from an international war. For four years both sides fought with the greatest bitterness and the greatest bravery. This was among the bloodiest wars of the nineteenth century. The North won it, and slavery was abolished. Apart from this, the constitution was retained, and today is still a model of what such a constitution should be. It would not be possible for a world federation to invent a better one. Yet even this model constitution could not prevent dissension and division. So who can guarantee that similar events will not occur within the world federation?

There is no clear dividing-line between war and revolution, between national and civil war. According to international law, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 was a revolution by Prussia against the German League, to which she had adhered since 1815. Sardinia's wars against Austria in the nineteenth century were only incidents in the great revolution that resulted in Italian unification and liberation from Austrian control. The war in Indo-China was a revolution by Viet-Minh against

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France. So long as no means are found of preventing revolutions, peace will always be in jeopardy.

3. The Fifth Column

The 'Fifth Column' is the link between civil war and international war. It is based on collaboration between a dissatisfied population and a hostile power.

The Persian kings had their fifth column in Greece. Sometimes the Spartans were Persia's agents, sometimes the Athenians, or the Thebans, or the Corinthians. Hannibal owed his victories over the Romans in part to the fifth column he had mobilized against Rome in the Gaulish Po valley and in Italy.

The rapid victory of the Arabs over Byzantium in Asia Minor and North Africa is inexplicable if the part played by their fifth column is ignored. In Syria and Egypt this consisted frequently of Monophysites, who preferred the tolerant rule of foreigners to the oppression and persecution that had been their lot at the hands of the Orthodox Catholics of Byzantium. And in North Africa and Spain many Christians, despite their forced conversion to Catholicism, remained in their hearts followers of Arian; they found the radical monotheism of Islam preferable to the Catholic doctane of the Trinity.

During the Wars of Religion, the Guise faction was a Spanish fifth column in France, while the German Protestants can be described as a fifth column acting on behalf of the Swedes and the French.

In the twentieth century the national socialists in Austria and Czechoslovakia were Hitler's fifth column, as were the Quislings in other countries. And today the communists in

the democratic states of the West are an organized fifth column prepared against the eventuality of a third world war. Czechoslovakia was conquered for the Soviet Union not by the Red Army, but by a fifth column.

Here too the boundary between war and revolution is fluid and imprecise.

4. Oppression or Liberty?

History shows that there are two methods of dealing with the danger of revolution: oppression, and liberty. The lasting peace of Latin America, like that of Japan, was based on oppression: the Pax Britannica and the Pax Helvetica were founded on liberty.

The method of oppression derives from the premise that the dissemination of new ideas prepares the ground for revolution; therefore the spreading of subversive thoughts must be prohibited, to ensure the stability of the state and internal peace. The method of oppression relies on a political police, whose task it is to control public opinion, organize a censorship, incarcerate, exile or kill revolutionaries, and nip in the bud all propaganda hostile to the state.

This system can on occasion succeed in preventing revolution for several generations: that is, until the day when a sufficient number of heroes arise ready to sacrifice life and happiness in the struggle for freedom. These revolutionaries awaken a spontaneous echo among the supposed servants of reaction, and also among the representatives of the armed forces entrusted with the defence of reaction. The fall of the Spanish viceroys in America, of the Shogunate in Japan, and of

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Czarism in Russia, are proof that oppression can only postpone revolution and cannot prevent it.

The second method of preventing revolution is through evolution. This does not involve the oppression of revolutionary ideas, but sets them free and attempts to guide them into constitutional channels. Under such a regime of freedom, the revolutionary groups do not need to distribute pamphlets by stealth, for they have a free Press at their disposal. They do not have to form secret societies, since they can set up political parties. They are able to obtain power by means of the ballot box, instead of by bombs. If they can succeed in winning the majority of public opinion, the state will fall into their hands without a fight.

This democratic procedure prevents revolution by making it superfluous — it is more agreeable to be a member of parliament than to be a conspirator — and during the course of the last century it has usually proved its value. Thanks to it, Great Britain has been transformed into a semi-socialist state without suffering social unrest. However, this method is not invariably successful. It was not capable of preventing the American Civil War, or the tascist revolutions in Italy, Germany and Spain; nor could it stop the communist revolution in Czechoslovakia.

The communict world attempts to prevent revolution by the method of appression: the democratic world, through freedom. This gives the East a great advantage in the event of war, for the organization of fifth columns is permitted in the West, but forbidden in the East.

It is possible that as a result of the invention of the hydrogen bomb, the great struggles of humanity will in the future be

carried out under the guise of revolutions, and not of wars. These revolutions, led by fifth columns, will be neither more nor less than wars fought in a novel way. The capture of China for Bolshevism provides an example of this new technique of warfare. Had Russia sent the Red Army into China to overthrow Chiang Kai Chek, America would probably have responded with atomic bombs, which at that time Russia did not possess. Instead of this, China was conquered by the propaganda and slogans of the Chinese communists, who were supported by Russia. What the Japanese had failed to do in a long war, the Russians achieved in a brief revolution. The capture of China by Moscow without a war is indicative of the direction that imperialism will take in a future overshadowed by the atom bomb.

5. Two Sorts of Legitimacy

War and revolution are so closely related that the struggle against the revolutionary danger is inextricably connected with the struggle against war.

The most certain weapon against revolution has at all times been the legitimacy of the regime. A legitimate regime has its roots in the hearts of its subjects. The alternative is a regime of naked force. This sort of regime is well adapted for the seizure of power — but not for its retention. For ultimately, a government of force cannot be supported by machine-guns and cannon, but only by the men into whose hands the weapons are entrusted. If these men do not believe in the regime they serve, they will eventually turn against their superiors and overthrow them. Against force, the use of force is legitimate:

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against legal power, it is not. Therefore every regime, even the most revolutionary, requires a basis of legitimacy.

There are two sorts of legitimacy, that of time and that of space: the legitimacy of tradition and the legitimacy of consent. In the past, the chief emphasis was on tradition; at present it is on democracy.

Tradition relies upon custom and habit. An injustice will in the course of generations become a prescriptive right: an absurd formula grows respectable at last. For centuries in Europe, as in East Asia, politics were based upon tradition. It was the American and French revolutions that broke with tradition and substituted spatial legitimacy in its place: that is to say, democracy. The question was no longer whether a certain institution was venerable, but whether it corresponded to the wishes of the majority. When the French Revolution had collapsed, and Bonapartism with it, Talleyrand and Metternich, engaged on the reconstruction of Europe at the Congress of Vienna, returned to the principle of temporal legitimacy, of tradition.

Dictatorships as well as democracies are aware that they require the authorization of legitimacy. Since they lack tradition, they rely on plebiscites. For dictators have learnt from history that nothing is more flugile than naked force — in the well-known phrase, you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them.

Democratic governments base their legitimacy upon the consent of public opinion. By free elections, they record its oscillations and fluctuations, so it at they may draw the necessary conclusions from them. As soon as a democratic government forfeits the approval of the popular majority, it loses its

legitimacy and vanishes. This cuts the ground from beneath the feet of most revolutions—the exception being those revolutions whose aim is rule by a minority, which is why the democracies have not been able to prevent fascist and communist revolutions.

A regime is most secure when it is not discussed, when it is upheld by two pillars, tradition and democracy. Great Britain is one example, Switzerland another. The policy changes, but the system of government remains: for it is anchored in the hearts of men, not in the paragraphs of a printed constitution. This combination of temporal and spatial tradition has in the last generations hamstrung revolutionary movements in Great Britain and Switzerland. It is the most reliable formula against revolution that has so far been discovered.

6. Architects and Gardeners

The secret of Great Britain's and Switzerland's political wisdom is that their political leaders usually have their roots in country life, while most statesmen in other lands are urban creatures. This is one of the reasons for the twin miracles of the Pax Britannica and the Pax Helvetica in a world of wars. For city-dwellers and countrymen see politics differently: the man in the city sees politics as architecture, the man in the country sees it as gardening.

The architect drafts his plans for houses and cities according to technical and aesthetic rules. Concrete, steel and bricks are the materials that serve his creative imagination. For the urban politician the state is a house. He can pull it down and rebuild it more beautifully than before. He can knock out walls and

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floors, add a wing here or a storey there. His aim is to create a house which according to his ideas will be comfortable to live in and pleasant to look at.

A man who has grown up in the country, or lived close to the land, sees the world through other eyes: his view is organic, not mechanic: psychological, not logical: paradoxical, not mathematical. Trees, not rows of houses, provide his natural environment. For him politics is gardening, not architecture. He knows the inescapable law of growth and decay, which applies to flowers even as it does to men and states. He knows that a good breed cannot be created overnight, but requires generations of tender care: that trees can be improved, but not changed: that everything in nature, and therefore also in politics, needs time, but that even so there are limits to what can be achieved: that gardens are created, and flourish, through co-operation between man and nature, between gardeners, flowers and trees: that man is weak, and God is strong.

CHAPTER TEN

THE DANGERS OF WAR

I. A World Divided in Two

WORLD divided in two automatically creates a perpetual and chronic danger of war. Only a clear, clever, courageous and far-sighted policy can prevent an armed clash between the two halves of the world. History shows that when two states or groups of states inhabiting the same region confront each other in an atmosphere of hostility, a clash is almost inevitable. This was true of Athens and Sparta, of Rome and Carthage, of Venice and Genoa, of France and Spain, of Prussia and Austria.

There is one exception to this rule of history. It is provided by the Russo-British rivalry of the nineteenth century, which did not result in world war but was ended by an entente between the two hostile powers. After Napoleon's fall Britain was the greatest sea power, as Russia was the greatest land power, in the world. Their interests collided in Turkey, Persia, China and central Asia. Britain was the champion of liberalism and democracy, Russia of absolutism and reaction. Britain was Protestant, Russia Orthodox. Towards the middle of the century there was a brief clash of arms between Russia and Britain, the Crimean War; but despite the participation of a third great power, it proved possible to localize the war and bring it to a timely end before it became a world war. In the years that followed, the Russo-British war, which all the world

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anticipated, was postponed, until it had at last become irrelevant and the Germany of William II had been recognized by both Russia and Britain as a common menace, and the Triple Entente was formed. When the First World War did eventually break out, Russia and Britain were not enemies but allies.

Perhaps the Russo-American enmity of today is taking a similar course. Russia and America have no common frontier. Only in the Bering Strait do they meet, but without contact. The danger of war is to be found rather in their respective systems of alliances than in a direct conflict between the two world powers. A collision between their allies some where in Korea, Germany or South-East Asia, a coup d'état in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan or India, is more likely to cause a third world war than is a conflict immediately between Russia and America.

Thus did the Peloponnesian War, between Sparta and Athens, develop out of a conflict between Athens and Sparta's ally, Corinth. The Second Punic War began with Hannibal's attack upon Rome's ally, Saguntum. The First World War too did not start with direct hostilities between the great nations of Europe, but with Austria's ultimatum to Serbia.

The danger is particularly acute as a result of the unresolved question of the frontier between the Russian and the Western blocs. The problem of the East European states is unsolved. America regards the present condition of the states lying between the Soviet border and the Iron Curtain as provisional, while from the Russian point of view it is permanent. This applies as well to the Oder-Neuron frontier between Germany and Poland. The question of the reunification of Germany is also unsolved, as is the paradoxical situation of Berlin. So too

is the question of the unification of Korea and Viet-Nam, as well as the relations between China and Formosa.

Each of these problems is sufficiently explosive to set off a third world war. It is high time that the two power groups worked together to find constructive solutions.

There is a danger of war also in the possibility of revolution. If Moscow's fifth column mounted a coup d'état in one of the democratic states of the NATO-SEATO group and set about taking that country across into the Russian camp — would the West allow it to happen? And would Russia permit one of its satellites to defect to the West by a similar coup d'état? The Hungarian revolution of gave an answer to this last question. The Russians sent their tanks to Budapest, and risked the outbreak of a world war, rather than permit Hungary to quit their camp. If the West had sent military help to its Hungarian friends, there would certainly have been a clash — and perhaps an atomic war.

Finally, there is a grave danger of war in the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours. If the Arab states should definitely join the Soviet camp, while Israel seeks help from the United Nations, the conflict could provoke a third world war. Only an agreement associating Israel with the Arab states can prevent this, and both power-blocs therefore have a vital interest in promoting such an agreement.

With so many questions still open, the finest orations in praise of peace by American and Russian statesmen will not alter the fact that world peace is imperilled and each day can witness a repetition of the tragedy of 1914.

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2. Wars of Race

The racial problem is a sword of Damocles, suspended over the future of mankind. In comparison with this fateful problem, the Russo-American antagonism may one day seem a mere episode in history—a cold fratricidal war fought within the community of the white race. For while the ideological split across the face of the globe can perhaps be healed in a single generation, the division of mankind into races will endure for thousands of years, until at last the races are destroyed by intermarriage.

The conference of representatives of the Asian and African peoples held at Bandung was the flash of sheet-lightning heralding the storm; it was the first step in the creation of an anti-white front under the leadership of China. Russia was no more invited than was America.

This racial front of tomorrow cuts clean across the ideological front of today. Bandung demanded the abolition of the colonial system and equality of rights for all races; that is to say, the ultimate handing over of Central and South Africa to the Negroes, of Australia and Siberia to the Chinese and the Japanese. Since the white populations of these lands are not ready of their own free will to agree to such demands, the demands imply the danger of a world war sooner or later between the white and the coloured races.

This antagonism began with the discovery of America and the circumnavigation of Africa. The age of the discoverers opened four centuries of Europ and world domination, of war by the white race against the coloured races of the world. World domination by the whites ended in 1905, with the

defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. At the naval battle of Tsushima, belief in the military supremacy of the white race — on which its domination of the world was based — was shattered for ever. Since that day, all Asia has dreamt of the end of the European colonial system, of the collapse of Europe's world domination. The liberation of Asia is today almost completed: India is free, and so are Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, the Philippines and Indo-China. Europe's withdrawal from the remainder of her Asiatic colonies is plainly marked in the time-table of future history. The withdrawal of Europe from Africa has begun with the liberation of Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana and French Guinea.

Before the whites conquered the world there was never any question of a unified front by the coloured races. A Chinese feels exactly as remote from an Arab, an Indian or a Negro as he does from a European. In South-East Asia, Chinese immigration constitutes a far greater danger for the Malay race in the future than does the remnant of European colonial rule.

The modern idea of Asian unity directed against Europe is also a dangerous myth so far as Europe is concerned. There has never been any sort of Asian racial or cultural unity. There was an East Asian civilization, an Indian civilization, and a civilization of the Near East, but there was never such a thing as an Asian civilization. From the point of view of race and culture, the Near East is incomparably closer to the peoples of Europe than to the inhabitants of the Far East. The bridges linking India with the West, too, are both stronger and more numerous than those connecting her with her northern neighbours.

Asia, as Europe's antagonist, is a European invention. The

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European geographers divided the great continent, whose western peninsula was Europe and whose southern one was India, into two very unequal halves, which they named Europe and Asia. Asia was nothing more than a collective word for all those parts of the great continent that were not Europe. Finally the Asiatics themselves have come to believe in this myth coined by the Europeans, in the existence of Asia, and have conceived a Pan-Asiatic movement which is in fact nothing more nor less than an anti-European movement. For the sole link that unites the peoples of Asia is their common hatred of European arrogance and colonialism.

Lenin first tried to yoke this Pan-Asiatic idea to the cart of communist world revolution, as a means towards the conquest of the world. Then Japan took over the slogan, in order to obtain the mastery of Asia during the Second World War as a springboard to global domination. Both these attempts were foiled by Chinese resistance, for China had no interest in becoming a satellite of either Russia or Japan. Now China herself, as the mightiest Asian nation, is in process of assuming the leadership of the Pan-Asiatic movement.

Since Western Europe has to a large extent withdrawn from Asia, the Pan-Asiatic movement must now be directed against the Soviet Union, which rules one-third of Asia. Its first objective must be the return of Mongolia and Tana Tuva to the Chinese federation, but then the question will arise of the future of Russian Turkestan and of the other states within the Soviet Union inhabited by Asian peoples. Thus the Pan-Asiatic movement and the Band and front constitute an explosive charge within the Russo-Chinese alliance. Similarly they are a bridge between Russia, America and Europe, the three

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great bastions of the white global front against which the revolution of the coloured races is directed.

In fact there is not one racial problem, but a whole series of racial problems. The Negro problem has a fundamentally different aspect in the United States from what it has in Brazil, or in South Africa, or in Central Africa. The question of the North American Indians is profoundly dissimilar to that of the Mexican Indians. The Arab problem in French North Africa is quite remote from the Arab problem in the Near East.

The conflict between Europeans and Arabs has no connection whatever with the racial question. It is a quarrel within the white section of mankind, to which the Arabs belong just as much as do the French. The Europeans alone are to blame for the fact that representatives of the Arab nations were misled into going to Bandung. From the Chinese point of view, the Christians and the Mohammedans are simply two branches of Western man, of the white race, and of the monotheistic religion founded by Moses. It is high time that both the Christians and the Mohammedans realized this truth.

Despite the religious antagonism between Christendom and Islam, the Mediterranean is still the landlocked centre of the eastern branch of the white race, as it has always been. Europeans and Arabs should work to re-create the unity of this Mediterranean world, so that this sea may cease to be a frontier between them. This could be achieved in practice by scrapping the geographical concept of Europe, and by inviting the community of Arab states to join what is now called the Council of Europe.

Turkey has gone forward with her amalgamation with Europe,

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even though the greater part of Turkish territory is in Asia and its inhabitants accept the faith of Islam. This experiment has been successful. Turkey has become a pillar of the Strasbourg Council of Europe. Why should not Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and the other Arab states, follow her example? And why not Israel?

India and Pakistan are culturally and racially closer to the West than to the Chinese. Sino-Indian solidarity is the remnant of a common resentment against Europe and the colonial epoch. The leaders of India and Pakistan were in part educated in England or America. Their mentality is a mixture of East and West. Nehru's decision, after the victory of the independence movement, that India should remain within the framework of the British Commonwealth was an act of unparalleled political sagacity. The British Commonwealth is gradually developing into a British-Indian Commonwealth. It is to be hoped that this bridge between East and West will not be snapped. One day the European continent should find the means of becoming part of this world-embracing commonwealth, which unites peoples of every race and creed in the service of peace and co-prosperity.

Of more significance for the future of mankind than the relationship between Europe and the Arab world or India, is the problem of future relations between the white and the yellow races. Will these two races know how to live on our planet at peace with each other—or will they eventually engage in a life-and-death struggle for global mastery? This is the fateful question for mankin

The communist revolution in China is more likely to improve understanding between the races than to bedevil it.

Communism does not accept racial theories. Within the Soviet Union it has done its best to put an end to racial antagonism. Apart from that, the Russo-Chinese alliance is itself a bridge across the abyss of racialism, a recognition of the solidarity that binds one of the great branches of the white race to one of the great branches of the yellow. This revolution is hastening the Westernization of China. It disposes of many of the antagonisms between China and the West which were only in appearance based on racial differences but were in fact derived from diversity of tradition, custom and culture; and here, the decision of the Chinese government to replace the ancient ideograms with the Latin — not the Russian — alphabet, is of the greatest importance, for it removes the Chinese Wall of ideograms, which hitherto, more than anything else, has isolated China from Western civilization.

In the struggle between Formosa and the Chinese People's Republic, Europe ought not to intervene. Sino-European relations should from the very beginning be based upon the principle of mutual non-intervention. The circumstance that China has accepted communism should not constitute an obstacle to friendly co-operation with Europe. All the states of the Western bloc at present enjoy excellent relations with communist Yugoslavia. Equally good relations with communist China will be all the easier to maintain, since Europe and China have no common border and therefore frontier disputes cannot arise.

Europe and China should work together from the very beginning in the creation of a peaceful world. The Chinese nation is far removed from the militarist traditions of Japan. Its basic character has always been pacifist. Once its future is

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ensured against invasions of all sorts, it will return to this pacifist tradition and will participate actively in the creation of a world at peace.

However, there is a prerequisite to an understanding between Europe and China, and it is that the white race abandon its racial arrogance. Most uneducated and semi-educated Europeans and Americans cherish the illusion that their race is the high development of mankind: that they are called upon to direct and lead humanity: that their domination of the world is based not only upon the superiority of their guns, but also upon their culture and their morality. Only a change in the way history is taught can break this arrogance, which is an obstacle to understanding among men and therefore to world peace.

Europe should at all times remember that her culture, her religion, her alphabet, and her numerical system, were all imported from Asia, not to mention numerous of her most important 'inventions', such as the printing press, gunpowder, paper, and the mariner's compass. When most Europeans were still living at the cultural level of today's bushmen, China already possessed a highly developed civilization. Only Greece and Rome achieved an equivalent culture, and even theirs did not surpass China's. After the fall of the Roman Empire, the cultural level of Furope sank far below that of the Chinese. Charlemagne was a savage by comparison with his Chinese contemporaries and colleagues of the T'ang dynasty. This is true of the whole of the Middle Ages and of all his successors, with the possible exception of ' Hohenstaufen Frederick II, who had absorbed the higher civilization of the Saracens at Palermo. Throughout all these centuries Asiatic peoples were

in the van of human civilization: Chinese, Japanese, Indians, Persians, Siamese, Burmans.

Marco Polo discovered the Far East towards the end of the thirteenth century, as Columbus was to discover America two hundred years later. Marco Polo had lived in Peking at the court of the Mongol Emperor Kublai Khan, whose empire stretched from Korea to the Black Sea and the deserts of Arabia. When he published his description of his travels, in Venice, his contemporaries regarded him as an imaginative liar, so incredible was his report of an empire that culturally, politically, technically and socially was to Europe as a cathedral is to a cottage.

The cultural superiority of the Far East to Europe lasted until the eighteenth century. The kingdom of Louis XIV is not to be compared with its contemporary, the empire of the Manchu Kang-Hi and his successor Kōen-Lun, in which China enjoyed its last cultural and political flowering. The European missionaries who went to China at this time could only be astonished at the high level of civilization and morality that prevailed within this vast non-Christian empire. Their reports on the China they saw, produced a deep effect upon the philosophy of Europe. Chinese ideas had a great influence upon the men of the European Enlightenment. Many of the so-called 'modern ideas' of the eighteenth century derived from China.

Only in the nineteenth century was this state of affairs reversed. China, as so often in her long and varied history, was afflicted with incompetent emperors and entered a period of decline, while the West was approaching its zenith owing to the Pax Britannica. The Taiping Rebellion, with the resultant devastation, hastened the fall of China, which has only

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recovered in our own generation, after a century of catastrophes, wars and revolutions.

In order to parry the danger of racial wars that threatens, what is needed is a renewal of the consciousness of human fraternity, transcending nationality, race, class and religion; an awareness that all men are the children of God and are therefore brothers and sisters: that our brief lives acquire a meaning only if we help one another to bear the heavy burden of existence, without inquiring as to another's race or nationality: that differences of pigmentation are less important than differences of heart: that cach race contains both good and evil men, noble and common, clever and stupid, saints and criminals: and that within almost every man there is a mixture not only of all the races, but also of the elements called good and evil.

In the nineteenth century it was still considered a special distinction to be described as a cosmopolitan. The cosmopolitans of all peoples and races formed a single great family, their kinship being the great spirits of the past. They embodied the hope that one day mankind would find the way to an age of peace and humanity. The tide of nationalism has washed away this notion. Those who were yesterday described as cosmopolitans are today referred to as internationalists and hence as people devoid of patriotism—as though world citizenship were somehow a denial of a man's love of his own people and his own home. Nevertheless today, more than ever before, the cosmopolitans provide the bridge to a new world in which human beings will understand one another - a bridge spanning the abysses of hostile isologies and racial enmities: they are the seed from which a spiritual nobility among men must come.

In this sense all the great religions — Christianity, Buddhism and Islam alike — have refused to accept racial hatred. And it was Confucius who spoke the eternal words, now more relevant than ever before: 'Among truly educated men there are no racial differences.'

3. Wars of Religion

The future of mankind is threatened not only by wars of race — whether there be a world federation or not — but also by wars of religion. Arguments based on reason can prevent wars of conquest, wars of power, and economic wars. But when reason yields to religious motives, sensible arguments are of no avail. This is true even under the shadow of the atomic bomb.

Nobody would risk annihilation by hydrogen bombs in order to conquer a province. But when it is the spiritual salvation of humanity that is at stake—when the question is whether future generations shall go to heaven or to hell—then the prospect of entire nations being destroyed hardly counts in the balance. Men who have died for their faith live on as martyrs. For the faithful, the most agonizing death is not too high a price to pay for eternal life.

That is why the religious crisis through which mankind is passing today is one of the most dangerous threats to mankind's future. This crisis is not limited to Christianity; it is affecting the other religions of the world, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism.

The crisis within Christianity began at the time of the Reformation, though there was no connection between the

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two. The teaching of Copernicus had destroyed the astronomic view of the world that had been held throughout the Middle Ages and antiquity. The new recognition that the earth revolved about the sun instead of vice versa was soon to be enlarged by the theory that the solar system itself was only a particle among the stars in the sky. The earth was tossed from its position in the centre of the universe, into the periphery.

This replacement of the Ptolomaic system by the Copernican affected man's philosophies. The Jewish, Christian and Mohammedan pictures of the world were geocentric. The first philosopher to draw conclusions from this change was Giordano Bruno. He was burned at the stake for doing so, but his ideas continued to foment. The philosophers of the eighteenth century scrapped dogma, but adhered firmly to the belief in God and the immortality of the soul. Nineteenth-century materialism, to which millions of semi-educated Europeans and Americans fell victim, scrapped the belief in God and in the existence of the soul.

All these philosophic theories were directed against Christian dogma, but not against Christian morality. The attack on Christian morality, the last stage of these anti-Christian developments, was launched by Nietzsche. Instead of that Christian caritas which requires that the strong help the weak, he demanded, on biological grounds and with reference to the Darwinian theory, the destruction of the weak and the survival of the strong. Instead of pity, Nietzsche wanted atrocity. The result of this development was a withering away of religion, of belief in God, of porality.

The first attempt, since that of Julian the Apostate, to abolish Christianity was made by the French Revolution,

with the introduction of the cult of the Supreme Being and of Reason. This attempt was short-lived and produced no effects. The victory of Bolshevism in Russia had far more serious results, so far as Christendom was concerned. One of the world's most Christian countries became anti-Christian overnight. Instead of Christianity, there arose the naturalistic and atheistic para-religion of Bolshevism.

When a little later Hitler preached his crusade against Bolshevism, he did so not in any spirit of Christendom but in that of a neo-pagan para-religion, with a pseudo-biological philosophy and the morality of Nietzsche. Hitler seems to have cherished a plan for the destruction of Christianity after his final victory in the Second World War and the substitution in its place of neo-pagan national-socialist theories. These plans were foiled. But it is by no means certain that the national-socialist vision of the world, which failed politically, will not one day reappear under a religious guise.

Of greater danger to mankind would be the development of Bolshevism into the sixth religion of the world. The decay of Christian belief has left a vacuum in many men's lives; for religion is one of the most fundamental requirements of the human soul. The Russian nation is one of the most deeply religiously-inclined nations in the world, and it is only natural that millions of young Russians should direct their unsatisfied longing for religion towards the Bolshevik idea, the idea of a world-wide paradise of human equality where there shall be no capitalism, no exploitation, no poverty, and no war.

Under Lenin, this belief in the terrestrial paradise seemed to be developing into the equivalent of a world religion, combining the socialism of early Christianity with the atheism of

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early Buddhism, and borne forward by one nation and one great power as was early Islam. Under Stalin the religious impetus slackened and died. After fearful persecutions the Soviet Union was reconciled with the Orthodox Church, which though it has not been encouraged, has since then been tolerated, by the State. Under Stalin's successors the religious character of Bolshevism has been eclipsed by its political and economic aspects. Nevertheless the danger of a Bolshevik world religion has not been finally overcome. As with everything else concerning Russia, this question is still in the balance.

In Europe and America also, the future of Christianity is uncertain. Since the war the power of Catholicism as a political force has been stronger than ever before. In many of the nations of Europe it provides the strongest political party. It is thanks entirely to the alliance between Catholicism and social-democracy that Stalin's plans of world revolution miscarried in Europe after the Second World War. The religious crisis of our time could well lead to a regeneration of Christendom.

Islam suffered a severe blow from the abolition of the Caliphate and from the fact that Turkey ceased to be a Mohammedan, and became a lay, state. In recompense, strictly orthodox Saudi Arabia has become a new centre of a fanatical Mohammedanism which is influencing the entire Arabic world. The religious future of India and the Far East is as uncertain as that of Russia and the West.

Any insignificant sect of today can become a world religion tomorrow. Who would have believed, in the time of Caligula, that a tiny and almost unknown Jewish sect would one day

conquer the Roman Empire and tumble the gods of Olympus from off their thrones? The political development of humanity will depend substantially upon its religious future, which is obscure. Religious movements may arise which are today, and for us, inconceivable; and such movements may serve humanity — or they may have a contrary effect, and result in a new age of religious wars.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE HOPES FOR PEACE

I. The H-bomb

If there is today a hope for peace, it is due to the discovery of the hydrogen bomb. Were it not for atomic weapons, the cold war between Russia and America would have developed into a hot war. So the curse of the atomic bomb has been transformed, so far, into a blessing. It has made war incomparably more horrible—but at the same time also less likely.

We are witnessing a race between world peace and world destruction. A war fought with H-bombs would mean more or less the end of mankind. The air would become pestilential, water and food would be poisoned. If men were to survive, many of their offspring would be freaks and monsters. Such a catastrophe would not be comparable with any of the migrations of the peoples, but only with the Flood — with or without a Noah's Ark. Even if a part of mankind, living in regions far from the areas of disaster, were to survive this catastrophe, a war fought with hydrogen bombs would within a few days destroy the products of thousands of years of creative, cultural activity. The centres of our civilization would be infected and uninhabitable for generations.

So long as the world is organied into sovereign states, this danger of global disaster due to human wickedness, stupidity or blindness will endure. There is only one way of banishing it:

world federation. For even if there were to be civil wars within a world federation, it is highly unlikely that hydrogen bombs would be employed, since each bomb would kill the adherents of both parties without discrimination. The military authority serving the world federation would alone possess the technical means for making and dropping hydrogen bombs, and it would be compelled not to use them. Any attempt by revolutionaries to make such bombs could probably be nipped in the bud.

The recognition of the magnitude of the danger, and of the fact that it can only be avoided in one way, must make the peoples bring the strongest pressure to bear upon their governments in favour of a world federation. So far this has not happened. On both sides of the Iron Curtain the idea of a third world war is still toyed with, just as though the hydrogen bomb had never been invented. Humanity appears to be blind in face of the peril that threatens it.

Such apathy can be overcome only by propaganda. Not only private individuals of great authority, but also the governments of West and East alike, should spread the knowledge that a war fought with hydrogen bombs would mean at least the end of civilization, if not of mankind itself: and that the creation of a world federation is the only way of dispelling this danger. Not until such knowledge is common property will public opinion in both West and East bring such strong pressure to bear upon the governments that the concept of world federation will cease to be a Utopian dream and become a programme, and then cease to be a programme and become reality.

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2. Bread and Fuel

Two-thirds of mankind are hungry or undernourished. This fact contains one of the greatest dangers of war and revolution, not merely for certain governments but for humanity as a whole, and the danger will be increased by the rapid rise in the population figures.

It is anticipated that by the population of the world will have risen from its present total of some twenty-four hundred millions to approximately thirty-six hundred millions — thanks to medical progress and the improvement of the world's economy. How to nourish so rapidly expanding a population is a serious problem for the scientists. It is not simply a question of increasing the world's supply of food; it is a question also of organizing the distribution of that supply on more efficient lines. Otherwise one day inevitably the hungry majority of mankind will organize itself against the satiated minority — which includes the Soviet Union — for the purpose of slaughter and inheritance: an excuse will come to hand, whether it be social revolution, racial war, or a war of religion.

Politicians alone cannot solve this question of global hunger, which is amenable only to a collaboration by politicians and scientists. Agricultural production has increased greatly in recent years, but the organization of methods of distribution has lagged behind. The productive countries are suffering from over-production: other lands, such as India and China, from hunger.

A collaboration by all men in this field need not wair until the world federation has been created. It could be undertaken

already — today — within the framework of the United Nations Organization. If the wheat, rice and corn fields of the world no longer suffice to nourish mankind, new sources of supply must be tapped.

One ray of hope is the discovery that the oceans, with their plankton and their algae, conceal an inexhaustible reservoir of food, which could one day supplement the food production of the continents and put an end to hunger. One of the future threats to peace would then disappear. If eventually the Chinese and the Japanese were in a position to feed themselves at home, there would no longer exist any motive for their migration to Siberia or Australia. The menace of a struggle between the races for the occupation of uninhabited territories would lose its acuteness. The way to world federation would lie open.

In order to raise the living standard of the peoples, bread is not the only requirement: there is also energy. The expenditure of energy per capita of any nation is a barometer of that nation's well-being. Only recently there was the threat of a shortage of energy owing to the ruthless exploitation of the world's coal and oil reserves. Science has overcome this crisis, not only by the discovery of ever-fresh supplies of coal and oil, but also by the harnessing of atomic energy. To this new source of energy, other untapped and mighty sources will soon be added, such as solar energy, tidal energy, the tension between the prevailing temperatures at the higher and lower levels of the sea, and other discoveries as yet undreamt of.

If humanity does not commit suicide in the deluge of an atomic war, it is moving towards a period of prosperity such as has never before been seen. For the first time in history,

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mankind is offered the possibility, with the help of the technicians, of ending poverty and making prosperity universal. The generations that will succeed our own can if they wish solve the social problems not only in the rich parts of the world — America, Europe, Russia — but also in Asia and Africa.

VIn this paradise of the future there stands one tree laden with forbidden fruit: atomic war. Will mankind follow the example of Adam, taste of this fruit, and be for the second time expelled from paradise?

3. The Women's Revolution

Even as humanity moves towards the abyse of atomic war, one of the greatest revolutions in history is nearing its completion. This is the revolution of women, which has meant their liberation from the dictatorship of the male sex. From this revolution derives one of the greatest hopes for peace in our time. For despite the Amazons, it is man who is born to wage war, not woman. In her, the maternal instincts are dominant, as are the bellicose ones in him.

Throughout the whole world boys play at war, with lead soldiers and pistols, with guns and horses, with spears and boomerangs, dressed as cowbeys or Indians, cops or robbers. They dream of battles and victories. Little girls play at being mothers, with dolls, or animals, or their younger brothers and sisters. In their case the deepest instinct is to give life and to protect it: in the other, to kill.

The great passion of the male sex, during the intervals between wars, is the hunt. For centuries only the ruling classes were able to include in this sport. It was regarded as the

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privilege of kings and noblemen. Until the twentieth century it constituted their greatest delight, particularly the mounted chase, the pursuit of a wretched deer or fox with horse and hound. Hunting has always been a playing at war and a substitute for war. The passion for the hunt, like the passion for war, are born of man's instinct to fight and kill. Most of the South Sea islanders were distressed when the white colonizers forbade the continuance of their national sport, head-hunting.

The male desire to fight is closely connected with the nature of masculine sexuality. Stags, normally timid and peaceful ruminants, become aggressive and bellicose in the rutting season. Man's rutting season is not limited to a period of weeks. It embraces the greater part of his life. Small wonder then that throughout his life he dreams of fighting and war. In the animal creation the male is more aggressive than the female, as is shown by bulls and cocks; and the same law applies to humanity.

In the animal and human worlds the female is not less brave than the male, but only less aggressive. A tigress will defend her cubs with the greatest ferocity, as a woman will her children. But this bravery is of a defensive nature. Woman's deepest instinct is to preserve life. She hates war. She knows, or can guess, what it means to bring children into the world and care for them while they are growing up, and she shudders at the thought that these children should be sacrificed in the interests of others or of abstract ideas.

Historians are repeatedly surprised by the fact that while female rulers are rare, there are relatively more important queens than kings. It suffices in this connection to recall Elizabeth I and Victoria of England, Maria Theresa of Austria,

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Isabella I of Spain, and Catherine II of Russia. In France too, where the Salic Law made it impossible for a woman to inherit the crown, female regencies have been among the happiest periods of the nation's history.

The basis for the historical superiority of female over male rulers is to be found partly in woman's deeper insight into human character, but also in the fact that queens have been induced less often than kings into fighting wars of conquest. In any event, woman's success in the sole political career open to her in the past — the career of monarchy — has more than proved her equality of political talent with man.

The introduction of female suffrage in the twentieth century has so far scarcely produced any effect. Governments are led by men, most of the seats in the electoral assemblies are held by men, and men occupy the most important administrative posts in every country. Women in general vote for men. They ioin male political parties. Politically they play a very subordinate part, despite their theoretical equality. The cause for this is to be found in woman's political inferiority complex, the fruit of six thousand years of oppression. The tradition of the matriarchate, which preceded patriarchal organization of the family and of society, has been extinguished.

The average woman believe, quite wrongly, in the political superiority of men. In defiance of her maternal instinct, she will often vote for bellicose men and even for warmongers. For, much as the woman hates war, she loves the warrior, who complements and protects her. When at last woman realizes that it is her duty to oppose the male policy of war with a female policy of peace, then female emancipation will have achieved its object.

For just as for centuries it was man's highest duty to fight for freedom, so it is woman's highest duty to intervene on behalf of peace and against masculine imperialism, militarism and bellicosity. And as soon as woman throws her newly-won political power into the scales on the side of peace, she will be in a position to insist upon the creation of a world federation and thus of an enduring peace.

4. An Understanding between West and East?

Whether the future will bring world federation or a third world war depends largely upon whether the ideologies of West and East are to diverge or to converge: whether the abyss that separates the two camps into which mankind is divided is to become deeper or to disappear.

No one can deny that the ideologies of West and East are closer to one another today than they were in Lenin's time. Lenin was the mortal enemy of bourgeois society and capitalism. He was the prophet of a new religion whose creed was—justice on earth. Stalin was a super-czar who built a communist world power on the foundations provided by Lenin's ideas. Stalin's successors administer this inheritance—but without revolutionary enthusiasm.

Public opinion in the West continues to argue whether or not Stalin's death has resulted in any significant change in the structure and policy of the Soviet Union. The answer to this is that Stalin's death had precisely the same meaning for the Russian revolution as Robespierre's death had for the French Revolution. In the one case as in the other, the disappearance of the dictator meant the liquidation of a terrorist

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government and its replacement by a committee of moderate revolutionaries.

At the time of Robespierre, Jacobinism was just as much hated, feared and abhorred by all non-revolutionary Europe as Bolshevism was under Lenin. A reconciliation between the ideas of the French Revolution and traditional Europe seemed then to be a Utopian fantasy, an impossibility. Yet less than half a century later the Monarchy of Louis-Philippe built the bridge between these two apparently irreconcilable ideologies. Louis-Philippe was the son of Philippe Égalité, who had been the éminence grise of the revolution betore becoming its victim and had been both a scion of the royal house and a regicide. Louis-Philippe was a king who headed a Aemocratic state imbued with the most fearful ideas of the French Revolution: the House of Capet was reconciled with the revolutionary Tricolore and with the 'Marseillaise'.

This example shows how irreconcilable antagonisms can eventually be lifted. It also shows how the antagonism between the ideas of the Russian revolution and those of the West may possibly develop. Today we have not yet reached the period of Louis-Philippe, but only that of the *Directoire*.

The development of the Soviet regime towards normality and legality is in line with Legin's doctrine. According to this doctrine, the dictatorship of the proletariat was not intended to be a permanency: it was only a temporary expedient for the liquidation of the capitalist bourgeoisie and the old class state. After the conclusion of this levelling process, the dictatorship of the proletariat, which would be hen have lost its purpose, was to be replaced by a democratic regime of liberty, which was itself to be a period of transition; and this would be followed

by a withering away of the State, that is to say by the extreme freedom of a decent anarchy.

In the Soviet Union no mention is made of this withering away of the State. The Soviet state is stronger than any bourgeois state in the world, for it controls not only the country's political, but also its economic, life. It not only represents the world's second greatest power, it is at the same time the world's greatest trust company. There is also no mention, within the Soviet Union, of that classless society which was Lenin's dream. After the liquidation of the old aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, a new ruling class arose, with new fortunes and new privileges.

The Soviet Union is not developing along the lines foreseen by Marx and Lenin. Far more is it approximating to the Platonic state, which was conceived as being at one and the same time communist and aristocratic, with three castes: the scholastic, the military, and the food-producing. The scholastic caste is represented by the communist intellectuals, in whose hands is the control of the state and of the national economy; the military caste is the Red Army; the caste of food-producers is the population of workers and peasants.

The policy, the economy and the culture of this gigantic empire are at present in the hands of the Soviet bureaucracy. This ruling class has no cause to feel dissatisfied. Not only the road to power is open to its members, but also the road to riches. The number of Soviet millionaires increases month by month; they have their splendid villas, their retinues of servants, their cars, every luxury.

After four decades of revolution the Soviet Union is as remote from communism as was Constantine the Great's

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Roman Empire from early Christianity. Communism is an article of export, similar to Panslavism under the last Czars, an invention that was exported to Austria and the Balkans with the slogan 'Liberate the Slavs!' — while in Russia herself Poles and Ukrainians were being ruthlessly oppressed.

The fraudulent nature of the West-East antagonism begins with the false use of words. The West is no longer capitalist, the East is no longer communist: these are merely two labels, for the convenience of men too lazy to think. And nothing more.

Russia is not communist, but state-capitalist. The state rules the economy and owns the means of production. It administers the national industries in the same way as most European states administer their postal service, their railways, their telephones. For the mass of the workers, as for the consumers, it is a matter of indifference whether industrial enterprises belong to the state or to shareholders. On the other hand it is not a matter of indifference to the individual whether the police is subordinate or superior to the judges: whether arbitrary arrest and deportation to concentration camps is possible or not: whether the population is, or is not, terrorized by the police, stool-pigeons and informers.

An important difference Letween West and East is the question of whether the governmental party is above or below the state. The Soviet Union is a theocracy, a church-state: the Party is mistress of the State. There are no opposition parties, ready and anxious to replace the party in office. Elections are not free and secret, but open will therefore not free.

A significant difference between West and East is in the status of the peasantry. The Soviet government regards a free

peasantry as its mortal enemy. It makes every effort to transform the peasantry into an agricultural proletariat, whose factory is the collective farm, the kolkhose. The leaders of the Soviet Union know that there is no man under the sun more free than the peasant, who depends upon no master. That is why the Soviet system has reintroduced serfdom: but the peasant's lord is no longer the aristocratic land-owner but the state itself, and its representative, the director of the kolkhose. Once again, as in the age of serfdom, the peasant is tied to his plot of earth, without freedom of movement, and without liberty.

The West is at present no more capitalist than the East is communist. From year to year it becomes increasingly socialist. Great Britain and the Scandinavian kingdoms are semisocialist states. In France most of the large banks and many of the industrial enterprises are state property. Even within the citadel of capitalism, the United States of America, Franklin D. Roosevelt carried out a bloodless revolution directed towards socialism. Throughout the entire Western world, taxation is so high that it amounts to expropriation by instalments. But this socialist revolution in the West is being completed by stages, and without terrorism. Most of the political leaders in the West are not capitalists but impecunious intellectuals poorer men than the majority of their Soviet colleagues. Many of them are not only quite independent of capitalism: they are even its sworn enemies, disciples of Karl Marx just as are the communists.

The important difference between West and East is that the West holds fast to the principle of competition as the strongest motive for economic development, while the East believes in

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the superior efficiency of a state-planned economy. The same difference applies to politics. In the West the parties are rivals; in the Soviet Union the single-party system, without competitors, is the rule.

All these differences between West and East do not preclude a peaceful coexistence of the two systems. The ways of life followed by the inhabitants of these two worlds are less different than their political systems. Communist Yugoslavia, with its wholehearted connections with the Atlantic world, and democratic Finland, closely linked with the Soviet Union, offer proof that differences in political ideology constitute no obstacle to close, and even friendly, relations between states. In the second half of the nineteenth century the people of Russia, living a semi-Oriental life under an absolutist constitution, were more foreign to the rest of Europe than communist Russia is today. Yet the relations between the Cz trist Empire and its European allies were thoroughly cordial. The same relations could exist tomorrow between the Soviet Union and the world of the North-Atlantic Pact.

Europe should learn from the tragic experience of the religious wars. During the sixteenth century, Catholics and Protestants were convinced of the impossibility of peaceful coexistence. Each party attenanted to exterminate or convert the other, or else to drive its enemy into exile. Only after one and a half centuries of wars, massacres, executions and atrocities, did they both realize that peaceful coexistence was not only possible but imperative. Today in Germany, the bartlefield of the Thirty Years War, Catholic and Protestants form a single Christian party; any Catholic or Protestant who nowadays advocated a resumption of the wars of religion would be

locked up in a lunatic asylum. It is only to be hoped that communists and anti-communists will not require the experience of atomic war before they recognize the necessity and the advantages of peaceful coexistence.

An argument against this comparison with post-Reformation Europe is that Catholics and Protestants had fundamentally the same philosophy, whereas the Christian West and the materialistic Soviet Union are divided by an irreconcilable antagonism. But this argument is based on the premise that the policy of the West is an expression of Christian philosophy, and unfortunately that is not the case. The majority of Westerners are, in theory at least, Christians, but in general they are activated by selfish, and not by Christian, motives. Only a few of the leading statesmen of the West allow themselves to be guided by the ideals of Christianity. Many are atheists, materialists, heathens, cynics or hypocrites: in this respect they have no reason to condemn their Soviet colleagues. But in Moscow too it would be difficult to draw a line between the Soviet leaders' unselfish belief in the communist gospel, and their personal ambitions.

The political bible common to West and East is neither the New Testament nor Das Kapital, but Machiavelli's The Prince. As true Machiavellians the statesmen of both worlds ought to come together to find a way of preventing an atomic war: not because an atomic war would be the most monstrous crime, but because it would be the greatest folly, in the history of the world. An understanding between West and East is possible, because Bolshevism accepts the same fundamental morality as America, Europe and the civilized nations of Asia. Such coexistence would be impossible with a world power

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inspired by the ideas of national-socialism, because the national-socialists denied the moral values accepted by the rest of mankind and would replace them with the superman doctrine and the immorality of Nietzsche.

However, the prerequisite for a reconciliation among men is that Bolshevism should remain a politico-economic system, and not develop into a new world religion—for such a development would lead directly to a conflict between Christendom and anti-Christendom, with crusades, massacres, and the object of mutual extermination. But the danger seems hardly a real one today, since the Soviet Union has come to an arrangement with the Orthodox Church. It is to be hoped that a similar arrangement with the Catholic Church and with Protestantism will follow. Then the way will be open for an inner understanding between West and East: for true world peace.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE WAY TO PEACE

I. The Atomic War

or even the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are able to imagine the war of the future, so incomparably more fearful is the destructive power of the hydrogen bomb than that of the first atom bombs.

It could happen tomorrow in this way. Somewhere in the world a dispute arises between two small neighbouring states, one of which is in the NATO sphere of influence and the other under the protection of the Eastern bloc. Both sides have recourse to arms. Each declares the other to be the aggressor. The United Nations Organization is powerless. Frontier incidents are followed by the delivery of weapons. The mood of the Press of both East and West becomes ever more violent. There is talk of national honour, the future of the freedom of mankind, and socialism; of the spectres of world revolution and imperialism, of reaction and tyranny.

The denunciations of the Press are followed more slowly by diplomatic action. Everywhere a warlike atmosphere prevails and he who speaks of peace is branded as an enemy agent or a traitor.

Suddenly, and at the same moment as the declaration of war, hydrogen bombs are dropped from the sky.

In the meantime, the political and military leaders of East and West have boarded their aeroplanes and are directing

operations from the stratosphere — beyond the reach of the atomic cloud.

For millions of Europeans, Americans and Russians, the thunder of the explosions is their first intimation of the outbreak of war. A few minutes later death overtakes them. Many of them are just able to reach the air-raid shelters, but only to die there.

Atomic clouds begin to drift from the cities and to cover the countryside. The inhabitants of those towns and villages that have escaped a direct hit, flee from this lethal fog. The roads become blocked with the cars of frightened drivers. He who would save himself must run, and a race with the atomic cloud begins. Old and young, men, women and children, collapse from exhaustion, and death soon enfolds them with its gaseous robe.

Yet those who survive are even more to be pitied. The wells and the water, the seas and the food, are all poisoned. There is none to bury the dead or nurse the sick.

Against such a catastrophe, only a policy of peace and not of neutrality can offer protection. Even if the neutrality of Switzerland and Austria were respected, their inhabitants would also suffer destruction through the far-reaching effects of hydrogen bombs dropped on Strasbourg and Stuttgart, on Prague and Budapest.

From their headquarters in the air, the respective heads of government and commanders-in-chief would watch, while one after another their cities disappeared in a cloud of white smoke. The shock of this appeared in a cloud of white make them seek contact with the opposing enemy headquarters in order to put an end to the bombardment and to call a truce.

But to do this they would first have to find a safe landing ground far away to the south.

In the meantime, wind and air currents would bear the death-dealing atomic cloud around the globe, to Asia and Africa, Australia and South America, leaving behind it a trail of panic, death, starvation and disease. The fate of whole countries would be dependent upon the chance direction of the winds. The earth's atmosphere would in a short time become completely polluted, and for those who still lived, the price of survival must be paid in millions of deformed and mentally defective children.

2. Peace Through Strength

All mankind ought to form a united front against the danger of the threat of atomic war. But today, unfortunately, there is no 'all mankind', only a divided humanity, whose separate halves neither understand nor trust each other. Neither can rely on the promises of the other that atomic weapons would not be used in war.

Over and over again the demand is made that those countries that possess the atomic bomb should mutually agree to destroy all atomic weapons and to prevent their manufacture. But such a proposal is unworkable in the absence of international control. In America and England, Parliament and a free Press would probably ensure that such an agreement was kept. But who could prevent the Soviet Union from building somewhere in Siberia an underground factory for the production of the hydrogen bomb, unknown to the Western powers; so that in a few years' time they would be the only country in

the world with such a bomb at their disposal? In such a manner, with or without a third world war, Russia would hold the key to the mastery of the world.

Opinion is divided as to how far it is possible to exerciscontrol over the manufacture of the atomic bomb. This is a question that must first be solved by the experts, before it is tackled by the politicians. Until then there is only one defence against the hydrogen bomb: the hydrogen bomb itself. The Western powers cannot prevent the Soviet Union from destroying, one night, all the American and European manufacturing centres in a single vast attack, launched with no previous declaration of war. To this the Western powers have only one reply; to make it clear beyond all doubt that such an attack would, within a few hours, be answered with a counter-attack that would likewise lay waste the Soviet Union. It follows from this that any sudden attack with atomic weapons not only would result in murder, but would be a suicide pact.

Some maddened dictator like Stalin could perhaps bring about a double suicide like this, but not a political realist such as Khrushchev. These circumstances combine to produce what is almost a guarantee of peace, since it is of course recognized by the Western powers that an attack with atomic weapons against the Soviet Union would bring about their own destruction. Unfortunately no one can tell how the present internal Russian crisis will develop, or whether a new dictator, filled with dreams of imperialism, will not follow Khrushchev. It would therefore be foolish for the Western powers to regard the revolution in Russia as 1.7 l, or to build their plans for peace upon it.

Since the beginning of the world, two ways, not one, have

led to peace: negotiation, and force. Negotiation presupposes trust. When that is lacking, only one way is left: the way of non-aggressive power-superiority.

This method has proved itself efficient during the course of the last thousand years. It brought long periods of peace to the East as well as to the West: to China and Persia, to the Mediterranean and to Latin America. During the first decade after the Second World War, the United States, despite Stalin's aggressive world policy, made use of this method to prevent a third world war. They neither invited him by their weakness, nor provoked him by their strength, to make an attack upon the Western powers.

America, who possessed a world monopoly of the atomic bomb, pursued a policy of peace without parallel in history. Most European or Asiatic statesmen would have used this unique opportunity to ensure world peace, under their leadership, for many generations: the first provocation from Stalin would have been replied to with an ultimatum demanding the evacuation of the satellite states and the placing of atomic experiments under international control: either Stalin would have bowed to this ultimatum or, after a brief battle, the Americans would have laid down terms of peace: the Pax Americana: and Europe, not distant America, would have borne the brunt of the hostilities. America, by her renunciation of an imperialistic policy of this nature, gave unequivocal evidence of her peaceful intentions.

The policy of peace pursued by America was supplemented by a policy of military strength based on armaments and a system of alliances. When she voluntarily renounced the mastership of the world, she simultaneously prevented Stalin from

assuming the role. By her intervention in Korea, she made it clear to Russia that, although she desired peace, she was not prepared to avoid war at any price. Russia understood.

While carrying through the greatest armaments programme in the history of the world, the United States of America has at the same time formed the strongest system of alliances that has ever been known in time of peace, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization supplemented by the South-East Asia Treaty Organization.

By reason of this non-aggressive power policy, America has saved the world from a third war and Europe from a Russian invasion. This policy should be expanded: NATO ought not only to be strengthened, but where possible extended to include South America and Africa and thus to cover the whole Atlantic world to form a Pax Atlantica. From this position of strength, the West should endeavour to come to a lasting and sincere understanding with the East.

3. Coexistence

Trust cannot be fo.ced, but must be allowed to ripen on its own. It took the world five years to regain, through the efforts of the Adenauer government, that confidence in the German people which the National Socialist Party had destroyed so completely. In the same space of time the Soviet Union could, by a policy of sincerity, succeed in regaining the confidence of the West.

The attitude of the world ton rds Stalin's successors is more friendly than it was towards Stalin himself. The condemnation of Stalin by those who have succeeded him facilitates discussion.

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But the West must be on its guard not to interpret a crisis within the Bolshevik party as a crisis for Bolshevism itself. For to say the least, Stalin's successor is certainly as fully convinced a communist as he was. The ideas of Marx and Lenin remain the inspiration of his policy. Khrushchev also believes in world revolution. It may be that he feels this can be more suitably accomplished by precept and example than by war; if so, then conditions have already been established for peaceful coexistence between East and West.

One sign of this change of heart can be seen in the first partial raising of the Iron Curtain. The Western powers have every reason to encourage this development. They have nothing to hide from the East. The peoples of both worlds should be given the chance of seeing for themselves the way of life of the men and women living on both sides of the Soviet border. Through the intermingling of the nationals of East and West and by the exchange of books, newspapers, films, works of art and scientific discoveries, the world could gradually be led back to that state of unity which existed before 1914. Instead of the childish bugbears of Bolshevism and capitalism, there could be a growing recognition, both here and there, that on both sides men live out their lives possessed of the same virtues and failings, the same joys and sorrows, the same hopes and fears, and that the different systems of government under which the two sides live have not diminished this bond of brotherhood and humanity.

Above all else, in an effort to cultivate an atmosphere of mutual trust, East and West must put an end to their hostile propaganda and to their attempts to overthrow each other's governments by fifth-column activity. Instead, each must try

to prove by its services to its peoples that its system is the better of the two: both should learn that the world is wide and that there is room for more than one formula that will lead to the political happiness of mankind. The Western powers must accustom themselves to looking upon Bolshevism as a system that has a birthright equal, and not inferior, to their own.

Many Europeans and Americans treasure the illusion that democracy is the only stable form of government and that therefore rule by a majority will sooner or later replace rule by a minority; but unfortunately history has shown the contrary to be true. In the past the countries of Asia, Europe, Africa and America have almost always been ruled by undemocratic governments. Contented and powerful minorities have governed discontented but impotent majorities. Those in power had every reason to support a government of this kind; the unhappy majority, being powerless and in no position to revolt, did not even dare give expression to their discontent. This type of government has proved itself efficient since the time of the Pharaohs, the Babylonians and ancient China. It proves itself efficient today in the Soviet Union. The ruling class of bureaucrats and officers has no possible reason for overthrowing the government; and the discontented peasants have no chance to do so.

In the history of the world, democratic governments have appeared only as rare exceptions to the general rule. They have blossomed for a while, but soon fallen into the grip of anarchy or tyranny, or become dominated by a clique, a so-called aristocracy of power and privilite. The short-lived Athenian democracy was in fact never a true democracy, since it consisted of a small minority dominating a vast slave majority.

Rome developed from an aristocracy to a monarchy and was never a democracy. During the Middle Ages some city-republics had democratic governments for a short while. But even in Switzerland the reins of government were held for a century not in democratic hands but in those of the patricians of Berne. And in England as late as the twentieth century it was the aristocracy who, in spite of an elected parliament, guided the destiny of the country.

The democratic point of view began its victorious progress with the American Revolution. In less than two centuries it had conquered first America, then Europe, and finally the remote lands of Asia. In some countries it has proved itself more efficient than in others. The success of democracy presupposes a superior national education, a high standard of living and a robust humanism. When these conditions are lacking, there is a danger that democracy will degenerate into demagogy and thence into dictatorship. The future of democracy, as well as the future of communism, is for this reason in peril. It is possible that both these systems of government will one day be replaced by something entirely new.

4. Peace Negotiations

The Eastern and Western powers first discussed the question of peace when the heads of government met at Geneva in 1955. Such negotiations will go on for years, until they lead at last to some form of understanding between the two sides. They will not produce immediate results, for the problem is one of bringing the world back to its senses after four decades of hot and cold war. The discussions that led to the Peace of

Westphalia lasted for almost five years: and the problems that have to be solved today are far more complicated.

Results will be achieved more easily if as few statesmen as possible take part in these discussions. The ideal arrangement would be for all the NATO and SEATO countries to elect the President of the United States as their plenipotentiary and for the Eastern powers to give a similar mandate to the chief minister of the Soviet Union. Only when these two statesmen have agreed upon the terms of a peace treaty, would the terms be laid before a full peace conference.

To facilitate discussion, the sides should first agree on a common programme. Such a programme is not far to seek, since it already exists under the name of the 'Alantic Charter'—drafted by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in August. On January 1st, it was signed under the title of 'The United Nations Declaration' by fifty-four allied nations' representatives, including the Russian ambassador Litvinoff, acting on behalf of Stalin, and the document was reaffirmed by President Eisenhower and Sir Winston Churchill in the so-called Potomac Declaration.

A peace conference of this nature must above all attempt to resolve four questions:

- 1. the abolition, under international control, of atomic bombs,
- 2. the setting up of a world pool for the peaceful use of atomic energy,
- 3. the reform of the United Nations Organization,
- 4. the future of castern Europe.

There are of course many other questions as well, such as those

of Korea, Indo-China, Palestine, New Guinea, Kashmir and Formosa. A solution to these questions must either be found by compromise or be postponed until a more favourable opportunity arises. In the meantime they must be rendered innocuous so that they cease to form an explosive charge that could be touched off and lead to a third world war.

The toughest dispute between East and West is that concerning the East European satellite states that were occupied by the Red Army in the final phases of the war. Their communist governments were set up by force, under the protection of Moscow. Of all these countries, only Tito's Yugoslavia has so far succeeded, by her own efforts, in freeing herself from this guardianship. It was agreed between America, Russia and Britain at Yalta and Potsdam that the decision as to the ultimate destiny of the satellite countries should be left to the free vote of their peoples. But this free vote has never taken place; provisional governments have become permanent, and previously independent European countries have become dependants of Moscow. There can be no true peace between Russia and the West until a solution to this question is found.

It may be that, during the course of discussions on peace, the Russians will be able to come to some agreement with the satellite countries over the conception of freedom of opinion, and perhaps these countries, without breaking with Russia, will be granted the same degree of democratic freedom as Finland. To Europeans it seems a question of a vast land bloc, whereas to the Russians it is a mere matter of a small strip of land far to the west inhabited by unreliable and hostile peoples, infected with liberal ideas. Had Stalin wanted to bring these countries into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, he

would probably have succeeded in doing so; but he never attempted it. Instead, he did his best to avoid bringing his people, grown up in the Bolshevik ideology, into too close contact with the dangerous political ideas prevalent in the foreign lands. Moreover the technically advanced inhabitants of the satellite states provide growing competition with the Soviet economy.

The Russian protectorate over eastern Europe exists chiefly for strategical and not for political reasons. So long as the danger of a third world war remains, Russia will strive to push her frontier as far as possible to the west. When this danger vanishes—and this is the primary aim of the peace negotiations—so also will the principal motive for Russia's protectorate over eastern Europe. Should this ever happen, then Russia may withdraw from the satellite states as she voluntarily withdrew—despite all prophecies—from Manchuria, potentially the richest Asian province, and from Porkkala, the strategic key to Kronsta It and Leningrad.

Inextricably bound up with the future of eastern Europe is the question of the reunification of Germany. The 'German Democratic Republic is in fact only another Russian satellite. So long as Russia maintains her system of satellites, it is unlikely that she will relinque she her powerful position on the Elbe. The necessary conditions for the reunification of Germany will exist only when the Soviet Union, realizing that reunification would be a preliminary for peace with the West, arrives at some agreement over the right of the people of eastern Europe to the free expression opinion.

Thereafter, for the next generation, the future of Russia will lie not in Europe but in Siberia.

5. A World Truce

History shows that the conclusion of a peace has almost always meant a mere pause in the manufacture of arms: an interval for the preparation of new types of weapon. Both sides reserve to themselves the right, at a favourable opportunity, to break the peace treaty with a fresh declaration of war.

The purpose of such peace treaties, for what it is worth, is to put an end to an existing state of war, or at least to interrupt it. A temporary peace treaty of this nature between America and Russia and their allies would be pointless, since there is no state of war between them. A peace treaty between America and Russia would have a purpose only if it succeeded in changing the present uneasy truce into a lasting peace, exorcizing the danger of war, and banishing the sword of Damocles that today hangs over the heads of countless thousands of people. It is therefore only logical that pacifists of West and East are striving for a peace that will be enduring. A similar desire at the end of the Napoleonic Wars led to the Holy Alliance, and after the First World War to the League of Nations.

The achievement of a lasting peace presupposes the solution, through the stabilization of world politics, of the difficult problems still in dispute. An examination of these problems, however, shows that not all are soluble.

Among those that can be solved is the European problem. The nations of Europe, who have been fighting each other for the last hundred years, have today no differences that cannot be solved by peaceful means, and the time is now ripe for the

formation of a Federation of Europe, which will have the support of public opinion. The United States of Europe, like the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ought to be internationally recognized as a great nation of many peoples and diverse tongues. In this way an age-old focal point of world wars will be finally removed. The consequent withdrawal of Russian and American troops from eastern and western Europe would form an additional safeguard for peace.

The racial question is among the problems which for the time being must remain insoluble. The cause of peace would not be served by an attempt at an immediate solution. For example an endeavour to force the white population of South Africa, in the name of democracy and racial equality, to submit to the wishes of their black fellow citizens with their overwhelming majority, would result in the whites fighting to the last man to maintain that racial superiority on which their culture depends. There is also the difference of opinion between the yellow and white races concerning the settlement of the uninhabited parts of Siberia and Australia. Where two rightful claims are so diametrically opposed, force is the only arbiter.

In order to safeguard world peace, we must make up our minds to solve those problems that are soluble and to postpone those that are not. This me as the renunciation of the dream of everlasting peace in favour of a protracted truce between Washington and Moscow and their allies of West and East. A fifty-year world truce would be a realistic compromise between the unendurable situation of an ever-present danger of war and the vision of an enduring peace. The contracting parties ought to agree that the truce can be extended every ten years for a further decade.

This truce would give the United Nations Organization an added and stronger authority for the revision of its statutes with a view to the removal of the right of veto now held by the great powers. Moreover uno should control the ban on atomic weapons and carry out President Eisenhower's proposal for the building up of a world pool of atomic energy.

Apart from the problem of atomic weapons, the truce must not be allowed to bog down in questions concerning disarmament. International disarmament would not be a precondition of a truce, but the direct result of it. The absurd and pointless expenditure on armaments would cease with the gradual disappearance of the danger of war. Supplementary disarmament agreements between West and East would be welcome sources of economy to both sides.

It is argued with some force that there is no guarantee that such a truce would be observed; that it would be broken as easily as a peace treaty; that the most famous truce in history, the fifty-year truce between Athens and Sparta, called the 'Peace of Nikias', was broken after only three years. The answer to this argument is that it is just as illogical to refuse to make peace treaties because they are so often broken, as it is to refuse to make laws because they are so often disobeyed. A world truce would without any doubt be an additional guarantee of world peace.

It would however be very dangerous for NATO to sacrifice its present safeguards. There must be no question of that. The defensive alliance of NATO must remain as a security, in case the truce should prove insufficient for this purpose.

The conclusion of a truce of this kind would be easier in

practice than in theory. Theoretically, it is a matter of a treaty between about seventy states; in practice, this means between Washington and Moscow. If those who now hold power in the United States and in the Soviet Union were determined to put an end to war for the next fifty years, they would undoubtedly be able to do so. China, the third world power, needs at least fifty years to reach the industrial level of America and Russia.

In order to safeguard this fifty-year peace, Washington and Moscow must first prevent the outbreak of a Russian-American war, and secondly keep their respective allies under control. If nevertheless one of these states should attack its neighbour against the wishes of Washington and Moscow, then these two world powers could together, and without much trouble, put out the incipient conflagration before it had time to spread as the Suez campaign of made perfectly clear. Britain, France and Israel, attempting to occupy the Suez Canal and to overthrow Nasser, were stopped, not by the United Nations but by the combined vetos of Washington and Moscow: Europe's two greatest powers were unable to resist this double pressure. Thus we have seen that if Washington and Moscow were determined to join their forces to prevent a third world war, the danger would promptly vanish. Washington and Moscow have a mutual interest in sharing the monopoly of the atomic bomb with Great Britain and Canada and France alone, and in preventing the smaller states, when the costs of production become sufficiently small, from possessing Hbombs, wherewith they wound be able to blackmail the great powers and thus endanger world peace.

There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of

Americans and Russians would enthusiastically endorse a peace policy of this nature. America and Russia have never waged war against each other. They have no frontier problems. They belong to the same race. Both are under-populated and dispose of sufficient living space. The sole question that divides them is that concerning their respective political-social systems. As soon as Russia abandons her aim of spreading Bolshevism across America, and America stops her anti-Bolshevik propaganda, there will be no cause for a Russian-American conflict.

It is by no means impossible that a world truce would lead to a Russian-American entente. In 1898 England and France, as the result of the Fashoda incident, were on the edge of war. Six years later there came the Entente Cordiale. Again, who would have dared to prophesy in 1945 that ten years later Germany would be allied with England, and Japan with the United States? If in conjunction with a world truce an entente cordiale should be formed between America and Russia, then peace in the world would be assured, in theory and in practice, for many years to come.

No one can tell in what manner the world will change during the next fifty years. Many a question that today seems insoluble will in five decades have ceased to exist, and fresh problems will have arisen to take their place. The differences of political opinion which today divide East from West will perhaps, in fifty years' time, be of interest only to the historians. The crisis in the Soviet Union that started with Stalin's death and subsequent degradation can lead in the next few years to incalculable results. The political structure of the United States may also, in fifty years' time, have changed fundamentally: in

the year America may have become more socialist than Ruscia.

Unfortunately the racial controversy cannot be expected to diminish during the next decade; nevertheless, a change in the psychological approach to the problem is not out of the question. Anthropology may one day show the falsity of the present widely held belief that intermarriage between different races leads to degeneration. The fact that the English thoroughbred horse has a mixed ancestry, like the Newfoundland and Doberman dogs, can contribute as much to a revision of opinion in this matter as the facts that the Japanese derive from a mixture of Mongolian and Malayan races, and the Russians from a mixture of Caucasian and Mongolian races, and that the ancient Egyptians had negroid ancestors. Such a revision of present-day racial theories could lead to the peopling of Siberia with a mixed race of Russians and Chinese, and thereby to the solution of one of the most explosive problems that will eventually have to be faced.

6. The Great Peace

Every truce serves as a preparation for peace, and a world truce ought to be the preparation for a world peace. Not perpetual peace: for this, untortunately, is incompatible with the laws of biology and history, of evolution and life. Our object should be to attain peace for a long period of time, but not the eternal peace of Utopia.

Previous periods of peace is we been limited in space as well as in time. Most of them fell victims to attacks by outsiders; the Roman Peace was shattered by the hordes of the migration

of the peoples and the Japanese Peace by the guns of America and France. The Japanese Peace had endured for a quarter of a millennium, and but for American and European intervention would have lasted for much longer. The statesmanship of the Swiss people has succeeded in maintaining a Peace Union for almost five hundred years, while the rest of Europe has been torn by perpetual warfare. In view of this, it is not too optimistic to hope for a century of peace through a world union.

A peace union covering the whole world ought to be formed before the expiration of the world peace. This peace union can be a true safeguard only if it controls all the essential sources of power. There will always be a danger of war if there is more than one army in the world.

Only a world government can ensure the perpetuation of world peace. This government must be based on the federal system; it must control the present great federations such as China, Europe, the Soviet Union and America. Its activity must be limited to the safeguarding of peace: otherwise mankind will live under the threat of a totalitarian world dictatorship. A blueprint for world government must be drafted as soon as possible; for at any moment favourable conditions may arise to enable the scheme to be realized.

Although men are brought ever closer to one another by the development of the techniques of warfare and commerce, the confusion of languages still forms one of the greatest obstacles to international understanding and world peace. The Middle Ages knew only one international language, the Latin used by teachers and in the churches. In more modern times the language of France was used in diplomatic relations. The

various attempts to introduce an artificial language have all failed, and English has now established itself throughout the world as the international means of communication. Let us hope that the Russians or the Chinese will not attempt, on political grounds, to alter this state of affairs; for a knowledge of the English language disseminated by the educated classes through an ever-widening circle of peoples of all nations — so that it eventually became second only to their mother tongues — would at last exorcize the curse of the Tower of Babel. Explanations of problems are more easily understood when given in the same language as they are propounded in.

The problem of peace that now lies before us is twofold: the conclusion of a truce between Washington and Moscow as the preliminary to a true peace union, and the conclusion of the Great Truce as the preliminary to the Great Peace. The Great Peace is a problem for our children. Our duty is to prepare and introduce this decisive development in the affairs of mankind: the conclusion of the Great Truce is the historic task for our generation.

Exacerbated by incessant technological progress, man is approaching the most dangerous crisis of his history. This crisis can lead either to unimaginable catastrophe or to an incomparable renaissance. The tudy of philosophy and history shows no grounds for optimism, for the road that leads to a third world war is broad and paved with hate and stupidity, while only the narrow path of patience and insight will guide the human race towards the Great Peace. Man is threatened more by his own blindness that by the hydrogen bomb: and his illusions are as dangerous politically as was the Fata Morgana for travellers. In the midst of such dangers and in the

shadow of the atomic bomb, it is now more than ever worth fighting for the conclusion of the Great Peace. That same wisdom of spirit that enables us to live cheerfully and bravely under the shadow of death in a tragic and perilous world, will give us the strength and the will to achieve our purpose.